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Abstract
Learning allows organisms to predict and prepare for events in the environment
that are not sufficiently regular that responses to each situation could be genetically
hardwired. A possible categorization of what can be learned is as follows: First, an
animal may learn that an event is likely to happen. This means learning predictive
relations between events, or the probability that an event A occurs with an event B,
rather than independently. Second, they may form a representation of the magnitude
of the event. Third, animals may learn when an event is likely to happen, the
temporal relations between events. Fourth, they may acquire knowledge where
something will happen, the spatial relations between events.
The question arises whether these distinctions are merely convenient labels or
reflect genuine differences between dissociable psychological variables and perhaps
processes. The most widely accepted account of animal learning, associative
learning theory, assumes that information from all these variables is collapsed into
only a single output variable: the strength of an associative link. The theoretical
framework of associative learning has predominantly been developed and tested
within the domain of learning about predictive relationships between events,
weighted by event relevance. The requirements for navigation through space are in
some respects quite different. Animals can influence the rate and direction of their
passage through space. In the two or three dimensions of space shortcuts and detours
become possible. The computation of path length may require vector addition.
Possible goals of computation will be considered and compared to data on the
contents, acquisition and manipulation of spatial representations. The experimental
part of this thesis concentrates on two aspects of information acquisition, landmark
stability and blocking. Animals appear to weigh information from different sources
according to two different and normally opposed criteria, accuracy and reliability. If
discrepancy between two such sources is small, more weight will be given to the
more accurate source of information, if the discrepancy is large more to the reliable
source. The experiments on landmark stability suggest that manipulating
discrepancy throughout training will influence animals' estimate of reliability of a
source of information. Other manipulations of this estimate, independent from
discrepancy, are also possible. The experiments on blocking have not yielded a
simple result. Blocking occurs when the animals were trained with one of two
landmark arrays; the other array led to an enhancement of performance when testing
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with the added landmarks. In addition, previous work on the "geometric module" has
been extended and a novel weighting of landmarks by position in the array, rather
than distance from a goal, has been found.
It is argued that there associative learning can play a role in the creation of most
possible representations of space, but that some aspects of navigation involve
computations which associative learning is not capable of. Further, consideration of
the possible functions of navigation suggests that there is no clear dichotomy
between mapping and non-mapping strategies. The features of cognitive maps
derived from analogy with physical maps do not form an indivisible category. A
navigational system may have only some of these properties, depending on what is
required of it. The supposed incompatibility of cognitive mapping and associative
learning does not exist, both because there are several navigational strategies that
could be considered cognitive mapping processes and because associative learning
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A party of pschologists goes hiking in the mountains. After a few hours they are
completely lost. One of them takes the map and compass, takes the bearings of
distant landmarks, checks the position of the sun, and so on. After a while he says:
"Do you see that big mountain over there?"
"Yes?"
"Well, according to the map we're right on top of it."
X
Introduction
Learning allows organisms to predict and prepare for events in the environment CUciv
that are not sufficiently regular that responses to each situation could be genetically
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hardwired. A possible categorization of what can be learned is as follows: First, an
animal may learn that an event is likely to happen. This means learning the
predictive relations between events, or the probability that an event A occurs with an
event B, rather than independently. Recognition and categorisation may be included
here as it requires learning which features occur together in any particular situation.
Second, animals may form a representation of the magnitude of the event. This could
be the size of a food item, the rate of energy intake in a foraging patch or perhaps the
degree of injury and pain incurred from fighting a dominant competitor or a predator.
Third, animals may learn when an event is likely to happen, the temporal relations
between events. Fourth, they may acquire knowledge where something will happen,
the spatial relations between events. Knowledge about the reliability of estimates of
magnitude, temporal and spatial relations would raise the possible number of
variables to be represented from four to seven. Magnitude might even be subdivided
further into components of size and number, or intensity and duration, raising the
number of variables still more.
The question arises whether these distinctions are merely convenient labels or
reflect genuine differences between dissociable psychological variables and perhaps
processes. The most widely accepted account of animal learning, associative learning
theory, assumes that information from all these variables is collapsed onto only a
single output variable: the strength of an associative link. The theoretical framework
of associative learning has predominantly been tested and developed within the
domain of learning about predictive relations. Within this domain some phenomena
once considered a challenge have been absorbed into associative learning theory: for
example biological constraints in the form of associative predispositions, which may
be species-specific; or long delay learning, found most frequently, but not
exclusively, in taste aversion learning.
Another challenge to the general applicability of associative learning theory
comes from the study of animal navigation, which has computational requirements
that appear to be quite different. Animals can influence the rate and direction of their
passage through space, in the two or three dimensions of space shortcuts and detours
become possible and the computation of path length may require vector addition.
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The navigational competence of animals and its relationship with theories of
associative learning and cognitive mapping is the focus of this dissertation. To that
purpose I will attempt a characterisation and classification of spatial representations
and computations as well as examining how associative learning and/or cognitive
mapping can be applied to these problems. This will require some discussion of the
characteristics and constraints of both types of theories and how they relate to each
other.
A key argument is that some of the confusion surrounding the question whether
there are cognitive maps is due to there being numerous kinds of possible
navigational strategies, with varying degrees of sophistication and flexibility. Some
of these can be used in parallel and largely independently. Some may be integrated
into a single system. Two to five of these possible navigational systems could be
called cognitive mapping systems, depending on one's criteria. Likewise, discussion
of the applicability of associative learning suffers from an assumption that there is
only one, possibly two, navigational systems, all primarily landmark driven. I hope
to show that in most possible systems (that I was able to find) associative learning
could play a role, but that in only very few of these systems it could deal with all
necessary storage of information in memory.
Chapter 1 examines representations of the environment at a conceptual level.
What are the possible functions of representations? What kind of information might
be useful in a representation? Would there be one system storing and processing that
information or several? What are the relevant levels of analysis?
Chapter 2 elaborates on some of the points raised in section 1.5, the goals and
computational requirements of navigation, by examining navigational strategies using
information from either external landmarks or from 'path integration' or 'dead
reckoning'. In both cases several strategies of varying flexibility are possible. Some
relevant behavioural evidence is discussed, but due to the sheer volume of that
literature (and my limited familiarity with some of it) this review must necessarily be
selective.
The topic of chapter 3 is the integration of spatial information. I will argue that
dead reckoning and landmark information complement each other. Depending on
the level of sophistication of each strategy, the combination may be sufficient to
provide most of the capacities postulated for cognitive maps, even when neither
component on its own would be sufficient.
After these considerations of the contents and structure of spatial representations,
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chapter 4 will turn to the conditions of information acquisition, in connection with
my own experimental work on landmark stability. To keep this thesis reasonably
concise only those experiments will be reported that provided interesting results. The
numerous pilot studies will be ignored.
Chapter 5 will deal with another aspect of the conditions of learning, blocking and
overshadowing, and an experiment examining blocking in the spatial domain.
Chapter 6 contains the summary and conclusions. I will argue that contrary to the
claims of advocates of either cognitive mapping or associative learning, these two
theoretical approaches are not incompatible. This very much reduces the importance
of the question whether associative learning can account for navigation. There are
many possible navigational strategies, and the answer depends on what strategy is
being used in any particular situation. Likewise I suggest that there are several
possible systems that could be said to perform cognitive mapping. There is
experimental evidence for some of them, but not others. Questions about cognitive
mapping or associative learning in navigation are answerable, if care is taken in the
formulation of the question. The polarisation of this issue into a mutually exclusive
distinction between cognitive mapping and associative learning is misleading because
several issues are confounded.
3
1. Representations of the environment
This chapter examines the functions of representations, the operations performed
on them, and the implications of various assumptions implicit in theories of learning.
A fundamental constraint of associative learning theory is its insistence on a single
output variable, the associative strength. An alternative class of theories assumes that
primitive variables are stored and can be combined to produce derived
representations. This offers, in principle, greater flexibility, one of the proposed
characteristic features of cognitive maps. It also raises the question whether there are
specialised and distinguishable learning and memory systems. If so, what makes a
division into several systems necessary and what could be done within a single
system?
1.1. Some thoughts on the nature of
representations
The function of representations is to manipulate and combine information in such
a way that other information can be derived that is not directly available. This is not
necessarily a high-level 'inferential' or 'cognitive' process. For example, sound is
inherently directional. The ears of fishes have directionally sensitive hair cells
arranged in ordered fields. Information about the direction of a sound source is
available at the level of the sensory epithelium. Impedance matching between air and
the fluid surrounding the hair cells, and the required channelling and concentration of
sound energy, makes this impossible for terrestrial animals. They must derive sound
direction from intensity and phase differences between ears. The barn owl uses this
information to compute azimuth and elevation of sound in head-centered coordinates
and combines them in a two-dimensional map where direction is represented as a
patch of neural activity (Knudsen et al., 1987). On a slightly more abstract level, a
hummingbird could use a representation of the location and appearance of a patch of
flowers, together with the time since they were last emptied and the rate of
replenishment, to determine whether and when it is worth to visit this patch again,
without having any current sensory information about the state of this patch.
To fulfil such a function there must be some correspondence or isomorphism
between the representation and the environment. An isomorphism exists when the
mapping between entities in the represented and the representing system preserves
relations and operations, so that there is a relation between entities in the representing
system if and only if there is a corresponding relation between entities in the
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represented system (see Gallistel, 1990, for an extensive review). The reverse need
not be true, and in psychology is unlikely to be true, as the representing system may
not contain all properties of the represented system. The relations in the representing
system also may only approximate the relations in the represented environment, and
that possibly only over a restricted range that is particularly relevant.
Whether different computations are necessary to deal with different types of
information depends on the nature of the representations employed and the richness
of the isomorphism between the represented and the representing system. A neuron
responding to a feature is sometimes said to represent that feature. If the mapping
between represented and representing system preserves only presence or absence of
the feature the isomorphism is restricted to identity. This is the most impoverished
form of representation and it does not require any specialised computations. An
example of a richer isomorphism is mental rotation. The time required by human
subjects to match a sample stimulus to a rotated comparison stimulus increases
linearly with the degree of rotation (Shepard and Metzler, 1971). The inference is
that a representation of one of the stimuli is rotated and compared with the other.
This operation is equivalent to an operation that could be performed on a physical
object and presumably the computational requirements are different from those for,
say, timing a response.
1.2. Some relevant features of associative
learning theory
Learning about predictive relations has been studied extensively and successfully
within the framework of associative learning theory. In this review, associative
learning theory is defined as the assumption that learning can be adequately described
by specifying the strengths of associations between stimuli (or their features) and the
rules governing the change of associative strength (Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce and
Hall, 1980; Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Sutton and Barto, 1981, 1989; Wagner,
1981)
The asymptotic strength of an associative link is assumed to be proportional to
some aspect of the significance of the predicted event, such as average rate of food
delivery or strength of a foot shock. However, associative strength does not directly
represent the importance or size of the signalled event. It also depends on the
predictive relationship between conditioned stimulus (CS) and unconditioned
stimulus (US). It can be considered a compound representation of relevance: a
combination of the importance of the US and of the strength of the evidence for its
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imminent occurrence that is provided by the CS. Put another way, associative
learning detects statistical invariances and weights them by their relevance to the
animal. Rescorla (1968) found that the associative strength of a target depends on its
correlation with the US. i.e. how well it predicts the US. Wagner et al. (1968)
discovered that the associative strength of a target stimulus is also influenced by
"relative validity", how well other stimuli predict the US. When given a range of
stimuli that signal an interesting event, animals will concentrate on the best predictor,
to the detriment of other stimuli.
Additivity is largely preserved within this compound representation of relevance.
If two stimuli predicting the same consequence are separately conditioned to
asymptote and then presented simultaneously the subject will expect a US of larger
magnitude, a phenomenon known as overexpectancy (Kremer, 1978; Rescorla, 1970).
If the magnitude of the US does not change, the associative strength of both stimuli
will decrease. Alternatively, if a third stimulus is added it will become an inhibitor.
Inhibitory stimuli predict the absence or reduced magnitude of an otherwise expected
US. When combined with an excitatory stimulus of equal strength the overall
prediction will be the same as in absence of all stimuli. However, additivity is not
always strictly preserved. If a stimulus A has been trained to asymptote, and then
stimulus B is added and the US is omitted, B will become an inhibitor. If the
magnitude of the US is reduced, the strength of the inhibition should depend directly
on the reduction in magnitude of the US. If the US remains the samej inhibition, as
well as excitation, are zero. This is a blocking procedure. Instead it has been found
that reductions of US magnitude can lead to unblocking (Dickinson et al., 1976;
Dickinson and Mackintosh, 1979; Mackintosh and Cotton, 1980) rather than
inhibitory conditioning. This is one of the failures of the Rescorla-Wagner (1972)
model, whose central assumption is one of strict preservation of additivity.
If a CS is presented either in isolation or uncorrelated with the US subsequent
conditioning of this stimulus to the US will be retarded. Conditioning to a US of
magnitude A will also retard subsequent conditioning to the same type of US of a
larger magnitude B (Pearce and Hall, 1982). This phenomenon of latent inhibition is
usually described as due to a decrease of a learning rate parameter. A low setting of
the learning rate could be taken to represent a high degree of confidence that the
associative strength is set at the correct value. However, the learning rate only
influences the rate of change in associative strength, which remains the only output of
the learning process. The learning rate parameter is not directly accessible. By its
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nature it also would not allow an animal to distinguish between a highly variable rate
of occurrence and a transition from one rate to another, both with low variance.
The function of associative processes has sometimes been characterised as
"detecting and storing information about the causal texture and structure of its
environment" (Dickinson, 1980; p. 8). It is important to distinguish between
understanding the relationship between cause and effect and merely being able to
predict events. As Dickinson himself points out, "animals may not possess the
necessary sensory mechanisms to detect the actual proximate cause of a particular
event" (p.8). Just as importantly, it may not have the cognitive capacity to identify a
cause even if it does have the necessary sensory apparatus. This point is illustrated
by the studies of Visalberghi and coworkers (Visalberghi and De Lillo, 1995;
Limongelli et al., 1995; Visalberghi et al., 1995) using the trap tube task. A reward is
put into a transparent plexiglass tube. The subjects, monkeys or apes, are provided
with various sorts of stick, some immediately useful for pushing the reward out of the
tube, some only after modification. The tube may be replaced by one with a trap in
the centre. If the reward is pushed in the wrong direction, it will fall into the trap and
cannot be retrieved. Variations on this task showed that at least some of the apes did
show understanding of causal relationships. In contrast, capuchin monkeys (Cebus
apella) did not understand what made a particular tool or procedure successful. If the
trap was located off-centre, monkeys would still push the reward away from the
centre, even if that pushed the reward into the tube. If the tube was turned so the trap
pointed up, and the reward could not fall into it, monkeys still carefully selected the
direction in which to push the reward, even though that made no difference any
longer. They seemed to rely on associative rules, push away from the centre or away
from the trap, that failed when the task was modified. There is no known difference
in sensory capacities that could account for the difference. Rather than representing
causal relations, associative learning appears to be a specialised mechanism for
detecting correlations, weighted by their significance to the animal.
Associations may form hierarchies. Rescorla (1991) has reviewed evidence that
animals can not only form binary associations between a stimulus and a response (S-
R) a response and an outcome (R-O) and a stimulus and an outcome (S-O, more often
referred to as S-S association for Stimulus-Stimulus), but that there can also be
associations between a stimulus and a response-outcome complex (S-(R-O)). Of
those associations only the S-O, R-O and S-(R-O) associations can be considered to
represent a predictive relation. An S-R association is a consequence of responding to
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a previous predictive relation, an autonomous habit not requiring further processing.
Holman and Mackintosh (1981) have presented evidence that discriminative stimuli,
SD, which predict a contingency or R-0 correlation, and conditioned stimuli, CS,
form independent associations. An SD can block learning about another SD, a CS can
block another CS, but an SD cannot block a CS and a CS cannot block an SD. Despite
the evidence for separate associations, the account given by associative learning
theory is restricted to a compound prediction of the fact that an event is likely to
happen and of its magnitude, where an event may be a stimulus, the consequence of a
response or a contingency. Time and space can only be accommodated as attributes
of an event, no different from any other feature. Variability can only be represented
by discounting or nonlinear weighting of events. This necessarily confounds the
qo \.s.ao&S
mean of a variable with its statistical uncertainty. Where several events contribute to
the formation of an association, the associative link also cannot keep a record of the
individual events. Different event histories leading to the same associative strength
are indistinguishable (independence of paths). If during learning some form of
discounting occurred, and changing conditions make a different discounting criterion
more appropriate, then the association cannot be adjusted without further experience.
The necessary information has been lost.
1.3. An alternative approach
Gallistel (1990) disputes that associations are the primitive building blocks of
learning even within the domain of predictive relations and/or event magnitudes.
They can only offer compound representations of several variables, in the examples
discussed so far magnitude (for simplicity rate of occurrence has been lumped with
this), probability and statistical uncertainty. Gallistel argues that phenomena such as
overshadowing, blocking, latent inhibition and others, conventionally explained as a
consequence of competition for a limited total sum of associative strength or
associability, are in fact emergent features of the interactions between more primitive
variables. Rate is assumed to be computed from the number and size of individual
events, and the temporal intervals between them. Temporal intervals themselves are
said to be secondary representations, calculated from differences in time of
occurrence. In Gallistel's theory of learning, the variables contributing to an animal's
choice of action are explicitly and separately represented, and their isomorphism with
the corresponding aspects of the environment is rich. Numbers can be multiplied by
sizes; times and numbers can be added and subtracted. The product of number and
size can be divided by a temporal interval to yield rate. It is this richness of
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isomorphism and the versatility of computations that can be performed with these
representations of primitive variables that lead Gallistel to call this the computational-
representational approach.
Gallistel considers associative learning to be a non-representational or
subsymbolic theory, on the grounds that it must compound several of what he
considers primitive variables in a single computation. In so far as Gallistel's
postulated computations accurately describe behaviour, the single computation of an
associative strength must effectively combine the properties of all these separate
computations. If all computation took place in informationally encapsulated modules
and if only the final combined output were accessible to determine behavioural
output, Gallistel's theory and a suitable associative learning mechanism computing
the same function would be indistinguishable by behavioural testing. A distinction
would be possible only if the output of each of the computations Gallistel postulates
were to be individually accessible and could be passed on to other processing if
necessary. The representational approach would then allow increased flexibility.
However, it is not clear that associative mechanisms can perform all the computations
postulated by Gallistel. He argues they cannot. On the other hand it is not clear
whether Gallistel's characterisation of the computations performed by animals is the
most appropriate.
1.4. Levels of analysis
Gallistel believes that a computational-representational approach provides strong
constraints in the design of models of cognition. He argues that for every problem
there will be few, often only one adequate computational model. At first sight, this
appears to be in sharp contrast to Anderson (1990) who claims that for every
computation it is possible to develop an infinite number of mechanistic models, many
of them indistinguishable by their output and even the time course of computations.
The difference lies mostly in the level of analysis.
Anderson suggests four levels of analysis. The most abstract is the rational or
adaptive level, similar to Marr's (1982) computational level and related to optimality
theory. It is basically a characterisation of the problems posed by the environment. It
specifies the goals of computation. Under the additional assumption that often there
will be only a single best solution to a problem and that cognition adopts that
solution, it constrains possible solutions. The level of algorithm specifies the actual
computation performed. The level of implementation concerns itself with details
such as how many memory stores there are and what their capacity is, whether
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processing is parallel or serial, etc. The biological level deals with the operation of
neurons. Anderson makes two important points about these levels of analysis. First,
that ultimately only the algorithm level and and the biological level are directly
relevant to what happens in a brain. The rational level only provides the demands
posed by the environment. The level of implementation is only an approximation to
the biological one. It is necessary both because usually not enough is known about
the biological level, and to simplify analysis. Nevertheless, evolution only selects
computations to be performed, which are realised only on the biological level.
Second, that there is a problem of identifiability at the implementational level.
Work on formal machine theory has shown that there is an infinite number of
mechanisms that compute the same input-output function. The problem gets worse
the more complex the function is, as there are more possible ways of computing it.
Physiological data can help constrain choices, but need to be detailed to avoid using
the wrong constraints. Anderson remarks that three very different theories of
cognition have all been proposed and defended in terms of neural timing.
Occam's Razor and its incarnation as Morgan's Canon, that one should assume
that any given behaviour is controlled by the simplest possible mental process, may
provide a useful heuristic for choosing between hypotheses. Nevertheless, there are
several problems with this principle of parsimony. It is often possible to rank
different mechanisms of the same type according to their complexity, but it would be
hard to compare different types ofmechanism, for example a production system and a
neural network. Mittelstaedt (1961) pointed out that the same behaviour might be
generated by simple interactions between complex elements or complex interactions
between simple elements. Which system would be more parsimonious? A
quantifiable measure of simplicity and complexity would need to be applied, a
notoriously difficult problem (Cohen and Stewart, 1994). It is also necessary to
assume that evolution chose the most parsimonious solution, which is demonstrably
not universally true. For example, Heiligenberg (1989, p. 273) summarises research
on processing of electrosensory information in electric fish as follows: "The analysis
of brain mechanisms commonly reveals designs that human engineers would not have
chosen. Brains appear to be built rather sloppily and are full of imperfections and
patchwork which has accumulated in the course of their evolution" (for more details
see Heiligenberg 1987).
Parsimony does not appear to be a good criterion for choosing hypotheses on the
biological and implementational levels. Is it applicable at the level of algorithm? A
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parsimony heuristic has some of the limitations of an optimality analysis. Evolution
can only reach local optima, and there may be no evolutionary path to the most
parsimonious solution of a problem. It is also not clear why there should be
evolutionary pressure for parsimony as such. Simpler systems might be less error
prone, but then resistance to errors would be the trait selected for, rather than
parsimony itself. Further, what is parsimonious may depend on the assumptions
made about the function of a process. What appears unnecessarily complex for a
small task domain may be barely adequate if this process is a solution to a larger
domain of problems. Of course, the reverse applies as well. I suggest that the
principle of parsimony is a useful guide at Anderson's rational or adaptive level of
analysis. When determining what a behaviour is for, one should make the simplest
possible assumption. Parsimony is not applicable at the level of algorithm and
implementation, which is the level at which the distinction between associative and
other forms of learning is made.
Returning to the adaptive level and analysis of optimal solutions, Anderson points
out that the most difficult part of this approach is an adequate characterisation of what
a system's function is. This is illustrated by Gallistel's (1990) approach to navigation.
He assumes the purpose of animal navigation is to answer the question 'where is X?'
with X being either locations of interest to the animal, or the animal itself in relation
to relevant locations. These two are equivalent. This question leads him to assume
that effectively all animal navigation is based on metric maps of the environment. I
will argue that there are other questions one could ask of a navigational system,
defining a smaller task domain and requiring only systems simpler than metric maps.
1.5. Computational goals of and requirements for
navigation
In the most general terms, the goal of navigation is to have the capacity to reach a
specific location different from the current one. In other words, the question is not
'where is X?', but 'how can I reach X?' This destination X could be food, water or
another resource, or cover from predators. Animals that have a home need a way to
return to it. The most basic requirement for this is to recognise a goal location once it
has been reached. In the absence of any other information, a goal could only be
reached through a random walk. In a two or three dimensional search space this is
clearly too inefficient to be useful. A method of finding a reasonably efficient path to
a location is required. Recognition of a location once there will be taken for granted
from here on.
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The simplest possible way of returning to a place is to lay down a trail when
leaving and to retrace it later. Limpets can follow their own slime trails to return to
the spot on the rock where the shell exactly fits the surface and will provide a secure
seal (Cook et al., 1969; Blackford-Cook, 1969). Other molluscs use the same
strategy (Cook, 1977). Ants lay odour trails to recruit other foragers (Wilson, 1971).
This strategy does not require representation of spatial relations in any form. It is
computationally simple, but has several problems. If there are localised resources
and trails cross at a home location, the organism would have to mark return trails
from each resource differently in order to be able to choose between them. Revisiting
a resource it must retrace a possibly quite tortuous outward path. The trail may fade
with time. Until it does it could be followed by competitors or predators (Gehlbach
et al., 1971; Gonor, 1967; Paine, 1963; Webb and Shine, 1992) which may either use
and deplete the resource or eat the animal that laid the trail.
These problems suggest additional properties which would make a navigational
system more useful. It should be able to identify and find one among several possible
destinations. The path there should be reasonably efficient. Relevant information
should only be identifiable as such in memory, rather than recognisable by other
organisms. Information may be either internal (efference copies, vestibular and
kinesthetic cues) or external (visual, olfactory, auditory, magnetic, etc.). It may be
used either to find a direction that takes the animal closer to the goal, or to compute
the spatial relationship between agent and goal. Several strategies are possible.
If a destination has a conspicuous feature perceptible at a distance, the animal
only needs to recognise and approach this beacon. As the appearance of a visual
beacon may depend on the direction of approach, and as more details become
perceptible during approach, recognition under all those conditions can be a complex
problem. The navigational aspect is fairly simple. Sounds or chemical gradients may
also serve as beacons. Following an extended cue, for example a river's edge, is a
special case of beacon navigation. These methods of navigation have also been
called 'guidance strategies' by O'Keefe and Nadel (1978). Direct approach of a
perceptible beacon assures an efficient path. If a beacon is too far, chaining could
still make it possible to reach the goal, but it is not certain how efficient the path
would be. Identification of beacons allows choice between different destinations.
If there is no beacon, the next option is to store a "snapshot" or "local view" of the
environment as seen from the goal. (As use of these terms is quite inconsistent, it
must be made clear that in this manuscript they refer to image-like representations
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without information about distances of objects or the spatial relations between them,
other than their sizes and their separation on the image.) There are three ways of
using a snapshot for navigation. The animal may proceed by a chain of stimulus-
response associations from snapshot to snapshot until it reaches the goal. The
response may be any combination of turning through an egocentrically defined angle,
turning towards a cue or in a compass direction; and to travel for a specific distance
or until hitting the next familiar place. In these cases the snapshots are used only for
place recognition. Alternatively, the animal moves so that a measure of mismatch
between remembered snapshot and currently perceived scene decreases. Or else there
must be an algorithm that computes from the mismatch a direction that takes the
animal closer to the goal (Cartwright and Collett, 1983, 1987). This method
effectively creates a virtual beacon where there is none in reality. None of these
methods requires representation of spatial relations.
Information about metric spatial relations is needed to compute the costs of
travelling between, for example, patchily distributed resources. The time and energy
needed depend on distance and possibly terrain. Metric information is also necessary
to plan and execute a trajectory in the absence of continuous feedback. One way to
represent metric relations is through a list of landmark-goal and possibly landmark-
landmark vectors. The creation of a vector list requires the correct assignment of
distances and angles to the corresponding landmarks. Angles can only be defined by
reference to three points or two points and a direction. A vector list is not necessarily
internally consistent. Adding up two different series of vectors to the same
destination could give two different resultant vectors. If vectors AB and BA are
listed separately, there is not even a guarantee that AB is equal to the reverse of BA.
Finally, a map might be defined as an internally consistent representation where
information about all relevant aspects of the environment is integrated. It might also
be characterised as using only implicit representation of spatial relation, reducing
redundancy of stored information. This rather vague definition will be elaborated
later in relation to specific theories and models.
Internally generated information is, in the simplest case, only used to integrate
velocity and direction into distance from home, and memory of distance travelled is
reset to zero only at the home location. This is called dead reckoning or path
integration. It would not seem entirely appropriate to call something a representation
of space that contains information about only two points, home and the animal's
current position, the latter not even fixed. Retaining information about locations
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other than home becomes possible if path integration is initiated at these locations or
if the vector to home can be stored and reversed. Multiple journeys to points other
than home make it necessary to have an external directional reference at least at the
home location to prevent accumulation of directional errors while at home or on other
excursions. Return only to home may be possible by exclusive reference to internally
generated directional information because the time span of integration is shorter.
Internally generated information must necessarily be metric in order to be of any use
because it cannot by itself provide any feedback. It may be reset at specific well
known locations.
1.6. Associative learning in navigation
Given the restriction to a single output variable, the simplest associative accounts
of navigational competence involve trail following, beacon navigation or the
association of a snapshot with either a response or reward. If a snapshot is associated
with a response, the animal would follow chains of stimulus response associations
that cover the area an animal has previously traversed (Deutsch, 1960). The view of
the environment available at each location would trigger the response that takes the
animal to the next remembered location. This procedure would be relatively
inflexible and construction of an optimised route fairly slow. Alternatively, the
animal could move so as to reduce the discrepancy between a remembered and the
currently perceived scene. This requires at least a measure of discrepancy or the sign
of change, or better, an algorithm that provides the correct direction of movement
(see Cartwright and Collett, 1983, 1987). Multiple snapshots might be used to
construct a route longer than the range of any individual snapshot, or distal landmarks
might be used for long range navigation and proximal landmarks close to the goal.
Regardless of whether they are associated with response or reward, snapshots may
also be classified as one of two types. Either animals can disregard irrelevant
features in the same way as bees differentially weight nearby and far landmarks, even
when retinal size is equated (Cheng et al. 1987). Then contingency would affect
landmarks in the same way as any other stimulus in conventional conditioning tasks.
Rescorla (1968) found that the associative strength of a target stimulus depends on its
correlation with reward. Wagner et al. (1968) discovered that it also depends on the
relative validity of other, competing stimuli. Other commonly found phenomena are
overshadowing, blocking (Kamin, 1969), latent inhibition (Baker and Mackintosh,
1979; Lubow and Moore, 1959) and overexpectancy (Kremer, 1978; Rescorla, 1970).
The strengths of snapshot-reward associations should react to such manipulations in
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the same way.
Alternatively, all visible features of a scene could be included in the snapshot,
entering into a configural association (Sutherland and Rudy, 1989). The
manipulation of contingency necessarily introduces variability between exposures to
an environment. If a configural association must include all features, then this
variability will force an animal to create as many configural representations as there
are combinations of features. In the absence of generalisation, each combination
would be unaffected by learning of other combinations and there would be no
contingency effects.
Snapshot models appear to be the default assumption when associative learning is
applied to the spatial domain, but more complex interpretations of associative
learning theory are possible. I hope to show that there is no clear dividing line
between these and some cognitive mapping models. Discussion of this grey area will
be delayed until after a consideration of cognitive mapping.
1.7. Cognitive mapping
The minimal requirements to call a spatial representation a cognitive map are that
it should have internal consistency and give the ability to plan routes in advance,
including novel detours and shortcuts. The most influential definition of cognitive
mapping, by O'Keefe and Nadel (1978) went considerably farther. O'Keefe and
Nadel derived the properties of cognitive maps by analogy with physical maps and by
contrasting them with routes. Routes are said to contain little information, already
sequentially organised. Therefore they are assumed to be fast and easy to use, to
require no special strategies for encoding spatial information and they may not be
easily reversible. Maps contain a great deal of information without redundancy, are
relatively invulnerable to loss of information and more flexible. Their use requires
knowledge of the strategies used to encode spatial information, which takes more
time than reading out a route. As is normal in a physical map, the presence of an
object at any particular location can only be encoded in an all-or-none fashion.
Mismatches between map and environment are rectified whenever detected.
Mapping requires a stable environment. If a particular object keeps generating
mismatches by moving its location frequently, it must be excluded from the map. If
mismatches are frequent in a specific area, it has no stable structure that could be
mapped. "Whenever an organism attends to an object it is encoded in the map. ...the
locale system will work in such a way as to direct the animal's attention away from
objects it can predict towards those whose presence was unexpected.
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Incorporation of information about stimuli occurs in non-incremental fashion.
...variability makes it difficult, if not impossible, to build a useful map" (O'Keefe and
Nadel, 1978, p. 95). A further implication is that there should be no overshadowing
or blocking within the cognitive mapping system. The theory even permits the
prediction that learning about new cues could be facilitated as it would only be
necessary to make a new entry into an existing map.
Are there any other reasons for postulating a difference between spatial and other
learning? A fundamental issue is whether spatial learning differs qualitatively from
associative learning by virtue of certain unique features of space that do not apply to
the correlational/temporal domain in which the vast majority of studies of associative
conditioning have so far been conducted. For example, in a one-dimensional domain
there are no shortcuts or detours, which would require vector addition to compute
their lengths. Similarly, animals can influence the rate and direction of their passage
through space, but not through time. The use of cognitive mapping is a frequently
suggested solution to these problems (Gallistel 1990; Gould, 1986; O'Keefe and
Nadel, 1978), but is contentious (Bennett, 1996; Dyer, 1991; Wehner and Menzel,
1990).
It may be best to examine the necessary features of a map by comparison with
representations that are simpler than maps, yet are more complex than the snapshot
models described above. A map should be internally consistent. A representation
consisting of lists of landmark-goal vectors (Cartwright and Collett, 1986) would not
necessarily fulfil this condition. Assume an animal is travelling by one of two routes
from point A to point B. It has lists of vectors giving distances and directions
between points on these routes. Vector addition of the components of the two routes
may give two different overall distances and directions. If the errors along each
component are sufficiently small, this would not affect the usefulness of the
representation. Planning routes in advance requires an integrated representation of
metric parameters. Assume an animal has seen its destination, but must detour
around an obstacle and through an area that only allows another view of the goal at a
very short distance. This would be a common problem for a predator whose goal is
prey and the obstacle an area of insufficient cover. Determining the correct direction
and distance once the detour is completed requires knowledge of both distance and
direction of the goal at the point where it was last seen, and knowledge of the path
travelled since then. A snapshot algorithm cannot provide the first. The second
requires the ability to start path integration at any arbitrary point, then add that
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displacement vector to the last perceived goal vector. If an animal loses its way and
manages to find a familiar landmark, then in the absence of further landmarks it
would need to reset path integration to its current location. This is not an ability to be
taken for granted. Wehner (1996) found that once desert ants had reeled off the
return vector to the nest, from a feeding station surrounded by conspicuous
landmarks, they were unable to duplicate this same route when caught at the nest and
returned to the same feeding station.
1.8. Intermediate models
Both the standard associative models and O'Keefe and Nadel's cognitive map
model propose links between the contents and the conditions of learning (see
Dickinson, 1980, pp. 22-25). The associative models start with the study of the
conditions of learning, draw inferences about mechanisms (associative links) and
postulate representations and computations that best fit this mechanism. O'Keefe and
Nadel derived the putative properties of cognitive maps from analogy with physical
maps, and inferred from this representation likely computations and conditions of
learning. The proposed links between contents and conditions seem plausible, but are
not necessary. It is at least conceivable that contents and conditions are largely
independent parameters. Animals might use spatial representations richer than a
snapshot, possibly even maps, but that information could be added according to the
rules of associative learning. Blocking and overshadowing might occur because
adding information to the map entails a cost, for example time spent exploring rather
than foraging. Then not all available information would be incorporated, only as
much as is necessary at the time. As an example, a model recently described by
McNaughton et al. (1996) could bridge the gap between the two approaches. It is
suggested that hippocampal place cells encode location within distinct multiple
reference frames rather than a unitary global map (see also Gothard et al., 1996). The
representation of locations within a reference frame is preconfigured to be internally
consistent even in the absence of experience. The primary means of navigation is
assumed to be dead reckoning and landmark information gets added only secondarily.
This is assumed to be an associative process, while the structure of reference frames
would give map-like properties to the representation of space. Sutherland and Rudy's
(1989) configural association theory might also create a map-like representation if
spatial properties are assumed to be part of configural associations. In both cases the
specification of a location relative to landmarks would be a step separate from
associating that place with reward or response. In neither case is the type of
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landmark information yet defined in sufficient detail to make testable predictions
concerning its acquisition and use. The complementary suggestion, the
representation of space by associative links that are established according to rules
different from those found in conditioning, has not, to my knowledge, been put
forward in a coherent theory, though some models do use competitive learning for
restricted aspects of a task (see section 2.5).
1.9. Are there parallel systems?
The dispute over the nature of spatial learning is part of a greater disagreement
over whether there is a generalised learning mechanism or whether evolution has
provided a lot of specialised and possibly independent mechanisms, each adapted to
an aspect of its owner's ecological niche (Revusky, 1977; Rozin and Kalat, 1971;
Shettleworth, 1972). So what are the general arguments concerning parallel systems
of learning and memory, and what are the criteria by which this question should be
judged?
The modular view of cognition (Fodor 1983) assumes that the brain possesses
separate processing pathways dealing with information with different computational
requirements. These modules are characterised by being informationally isolated.
Only the output of a module is available to other processes. If the input to a module
was ambiguous and the output is incompatible with that of other modules, processing
may start again with altered input. However, intermediate stages of processing are
not accessible and cannot be influenced by information other than the normal input to
the module, even if that information should be relevant. A module's computations
may or may not involve learning. Modules are assumed to perform their
computations in a unique context. A structure that performs a specialised operation
and is replicated as a subunit in different processing pathways, or a structure that is
called up sequentially by different pathways to perform its operation, as a subroutine
in a computer program may be called up, would not be considered a module.
Modules may be served by a common memory system and retrieval mechanism or by
separate memory systems.
Sherry and Schacter (1987) suggested that functional incompatibility should lead
to the evolution of multiple memory systems. Functional incompatibility exists when
an adaptation that serves one function cannot effectively serve another function due
to different requirements for the solution of the two problems. Multiple memory
systems are said to be characterised by fundamentally different rules of operation.
Sherry and Schacter outline a strong and a weak version of this idea. "By the strong
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view, a memory system is a functionally autonomous unit in which the component
processes interact exclusively with one another and operate independently of other
such units. In this scenario different memory systems not only operate according to
different rules but also share no component processes. By the weak view, a memory
system is an interaction among component acquisition, retention and retrieved
processes in which any of the components can interact with processes outside the
system. In this scenario different systems share some components but are still
defined by specific interactions among the processes that make up the system".
The authors convincingly argue that an evolutionary analysis is applicable to
memory because it fulfils the two essential requirements: heritable variation and
effects on reproductive success. Heritable variation has been demonstrated in
Drosophila and transgenic mice (Dudai et al., 1976; Silva et ah, 1992). Several
examples show the importance of memory for reproductive success. In some species
predator recognition is mediated by observing the mobbing behaviour of conspecifics
(Curio et al., 1978). Dominance hierarchies, which spare both winners and losers the
costs of fighting in every encounter, rely on individual recognition. Altruistic
behaviour is only an evolutionary stable strategy if restricted either to kin, who are
likely to share that genetic predisposition (the inclusive fitness model of Hamilton,
1964), or to individuals who return favours (Trivers, 1971) and so also requires
remembering individuals. One of the most striking examples of the need for memory
comes from the study of food hoarding. It was originally assumed that food hoarders
did not remember the locations of their hoards, found them with no greater success
rate than other conspecifics and benefited from their own hoarding as much as from
that of others. Then Andersson and Krebs (1978) showed that hoarding was only
evolutionarily stable if the hoarding individual benefited more than others. The only
privileged information that is not available to conspecifics, and therefore capable of
providing that individual benefit, is memory. Since then food hoarding species have
been shown to rely on memory rather than other strategies (Cowie et al. 1981).
The basic preconditions for evolution do apply to memory. What remains to be
shown is a requirement for different memory systems and a plausible way of
achieving diversification. The example chosen by Sherry and Schacter to illustrate
functional incompatibility is the comparison between song learning and food
cacheing. The arguments are that
(a) restrictions on what is learned would mean that only certain classes of spatial
locations could be remembered,
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(b) a sensitive period would mean that only cache sites established at certain times
could be remembered,
(c) if memory were resistant to modification cache sites could not be forgotten and
birds would persist in visiting emptied cache sites.
In each case the assumptions underlying the argument can be questioned:
(a) It is taken for granted that a cache site is analogous to a song. Only then would
restrictions on learning mean a restriction on the cache sites that can be
remembered. An alternative possibility is that the type of cue chosen to
characterise a spatial location is restricted. Cheng (1986) suggested that only
geometric parameters are used to specify a location. Brodbeck (1994) found
that a food storing species in a delayed matching to sample task gave most
weight to global spatial cues, less to array based spatial cues and least to the
appearance of feeding stations, while a non storing species in the same task
had no preference. Predispositions to associate certain classes of stimuli, such
as taste with illness, can be accommodated by associative learning theory
(Revusky 1977).
(b) In imprinting the appearance of a sensitive period, defined as the time during
which learning can occur, seems to be an consequence of the imprinting
process itself (see Bolhuis 1991 for a review). On the other hand, if sensitive
periods are a consequence of developmental changes the concept cannot be
applied to memory for cache sites in mature individuals.
(c) To counter this argument one need only assume that the bird remembers not
only the cache site but also remembers emptying it. That birds do not simply
forget empty caches is shown by the finding that birds avoid cacheing in areas
where their caches have been pilfered.
Sherry and Schacter also suggest a functional incompatibility between a Memory
System I, which is "procedural", "habit", "taxon" or "semantic" memory and Memory
System II, which is "declarative", "locale" or "episodic" memory. The characteristic
feature of tasks performed by System I is the requirement for detection and
preservation of invariances across episodes, while System II has to preserve variances
to create a unique representation of each event. Even this might be adequately
described within a generalised associative learning framework by assuming a
difference in a learning rate parameter. A low learning rate would allow recurrent
features to overshadow rarely occurring features, detecting invariance. A learning
rate high enough for one trial learning would lead to recall of all features of an event,
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with associative strengths apportioned proportional to the salience of each feature.
This would preserve variance.
The major problem with Sherry and Schacter's emphasis on different rules of
operation is that they do not give a sufficiently precise description of what differences
cause functional incompatibility. They do not offer a convincing argument that there
are differences in task requirements that cannot be accommodated by parametric
variations. That may be due to the examples chosen (imprinting, song learning,
learning of stellar configuration and olfactory orientation in salmonids). Their most
striking feature is that none is concerned with predicting a sequence of events. They
might be better characterised as perceptual learning, though Bolhuis (1991) argued, in
the case of imprinting, that the differences between an associative and a perceptual
learning account may not be substantial. The argument for functional incompatibility
would still apply if parametric variation cannot be accommodated within a single
memory system, but Sherry and Schacter have not shown that this is the case. They
do point out that, strictly speaking, it is only possible to determine whether there is
functional incompatibility between two systems after a complete analysis of both, in
which case the concept does not contribute to analysis. They suggest that functional
incompatibility can nevertheless be useful by helping to refine hypotheses about
memory systems.
If the question is whether there are multiple distinguishable memory systems, then
the emphasis on rules of operation is not the most appropriate level of analysis. For
example, classical and operant conditioning are dissociable. They can be made to
have opposite effects through omission contingencies (reviewed in Mackintosh,
1983) and were shown to be independent in Holman and Mackintosh's (1981)
blocking study. This implies that operant and classical conditioning depend on
independent memory systems, yet there seems to be not even a suggestion that they
operate according to different rules. Performing different computations would be a
sufficient condition for the evolution of independent memory systems, but not a
necessary one. Another condition might be that some data streams are best kept
separate, Fodor's criterion of informational encapsulation, which could follow from
parametric variation. In the context of memory Systems I and II, a low learning rate
in an associative system would detect statistical invariance. A high learning rate
would preserve variance, but to avoid forming a large number of spurious
associations selectivity would be needed. High learning rates must be restricted to
channels where events occur only rarely. If interference is minimised, possibly
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through associative predispositions and context-specificity, learning is possible after
few or even one event, or over relatively long delays (Revusky, 1971).
I have one final criticism of Sherry and Schacter's review. They argue there is a
need for adaptive specialisation, but do not offer a plausible scenario for
specialisation that would leave the original function of a memory system intact. They
only offer a mechanism for specialised systems to become more generalised. This
would imply an overall evolutionary trend from many specialised memory systems to
few generalised systems. The process Sherry and Schacter suggest for generalisation
could cause specialisation with only one additional assumption. Exaptation or
preadaptation exists when a feature selected for a function A deals with that function
in such a way that, by chance, it is of some use for some other function B that may
become relevant later in the species' evolutionary history. Sherry and Schacter
suggest that by this process specialised memory systems will be coopted to deal with
new problems and become more generalised. However, if a feature is duplicated, as
is the case with the various forms of haemoglobin, then a mutation in one of the two
copies opens the way for differentiation. Worden (1991) suggests the hippocampus
contains multiple "fragment fitters" operating in parallel. That would provide a
possible substrate for more specialised memory systems, should the need ever arise.
Shettleworth (1993) argues that there is no single solution to the problem of
classifying memory processes and that most discussions of the topic "rely on implicit
pretheoretical assumptions, neither well justified nor consistently applied, about what
differences among learning phenomena are important". It is necessary to recognise
that learning phenomena might differ in a number of ways and that all learning is
specialised in some way. A neat division into general processes and specialised
adaptations is not possible. Consideration of how learning processes differ is
therefore more profitable than disputes over how fundamental any difference may be.
Learning processes may be classified and compared along any of the following
dimensions. The identity of the events responsible for learning and their specific
effects of behaviour: the association of taste and illness leads to avoidance of the last
novel food consumed while a suitable exteroceptive stimulus followed by a painful
stimulus will trigger one of the predator avoidance responses. The conditions of
learning: contiguity and contingency, relative salience, redundancy of stimuli, as in
blocking, the relative novelty of stimuli, similarity between CS and US, ISI and ITI,
etc. The contents of learning: what aspects of a situation are represented, details of
stimulus features, emotional significance, timing, location? The structure of the
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representation: associations of stimulus, response, outcome or some combination
thereof or perhaps a change in a representational structure that cannot be reduced to
associations? And finally, how does learning influence behaviour? A stimulus-
response association need only activate the response. A stimulus-outcome
association needs some mechanism to translate learning into performance. A
cognitive map needs at least a readout mechanism. If learning can differ along all
these dimensions, then obviously it can be specialised in each of these aspects.
Shettleworth then proposes that this bottom-up approach must be complemented
by a top-down approach. A consideration of function can guide both the search for
and the characterisation of specialised processes. In turn, specialisation can make it
easier to give a rigorous and quantifiable definition of function. The study of a
specialised process may then uncover principles of operation that also apply to
general processes, whose specific parameters can then be understood in terms of their
function, rather than appearing arbitrary. This relationship between function, or the
goals of computation, and algorithm is one of the topics of the next section.
1.10. The representation of variability
Animals live in a world of uncertainty. They normally do not have complete
knowledge of their environments, or even of the parts that are relevant to them. Even
if they had complete knowledge, some events may be stochastic, rather than
deterministic. Under these conditions animals can only make a best guess given
available information. It may be valuable to know just how good this best guess is in
order to assess the risk of acting on that information. A squirrel or bird should know
the carrying capacity of a branch before attempting to land on it. Branches that
appear identical to the animal will have a capacity varying about some mean. If
beech branches have greater variance than birch, then allowance must be made for a
greater safety factor.
Sensitivity to variability has been investigated in studies of event magnitude and
timing. Comparison of stochastic and deterministic models of optimal foraging
showed that optimal policies are different when animals have complete knowledge of
invariant factors compared to when there is stochasticity of energy intake rate
(Caraco, 1980; Oaten, 1977; Oster and Wilson, 1978; Real 1980; Stephens, 1981).
Whether it is better to avoid or prefer a variable resource depends on the animal's
situation. Stephens (1981) showed that the influence of variability on risk of
starvation depends on the expected mean rate of energy gain during foraging. If the
rate of energy intake is above the rate required to prevent starvation, the forager
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should chose, among two
food sources with equal
means, the less variable
one. However, if the rate
is below requirement and
reserves are low, then the
more variable source offers
a better chance of getting
lucky (Fig 1.1). This
reversal from risk-averse to
risk-prone behaviour has
been found in several
studies (Caraco, 1981, 1983; Caraco et al., 1980; Stephens and Paton, 1986). Taking
reproduction into account changes the optimal strategy again. If an animal's energy
intake is sufficiently above requirement that starvation risk is low, but reserves are
not sufficient for reproduction, switch to a risk-prone strategy offers a better chance
of reproductive success (McNamara et al., 1991).
Finally, it should be noted that sensitivity to variability of magnitude only benefits
an organism if the number of samples it can take is limited, for example in the case of
a small bird that must have sufficient reserves to survive the night. If the number of
samples is very large, the energy intake rate approaches the mean regardless of
variations. Honey bees send out a large number of foragers, each of which visits a
large number of flowers, and were found not to show risk-sensitive foraging
(Banschbach and Waddington, 1994).
Risk sensitivity has also been studied in the domain of the timing of events.
Animals prefer small imminent rewards over larger delayed rewards. If the interval
between small rewards is sufficiently short to give a higher rate of delivery, this is
predicted by the matching law (Baum and Rachlin, 1969; Herrnstein, 1961), which
states that animals match the proportion of investment into a resource to the relative
rate of return it provides in comparison with other resources. Kagel et al. (1986)
review evidence that animals often discount delayed rewards more than required by
the matching law. As a consequence, if both reward size and average rate of delivery
are identical in two patches, animals tend to prefer the patch with more variable
timing. This tendency increases the lower the animal's energy reserves are, as long
term gains are less important if the animal is too weak to pursue them. The temporal
Figure 1.1. Probability distribution
of the mean rate of food intake in
two foraging patches with a mean
rate above that required to prevent
starving (A) or below (B). If the
mean rate of food intake lies above
the requirement to avoid starvation,
the risk of starvation increases
with variability (shaded
areas on the left side
of the diagrams). If
the mean is below
requirement, the pro¬
bability of starvation






discounting beyond matching could be considered an adaptation to uncertainty. In
most natural situations an animal that goes for an immediate, but smaller reward has
time and opportunity to search for more, while the animal waiting for the delayed and
larger reward may lose it to a competitor, or may have to leave to avoid a predator.
Thus in all cases where animals are "risk-prone" in that they prefer variability, the
actual effect of this strategy is to reduce risk. This must be kept in mind when
considering the functional significance of risk sensitivity.
Switching between risk-prone and risk-aversive strategies when dealing with the
same variable is of special interest because associative learning is restricted to a
single output variable. Explicit representation of both a mean and its statistical
uncertainty is therefore presently beyond the scope of this approach. Is there some
way of taking risk into account without explicit representation of statistical error? In
the first example animals could give more weight to experience with weaker
branches. This lowers the estimated strength of beech branches compared to the true
mean (Dickinson, pers. comm.). Likewise, a bird whose expected reserves at the end
of the foraging period will be above the requirement for avoiding starvation could
give more weight to small amounts of reward found in a foraging patch, one below
requirement more weight to large amounts. This strategy is possible only if two
preconditions are met. First, the animal must have sufficient time to experience the
conditions that require discounting one way or the other. If two different learning
histories give rise to the same associative strength, the organism has no way of
distinguishing between them. This is one of the most basic constraints of associative
learning. Therefore it is impossible to distinguish between an associative strength
based on experience of an invariable mean or a higher or lower discounted mean. If
the required direction of discounting changes, this is only possible by new learning
under these conditions. This precondition is not always realistic. A squirrel or
gibbon on a foraging excursion will only aim for branches with an estimated strength
above the required, and chose the lower variability given the same expected strength.
If pursued by a predator, and given as the only possibility of escape a choice between
two branches of equal expected strength below requirement, the better choice is the
more variable one. This is one example where immediate reassessment is necessary.
In the experimental studies of risk sensitive foraging it is not clear whether transfer
between risk-prone and risk-averse behaviour is immediate when energy intake
crosses over to the other side of requirement. The data of first choices are not
reported. This means it is impossible to decide whether the animals explicitly
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represented variation in reward magnitude, or whether they used nonlinear and
deprivation dependent discounting of reward magnitude.
The second precondition is knowing which direction of discounting is
appropriate. This is not a problem in the two examples above, the estimations of
magnitude and timing. In the first case the appropriate strategy is defined by the
animal's energy requirement compared to its intake, both variables available from
monitoring its internal state. In the case of timing, the interruption-of-foraging
account predicts only preference for resources with variable timing. Space presents a
different problem, as illustrated by two examples of sensitivity to uncertainty in
human marine navigation. When approaching a coast it is common practice to head
to one side of the destination by slightly more then the estimated error. On reaching
the coast out of sight of the destination it is then known in which direction it lies. It
is not possible to discount the estimate of the direction actually taken because it is not
possible to know in advance whether accumulated random errors will take the ship
right or left of the destination. Before the development of sufficiently accurate and
reliable clocks, celestial navigation gave a far more accurate estimate of latitude than
longitude. When headed for an island, ships would steer for a point on the same
latitude, but directly east or west by a distance exceeding the expected error in
longitude. Discounting of direction is not possible for the same reason as before. If
the error is in two dimensions of movement, not bounded by either a coast line or a
latitude, a knowledge of the likely navigation error can serve a different function.
Assume a fisherman returns to a lobster trap. If it cannot be found within the radius
of estimated navigation error, the fisherman can give up and get on with other jobs.
The same would apply to any animal searching for an impermanent and
inconspicuous resource.
I have offered specific examples where explicit representation of statistical
uncertainty would be advantageous. More generally, access to such an explicit
representation offers greater flexibility. If the significance of a variable changes, as
in the case of variability when requirement crosses over to the other side of the mean,
an explicit representation allows to make that inference without further learning in
that situation being needed. It also appears that space is different from time and
magnitude in that discounting to take account of error is not possible even within
limited cases.
To my knowledge uncertainty in navigation has not been studied directly in
animals. However, some features of animal navigation may be considered
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adaptations to uncertainty. In triangulation experiments systematic errors in dead
reckoning take animals back not directly to the starting point, but make the return
path intercept the outward path (Seguinot et al., 1993; see also Maurer and Seguinot,
1995; Etienne et al., 1996). Presumably that gets them back to an area they have just
traversed and which should be familiar. Without this systematic bias, random errors
would be more likely to take them into unfamiliar terrain. A similar principle
underlies the desert ant's search pattern in the vicinity of the calculated position of its
nest. The ant runs in loops that expand over time, but always return to the point
where search was initiated (Wehner and Srinivasan, 1981). Search time distribution
is a two dimensional Gaussian. The loops centered on the ant's best guess of the nest
location allow error correction if the ant misses and comes near the actual location for
a second time. Studies that have some bearing on the subject of error estimation in
navigation will be discussed later in connection with landmark stability and in
chapter 3.
1.11. Summary
The manipulation of a representation allows organisms to derive information
about the environment that is not directly available in current sensory input.
Representations can differ in the richness of isomorphism between represented
relations and those in the environment, as well as in the range of inputs over which
the representation is at least approximately isomorphic to the represented system.
The basic assumption of associative learning is that several relations in the
environment, such as correlation, average magnitude, timing, location and their
variability, are compressed into a single output variable, the associative strength.
Different learning histories leading to the same associative strength cannot be
distinguished because no record of individual events is kept. Greater flexibility could
be achieved by separate representation of each variable and their combination in ways
appropriate to each situation. What is appropriate can only be determined after
careful analysis of the problems posed by the environment. In the case of navigation
that problem is how to reach a location of interest. Several strategies of varying
complexity are possible, from trail following over chaining of actual or virtual
beacons to vector navigation and the use of maps.
27
2. Strategies and models of navigation
This chapter deals with only a subset of the strategies derived in section 1.5 from
a consideration of the possible function of a navigational system. The focus is on
those systems that are obviously not straightforward in their use of cues. For
example, trail following and the approach of beacons only require the recognition of
and orientation towards the appropriate cues. Although continued recognition of a
beacon as it changes size and appearance during approach may be complex, the
navigational aspects of these strategies are too simple to be of interest here. Chains
of S-R associations rely on recognition of a stimulus configuration and execution of
an orientation and displacement response. They must either send the animal on a
ballistic movement that only stops when the next stimulus configuration in the
sequence is recognised, or else depend for appropriate displacement on the metric of
internally generated cues. The arrangement of landmarks is only used to recognise a
place. Information about relevant action lies in the association with response. There
is no question that associative learning can account for such a strategy and it is also
relatively uninteresting as far as use of landmarks is concerned. Therefore this
chapter will concentrate on strategies that use information from the arrangement of
landmarks to either calculate a directions that takes the organism closer to the goal, or
to compute the actual goal location, followed by various ways of using dead
reckoning. These strategies are more interesting in terms of navigation, and the
computations involved might be different from associative learning and are
interesting in that context, too. The chapter will roughly follow the outline of
navigational strategies given in section 1.5, from use of snapshots over metric
information derived from landmarks to landmark maps and, finally, dead reckoning.
Each discussion of a type of navigational system will be followed by an outline of
some relevant experimental evidence. The division between landmark maps and
those integrating both landmark information and path integration (discussed in the
next chapter) is, to some extent, arbitrary.
2.1. The use of snapshots in finding a goal
The strategies using external cues and having interesting navigational aspects
begin with the use of snapshots. An animal may have some measure of the mismatch
between a remembered snapshot and the currently perceived surroundings. The goal
could be reached by a biased random walk, with the probability of a random change
in direction decreasing the faster the mismatch decreases. This would be analogous
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to bacterial chemotaxis (Adler 1976), with the degree of mismatch serving as a signal
in place of the concentration of a nutrient. If the change of mismatch can be
measured directly, the animal can move in the direction that decreases mismatch
fastest.
Alternatively, the mismatch function could include a spatial component.
Cartwright and Collett (1983) conducted a series of experiments investigating what
properties of landmarks honey bees use to find an inconspicuous food source and
how they use this information. Cartwright and Collett developed five algorithms to
simulate the bees' behaviour. Only the one that provided the closest match will be
described here. The retinal image and retinal snapshot are modelled as light and dark
areas on a circle (Figure 2.1). The snapshot must be aligned with the compass
orientation in which it was taken. Collett and Baron (1994) found that bees likewise
adopt a stereotyped orientation during the last phase of approach to the goal. The
middle of each area on the snapshot is determined and paired with the middle of the
nearest corresponding area on the retinal image. This may lead to some areas being
paired with more than one other, other areas may not be paired at all. The two
variables that the algorithm attempts to match are orientation of areas and their
angular extent. If paired areas are misaligned the algorithm generates a unit vector
tangential to the retina such that movement in the direction of the vector would
reduce discrepancy. If there is a mismatch in angular extent of paired areas, then the
Figure 2.1. The snapshot
model of Cartwright and
Collett (1987). (A) The bee
learns a snapshot at the goal.
Landmarks are black discs.
(B) The nner circle is the
snapshot, the outer circle the
current view on the retina.
The bee's orientation, marked
by a tail, remains constant.
(C) Approach to the goal. (D)
The bee matches areas on the
snapshot with the closest
areas on the retina that have
the same colour. It flies
towards areas that are smaller
than remembered (in this case
landmarks and the two gaps
between them) and away from
areas larger than remembered
(the region without landmarks
behind the bee). This is
shown by radial unit vectors.
\ \ If an area is farther right than
\,Y remembered, the bee flies to
11 the right, as shown by
tangential vectors. The flight direction results from addition of all these unit vectors. The length of
unit vectors does not vary with the size of mismatch. Adapted from Cartwright and Collett (1987).
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algorithm generates a vector radial to the retinal bisector, pointing from the larger to
the smaller area. The lengths of the vectors are not related to the size of the
discrepancy. Addition of these vectors yields the flight vector. This vector does not
represent distance and direction to the goal. It merely points in a direction that takes
the bee closer to the goal.
An important feature of the snapshot is that it represents space only implicitly and
in a quite impoverished sense. A bee navigating by snapshot does not know where
the goal is, only how to get there. It does not know the distance of landmarks from
the goal, only their retinal sizes. It does not know the distances of landmarks from
each other. It does not even know the angles between landmarks, but only their
retinal coordinates, or the retinal sizes of the spaces between them. As a
consequence, an animal navigating by snapshot reacts to transformations of landmark
arrays in quite characteristic ways. Changing the distance of landmarks while
keeping their retinal size constant cannot have any effect on the final search location.
Changing retinal size of landmarks, by altering either the size of landmarks or their
distance from the goal, while preserving their compass bearings has little effect. Any
adjustment of search location would change the retinal coordinates of landmarks even
more, if the angles between them are larger than the angles subtended by the
landmarks themselves. For the same reason a change of angles between landmarks
would shift search location so that this angle was largely restored, even if that altered
the retinal sizes of landmarks. Because snapshot algorithms only give a direction
taking an animal closer to the goal, not even the exact direction of the goal, they
require constant visual feedback. If an animal was given a view of a scene close to a
goal and then deprived of visual input, it could not plan a route.
In the experiments that led to the development of the snapshot model, bees
searched for food marked by one or several landmarks in a white painted room,
measuring 4 m by 4 m. The position of the landmark array was varied systematically,
but its compass orientation relative to reward was usually kept constant. First, bees
were trained to search for food at three different distances from a single landmark.
They concentrated their search at a single location near the landmark, not in an
annulus around the landmark. The search distance correlated with the training
distance. There are three potential cues bees might use to determine their distance
from a landmark: motion parallax, looming (the change in apparent size when
moving towards or away from a landmark) and retinal size. Search behaviour was
most consistent with the use of retinal size as distance cue. Separate manipulation of
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Figure 2.2. Navigation by snapshot in honey bees. Bees were trained with an array of three landmarks
(A). The search peak is at the intersection of the three lines. Its location was not influenced by
halving (B) or doubling (C) the distance between landmarks and goal, nor by halving (D) or doubling
(E) landmark size. Adapted from Cartwright and Collett (1983).
the vertical and horizontal extent of landmarks showed that both are used to
determine distance.
When the bees were trained with an array of three landmarks their behaviour was
best described by the simple rule that they moved until the compass bearings of the
landmarks were correct. Given a choice between a location where either the
distances or the compass bearings were the same as during training, the bees
preferred to match compass bearings. Altering the size or distance of landmarks did
not change the location of search (Figure 2.2). Landmark size is not completely
ignored. When the middle landmark was removed there were three possible partial
matches of compass bearings. The bees chose the one that also matched landmark
sizes. After a rotation of the array of 30° relative to the training orientation the bees
still searched at the location specified by the angles between landmarks. If the array
was rotated 90° the search location changed. Training with arrays of varying
orientation had a similar consequence. If the array was allowed to assume any
orientation during training the bees searched indiscriminately over a wide area. If the
training orientation varied no more than ±45° from the orientation during the tests,
the bees searched in the area specified by interlandmark angles.
The bees accepted imperfect matches between training and testing location. To
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test whether they were at all sensitive to the fact that matches were sometimes not
perfect, they were trained to find food in a square, at the intersection of the diagonals.
The comparison array was a rectangle with diagonals of the same length as the
square, but different angles between them. The more these angles deviated from 90°,
the more the bees preferred the square. If the comparison array was kite shaped,
which changed the distance of one landmark, but not the angles between diagonals,
the bees showed no reliable preference for one array over the other.
Cartwright and Collett (1987) extended the applicability of the snapshot model to
long-range navigation by adding several features. First, bees are assumed to use
stacks or sequences of snapshots. As they fly from the hive to a feeding site they tick
off one snapshot in the sequence after the other. Second, dead reckoning provides a
rough estimate of the distance and direction from the hive of feeding sites and of
locations where snapshots have been taken. This requires reading out locations from
dead reckoning and storing them in long term memory. If a bee gets displaced it can
pull out the best matching snapshot and either return to the hive or, if capable of
vector addition, fly towards the feeding site. This will be discussed in more detail in
chapter 3. Third, the bee computes goodness of fit between snapshot and current
view. If all snapshots in memory fall below a threshold, it creates a new one.
Finally, the bee filters landmarks according to distance. At any location it can create
two or more snapshots by storing only landmarks within a certain range of distances.
The arrangement of landmarks very close to a goal will not be recognisable at a large
distance. Distant landmarks will not change their arrangement sufficiently when
trying to pinpoint the goal. By filtering when the snapshot is created, and storing the
filter setting so it can be used when matching the snapshot, the bee can adjust the
accuracy and catchment area (where the output of the algorithm takes the bee closer
to the goal) according to its needs. This does not require storage of distances of
individual landmarks, only of the range in which landmarks will be accepted. Bees
can determine distance through motion parallax (Srinivasan et al., 1989).
Cheng et al. (1987) provided evidence that bees weight landmarks according to
their distance. Bees were trained to find food in the centre of a square array of four
large blue cylinders . Two smaller yellow landmarks were close to the goal. When
the bees were tested with the larger and more distant landmarks alone they searched
in the centre of the square. When the smaller proximal landmarks were moved from
the training position, the bees preferentially searched at the location defined by the











distributions of 4 bees
trained with 4 large blue
and 2 small yellow
landmarks. (A) Training
array. (B - D) Displace¬
ments of the yellow
landmarks. From Cheng
etal. (1987).
there was a secondary peak in ^
the centre of the distal array.
Further evidence for
weighting according to distance
comes from an experiment with
a trapezoid array of two large
and two small blue and yellow
landmarks. From the goal the
angles between adjacent
landmarks and their apparent
sizes were equal. In tests with
either four small or four large
landmarks in a rectangle the
bees searched in the area that
w »
gave the best match of the two
small and proximal landmarks, even when large distant landmarks better matched the
training configuration. Weighting according to distance when the memory is stored
overrides a possible influence of distance on matching.
Bees also weight landmarks according to apparent size. They were trained to the
centre of a square array of two small and two large landmarks. Tested with a
stretched array they showed a preference for the goal location defined by the larger
landmarks. When tested with the small landmarks alone they showed no bias to
either side. With the large landmarks they had a strong bias towards the correct side.
In both cases the effect of differential weighting is more accurate definition of the
goal. Closer landmarks change their bearings more for a given displacement. At a
given distance the apparent size of a larger landmark will also change more than that
of a smaller landmark.
Distance estimation from cues other than apparent size can contribute to matching
memory and perception. Bees were trained with a trapezoid array of two large and
two small landmarks, with equal apparent size at the goal. Tests were conducted with
either only two small or only two large landmarks. If only apparent size contributed
to matching, both partial arrays would give equally good matches on either side. The
bees showed a small but significant bias in the correct direction in both tests. This
matching by distance did not occur in Cartwright and Collett's experiment where one
landmark of a square array was moved to produce a mismatch in both distance and
33
apparent size (see above). It is not clear whether in this case distance contributed to
navigation, or whether it was merely another feature, like colour and shape, that
contributed to matching landmarks to the snapshot. If bees can only use the
remembered distance between goal and landmark, this knowledge is only useful for
matching once the bee has reached a position with good correspondence between
perception and snapshot. Using knowledge of distance from other locations
effectively requires vector addition, which in turn would make snapshot navigation
superfluous.
2.2. Metric information from landmarks - Vector
navigation
The common feature of the navigational strategies discussed so far is that
travelling to a destination not visible from the point of departure is only possible
through route following. Despite increased flexibility, even the snapshot model does
not allow to plan a route in advance, except by chaining snapshots. In the absence of
metric information it is not possible to estimate the travel costs of novel routes.
Cramer (1995, reviewed by Gallistel and Cramer, 1996) showed that vervet monkeys
minimised route length by looking at least three locations ahead when planning novel
routes in a familiar environment.
One possible [y representation of space that includes metric information is the
storage of vectors between a destination and nearby landmarks (Collett et al., 1986;
Cheng 1988). If there is some discrepancy between vectors, the animal is assumed to
search at a spot that is the weighted average of all relevant vectors (Figure 2.4). In
contrast to a snapshot algorithm, metric information enables gerbils to execute a route
in the dark, after room lights have been switched off and visual feedback is no longer
possible (Collett, 1987). Vector representations also react to landmark displacements
in ways that are characteristically different from those of snapshot algorithms. As
discussed above, snapshots tend to minimise deviations from the remembered angles
between landmarks or their compass bearings. When a landmark in an array is
Figure 2.4. The vector sum yy g
model. If a landmark is
moved its landmark-goal
vector moves with it.
Determining the goal location
by a weighted sum of vectors
results in a search location on
a straight line between the tip
of the displaced vector and
those of the other vectors.
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moved, the search peak typically shifts not only in the direction of the landmark
displacement, but also perpendicular to it. If a destination is specified by landmark-
goal vectors, the effect of landmark displacement is quite different. As a landmark is
displaced, the corresponding landmark goal vector moves with it. If no other vector
moves, the weighted vector sum must lie on a line between the end point of the
displaced vector and those of all other vectors (Figures 2.4 and 2.6). If landmark
identity can be established reliably on the basis of their appearance, only landmark-
goal vectors need to be stored. If some landmarks cannot be distinguished by their
features, as is likely in natural situations, they must be identified by their spatial
relations to other landmarks. The possible number of vectors between N landmarks is
(N-l) + (N-2) + ... + 1, or N2/2 - N/2. If all possible vectors between a large number
of landmarks were stored, this would lead to a combinatorial explosion. If spatial
relations are explicitly represented in the form of vectors, one might expect that only
those vectors necessary for a task would be stored to keep memory load low. The
acquisition of information should be goal driven, in contrast to O'Keefe and Nadel's
characterisation of a map, which can be curiosity driven due to its efficient storage
scheme. Of course, like all efficiency arguments, this must be treated with caution.
2.3. The use of individual landmarks in mammals
and birds
Collett et al. (1986) conducted a series of experiments on landmark use in gerbils.
The results suggest that when gerbils are faced with discrepancies between training
and testing conditions, they do not compute a single best match based on global
parameters, but they use landmarks individually to find possible matches. Gerbils
were trained to search for a sunflower seed at a location in a circular arena, specified
by one or more landmarks.
In the first experiment the seed was hidden 50 cm in a consistent compass
direction from a single, rotationally symmetrical landmark. The landmark alone
cannot specify a point location, but only a distance. Nevertheless the gerbils searched
for food at a single location, roughly at the correct distance. They must have had
other directional information (see discussion of Etienne et al. 1986).
Gerbils can use a consistent direction between the start point and an array of
landmarks and goal as a directional cue. When the whole arrangement of start box
and landmarks was rotated and the distance between start box and landmarks was
varied, the gerbils ran straight from the start to the goal. If the start direction was
varied relative to the centre of the array, the subjects seemed lost and searched widely
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in the vicinity of the array. After further training with varying start positions the
gerbils searched in the appropriate position regardless of the start location. The same
animals were then trained to search for the seed when the light was switched off
during their approach, at a point 100 cm to 250 cm from the goal. The search
distribution was still centred on the goal, evidence that gerbils can plan a trajectory
and execute it without constant visual feedback. There were several controls for
spurious cues.
The results of experiments involving alterations of the array suggest that the
landmarks were used individually to determine the location of the goal. Gerbils were
trained to a goal in the centre of an equilateral triangle of identical landmarks. When
tested with only one landmark, they searched in three separate locations, each
corresponding to a different match of the remaining landmark to one of the three in
the array. With two or three landmarks there was only one possible match and search
was restricted to one location.
Another group received training with a seed placed to the south of two identical
landmarks (Figure 2.5). In tests with both landmarks search was concentrated on the
goal location. When one landmark was removed, the remaining one was matched to
either landmark in the array, generating two search peaks in the compass directions
appropriate for each match. There were also two search peaks when the distance
between landmarks was doubled. The gerbils' search was not determined by the
compass bearings of landmarks, as for honey bees. They searched where the distance
q ^ • »
and bearing from individual
^
landmarks were correct. Relations
4
between landmarks are taken into
i
account when identifying
landmarks. The landmarks in the
stretched array were correctly
p
matched to the eastern and western
landmarks in the original
arrangement, else each landmark
should have generated two peaks.
The gerbils were also capable of F'g"r^20L(A^0n,e °Hfthefining arrays used by Colett& r et al. (1986). The landmarks are shwon as black circles,
using spatial relations between 'he foodlocation is marked by a small triangle. (B)° ' Search distribution during tests with the original array.
landmarks to obtain directional (C) When tested with landmarks there were two peaks at
the bearings and distance appropraite for each landmark,
information or discriminate arrays. (D) When the distance between landmarks was doubled
there were also two peaks.
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Some animals were trained to find reward in the centre of an equilateral triangle of
identical landmarks kept in a consistent orientation during training. A test with the
array in the training orientation resulted in search concentrated in the centre. When
the array was rotated 60° the animals soon left the centre and searched at three
locations outside the array, producing a large central and smaller peripheral peaks.
This is consistent with the animals searching at goal locations defined by individual
landmarks. The same animals were then accustomed to approaching the array in the
dark. In subsequent tests they always searched in the centre. This implies that the
trajectory was planned using directional information from the array. Gerbils were
also found to be able to distinguish between arrays of identical landmarks arranged
either in an equilateral or scalene triangle.
These experiments show that gerbils have a spatial representation which either
explicitly contains or allows to recover information about the distance and direction
of a goal relative to landmarks. Gerbils' ability to complete a trajectory in the dark
also demonstrates that distance must be represented in a form that makes it possible
to compute the length of a trajectory. Directional information can be derived from
from properties of the array or other unspecified cues. Given the choice between two
arrays differing only in their orientation, the gerbils prefer the one that matches the
training orientation. The search pattern in tests with rotated or distorted array is
consistent with landmarks being used individually to specify the position of the goal.
Landmarks cannot be treated independently when an array must be identified on the
basis of the spatial relations between landmarks. Addition of vectors between current
position, landmarks and goal specifies a trajectory to the goal. When different
vectors point to different locations, a goal may be determined by computing a
weighted average, analogous to computing the common centre of gravity of several
masses. Vectors from landmarks close to the goal are given more weight. The data
do not allow to decide whether spatial knowledge is explicitly represented as a list of
vectors or whether the vectors are recovered from some other type of representation.
Further evidence for the use of weighted vectors, as well as quantitative data,
comes from a series of studies by Cheng (1988, 1989, 1990, 1992). He trained
pigeons to find food in a well, hidden under bedding in a square (160 cm by 160 cm)
enclosure close to one of the walls (Figure 2.6). During training a light blue
cardboard cue was mounted on the top wall, centred 50 cm from the right wall.
Search behaviour was analysed separately along up-down and left-right axes.
Initial control tests established that the search distribution in the absence of food
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Vector sum model
Matching of compass directions
Matching of angles between features
Figure 2.6. Cheng (1988) trained pigeons to search for food in a 1.6 m x 1.6 m square arena, 20 cm
from a cue card on the "top" wall and 50 cm from the "right" wall. When the cue card was shifted up
to 30 cm, the search peaks shifted only parallel to that movement. Matching of the compass directions
of cue card and the two nearest corners would have resulted in search at the locations marked by +.
When matching angles between cues, a perfect fit is possible for any cue card displacement,
somewhere on the broken curve.
and food well was centred on and roughly symmetrical about the goal. In the
presence of the landmark the peak was equally pronounced along both axes. Absence
of the landmark did not affect search distribution along the up-down axis, but
broadened the distribution along the left-right axis.
Displacements of the landmark along the wall only affected the search
distribution along the left-right axis, parallel to the wall. The location of the search
peak shifted with the landmark until an individual limit was reached, then remained
at that limit. The slope of the variable portion of the displacement function indicates
the relative weight of the vector between landmark and goal. An animal that only
paid attention to the landmark would shift its search exactly as far as the landmark
was displaced; the slope would equal 1. No attention to the landmark would lead to
no displacement and a slope of 0. The relative weight given to the landmark stayed
constant (shown by a constant slope through the origin) until a limit of landmark
displacement was reached, then the weight decreased with further displacements.
The spread of the search distribution increased along the left-right axis with landmark
shifts along this axis. The search distribution along the up-down axis was unaffected.
The data do not fit a model based on matching apparent sizes and compass bearings
(Figure 2.6).
Cheng (1989) extended these results in a study with two landmarks in the same
apparatus. The goal was located 20 cm from the middle of the top wall. The
landmarks were rectangular wooden blocks which were placed 10 cm and 40 cm
either side of the goal. In tests they were moved either parallel or perpendicular to
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the top wall. The results broadly conformed to the previous study, with shifts and
increases in the spread of the search distribution occurring only in the axis of
landmark shift. In addition, the pigeons gave more weight to the closer landmark,
consistent with Collett et al. (1986).
In the first experiment of a third study (Cheng 1990) a single wooden block, was
placed either 15 cm or 30 cm to the right of the goal. The spread of the search
distribution along the right-left axis was found to be proportional to the distance
between landmark and goal, corresponding to Weber's law. Data from Cheng (1988)
were reanalysed, confirming this result.
In the second experiment a landmark was moved diagonally, from 9 cm left and 8
cm down from the goal to 19 cm left and 18 cm down from the goal. The vector sum
model predicts that a displacement of search should occur only in the direction of
landmark displacement, due to the fact that the expected goal location must lie
between the locations specified by displaced and non-displaced landmarks. The two
birds tested with the diagonally displaced landmark showed significant shifts
perpendicular to the direction of landmark displacement. This pattern of search shifts
was replicated by Spetch et al. (1992) in a touch screen task, by Gould-Beierle and
Kamil (in press) testing Clark's nutcrackers in an arena and by Cheng and Sherry
(1992) with chickadees and pigeons.
Cheng argues that these result disconfirms the vector-sum model of landmark use.
He does concede that in these experiments the landmark is relatively more
informative about the goal position along the left-right axis, as it is much closer to the
goal than any other cue. Along the up-down axis the next wall is a good distance cue.
So a bird may only record that the goal is a specific distance from a vaguely defined
part of the wall. Cheng claims that this is not a landmark-goal vector because it does
not have a definite point of origin. Such a definition of a vector is appropriate when a
landmark is small compared to the vector's measurement error. If a landmark is
larger than this error, or even larger than the vector, then clearly the origin of the
vector must be specified with respect to local features of the landmark or with respect
to other landmarks. If these other landmarks are far away, determination of that
origin will be inaccurate. In this example the location of a top-wall to goal vector
could even have been determined partly by reference to the shifted landmark, and
would have moved with it. Alternatively, the results could be described in terms of
representations of distances and directions, with vectors decomposed into either
distances and angles or into orthogonal scalar components.
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The difference is more than semantic.
Although direction is represented in the brain
(Taube et al. 1990a, 1990b) the question arises
whether these components are accessible to the
animal when choosing where to search, or
whether only the end result of the computation,
complete vectors, is available. When
landmarks and their corresponding vectors are
displaced, these alternatives are
indistinguishable. When vectors are given Figure 2.7. The weighted average of two
complete vectors must lie on a straight line
definite starting points, but their directions are between their end points. The same applies
to decomposing the vectors into orthogonal
altered, a distinction can be made (see Figure scalars and averaging then. If direction and
distance are averaged separately, the
2.7). Cheng (1994) used this principle in a resultant vector will have the same length as
the two original vectors and the end point
series of experiments with pigeons. The must lie on an arc of circle. Adapted from
Cheng (1994).
direction of a vector was changed either by
rotating a directionally polarised landmark, or by training with two landmarks
indicating different directions, testing with one landmark and exploiting confusion
between them. It was found that averaging of polar vectors, or of radial distance and
direction separately, gave the better fit to the data. There is one problem with that
conclusion. As the effect is fairly subtle, data from four experiments were used. In
one of those experiments the landmark was placed in the centre of a circular tray,
with food close to the edge of the tray. A vector pointing from the edge to the
landmark would introduce distance from the edge into the averaging process, even if
only whole vectors are averaged. Only if the result is not changed by omission of this
experiment can Cheng's conclusions be accepted.
2.4. Interactions between landmarks
Most of the data on interactions between landmarks cannot distinguish between
vector navigation and use of a map. Many are silent even with respect to the
distinction between snapshot navigation and navigation using metric information.
Nevertheless, this section is included here, so that the description of mapping theories
can be directly followed by the relevant data.
Suzuki et al. (1980) studied the role of extramaze cues in spatial learning in the
eight-arm radial maze to compare the predictions of the cognitive mapping theory
(O'Keefe and Nadel 1978) with those of the working memory model of Olton (1978).
The maze was housed in a large cylindrical chamber to improve stimulus control.
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Seven different stimuli hung over the ends of seven of the arms. The eighth arm was
unmarked (Figure 2.8).
All animals were trained with extramaze stimuli present. They made three forced
choices and were confined on the centre platform for 2.5 minutes, followed by free
choices until the remaining five food pellets had been obtained. In control trials the
array of stimuli was rotated by some amount and then rotated back during the
confinement period. In rotate trials the stimuli were rotated and the arms rebaited
accordingly. In transpose trials the stimuli were randomly rearranged, and five arms
associated with stimuli which had not been chosen previously were baited. There
was no difference between rotate and control trials, while performance was disrupted
by the transposition. Two choices would be correct regardless of the cues the rat
might use (Figure 2.9). The rats' choices did not differ in these arms with
overlapping stimuli, but did differ between the transpose trials and the rotate and
control trials in the three remaining arms, where extramaze stimuli and possible
spurious cues provided different information. This indicates that the rats did not treat
the extramaze stimuli as simple beacons, but used them as a configuration.


















S: ACDFG S: ACDFG
O: EAGBHO; ACDFG
Figure 2.8. Diagrams showing the location of the extramaze stimuli before and after each stimulus
manipulation. Encircled letters indicate the stimuli chosen in the forced choices, underlined letters
their locations before the control and stimulus manipulations. Rats should choose the stimuli
designated as S if they use the stimulus cues in guiding their performance, while they should choose
stimuli designated as O if they rely on some other cues such as intramaze and extrachamber cues. Note
that S and O are dissociated with two overlapping elements in both rotate and transpose trials. (After
Suzuki et al. 1980)
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whether memory might be reset during the confinement. If the rats did reset memory
then, first, the number of different choices should be comparable to performance
without preceding forced choices. Second, the choices after confinement should be
unrelated to the forced choices. While the first condition was fulfilled after all three
types of cue manipulation, only after a transposition did the rats fail to avoid the
stimuli visited in the forced choices. Suzuki et al. took this to indicate that the free
choices were treated as a new trial, unrelated to the preceding forced choices. An
alternative interpretation is that the new configuration of stimuli was treated as a new
environment. This assumption generates a different prediction from the working
memory theory if "resetting" is taken to imply erasure of the memory of the forced
choices. In that case the rats should choose unrelated to the three forced choices if
the original configuration was restored after the free choices. If they treated the
changed configuration as a different place, restoration of the original arrangement
should lead to the rats avoiding the arms they visited in the forced choices.
Cheng and Gallistel (1984), intended to specify more precisely than Suzuki et al.
(1980) what properties of the configuration of cues are contained in the rat's spatial
representation. The experimental environment was designed to allow some
categories of geometric properties to be manipulated independently. If the rats'
performance was disrupted by conflicting information from two classes of properties
than both classes must be contained in the representation, else the rats could not
detect the conflict.
The geometries to be examined were selected on the basis of two assumptions.
The first is that "animals may have weaker representations of space, but they are
unlikely to have systematically wrong ones" (Cheng and Gallistel 1984, p 412). The
geometries to be investigated therefore should be Euclidean geometry and those that
can be derived from it by deletion of some properties. The second assumption states
that weaker representations can be derived by deleting properties not in any arbitrary
order: "an imaginable neural code cannot capture formally stronger relations while
failing to capture the weaker, more primitive relations" (Gallistel, 1990; p. 176).
A hierarchy of relations can be developed by characterising them through the
transformations that change selected sets of properties. Rotation and translation are
Euclidean transformations. Coordinates change while the metric properties,
congruence of line segments and angles as well as linear and angular distances, are
conserved. Affine transformations are equivalent to uniform stretching and
compression along arbitrary axes. Parallelness, ratios of distances within families of
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parallel line segments and cross ratios of angles remain unaltered. Using only those
and weaker properties no two triangles of any size and shape can be distinguished. A
square can be transformed into any parallelogram, but not into a trapezoid or kite
shape, as that would not conserve parallelness. Projective transformations conserve
straightness, collinearity and type of conic section (ellipse, hyperbola, parabola).
Considering only projective and weaker relations a kite shape could not be
distinguished from a square. Topological transformations are arbitrary stretches and
compressions. Only the concurrence of curves at a point is conserved. The hierarchy
stems from the fact that a given transformation alters all stronger properties while
conserving the properties of its own and all weaker classes. For example, a projective
transformation alters Euclidean and affine relations and conserves projective and
topological relations. The only relation that stands outside this hierarchy and can be
included or excluded at any level is sense, the distinction between right and left.
The experimental environment was a rectangular box, 120 cm by 60 cm, with
black walls. Four movable boards in the corners of the enclosure served as
landmarks (Figure 2.09). An affine transformation can be achieved by squashing the
enclosure, maze and landmarks by a factor of 2 along the long axis and stretching
them by an equal factor along the perpendicular axis. An equivalent procedure is the
Training arrangement Affine transformation
Reflection Diagonal transposition
Figure 2.9. An illustration of an affine transformation, reflection and diagonal transposition of an array
of stimulus panels (adapted from Cheng 1986)
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movement of each cue to the adjacent corner either clockwise or anticlockwise. In all
experiments the rats were isolated as well as possible from spatial information from
outside the box. In a first study, rats' search for food in the corners of this arena was
unaffected by a rotation of cues, while they were severely disrupted by both the
reflection and the affine transformation. Cheng and Gallistel concluded that the rat's
spatial representation must include both metric properties and sense. However, a
more surprising feature of the rats' behaviour came to light when they later realised
that affine transformation and reflection only test for metric relations and sense in
isolation if rats relied primarily on the landmarks in the corners. If the rats only paid
attention to whether the chosen corner has a long wall on the left and a short wall on
the right, or vice versa, metric properties and sense are tested in conjunction, not
independently. Either transformation moves a bait from a corner with a long wall on
the left and short wall on the right to a corner with the opposite arrangement. On the
other hand, such a representation does not enable a rat to distinguish between the two
corners on the same diagonal. A reanalysis of the data and further experiments by
(Cheng 1986) in similar rectangular boxes confirmed this second interpretation. Even
covering one of the long walls with white polystyrene to give a very salient cue to
break the symmetry did not improve performance.
To investigate whether rats were able to use featural information at all in this
environment, some were trained in a reference memory paradigm. During the first
test phase the enclosure contained corner panels and one white wall, in the second
test phase only the four corner panels. Under both these conditions rats learned to
choose the coorrect corner, though the rats found it easier to identify a geometrically
correct corner than to distinguish between the two geometrically correct alternatives.
In a third test the panels in the correct and the diagonally opposite corner were
removed. In principle, the global congruence of cue arrangement could serve to
identify the correct corner. However, while the rats still had a significant preference
for the correct diagomal, they did not discriminate between the two alternatives.
Cheng concluded that, first, featural information is discriminable, second, that the rats
still rely to some extent on shape to identify the goal and third, that featural
information in the geometrically correct corners was necessary for discrimination.
Although, in principle, just one panel in one of the adjacent corners is sufficient to
make a choice the rats could not use this information.
Finally, rats were unaffected by a diagonal transposition, an exchange of the
panels in the correct and the diagonally opposite corner (Figure 2.9). It changes
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distances and angles between cues and their cyclical order, but leaves the geometrical
relations between the shape of the enclosure and the corner panels in the correct
diagonal intact. Errors were, again, concentrated in the diagonally opposite corner.
Performance declined in a second phase, when tested with either a reflection or an
affine transformation. Errors were no longer predominantly in the diagonal with the
correct panel.
Gallistel (1990) quoted another experiment which was not included in Cheng's
(1986) paper. Between sampling and test phases of a working memory paradigm, the
arrangement of stimulus panels always underwentaf an affine transformation. After
the retention interval food was never in the same position as defined by Euclidean
geometry, but was still under the same stimulus panel and in the same location as
defined by affine geometry. The rats did not show any preference for either a
stimulus panel or a diagonal. Gallistel argues that despite the increased difference
between optimum performance using affine geometry (25%) versus featural
information (100%), the rats fall back on affine relations to identify the goal, but still
rely on geometrical information. An alternative interpretation would be that the rats
learned two (or four) locations in which food could be found: one (or two) with the
long wall on the right and the short on the left, and one (or two) with the long wall on
the left and the short wall on the right. Either way, geometry was more important
than the features of the panels.
Margules and Gallistel (1988) tried to test three hypotheses arising from these
experiments. First, the assumption that the occurrence of rotational errors depends on
the rats being disoriented with respect to the space outside the box. Access to
information from a larger frame of reference should disambiguate geometrical
information from the box. Second, if there is a conflict between the two frames of
reference the rats should react to it, but may still be able to establish their heading if
the smaller frame of reference is directionally polarised. Third, they hypothesised
that the reason for the rats' failure to use featural information was that the corner
panels were perceived as moving and therefore unreliable. This could happen if the
rat, on finding itself misoriented 180°, assumed that not its orientation was at fault,
but that the stimulus panels had moved. Training in an environment that avoided
misorientation might make the rats rely on the cue panels.
The same two boxes served as experimental environment. While neither of two
groups of rats was in any way isolated from the room in which the experiment was
conducted, only one group was offered stimulus panels in the corners of the boxes.
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Rats in both groups learned to find the goal equally well, without rotational errors.
When the orientation of the box changed during the delay, performance dropped
significantly. The groups with and without panels did not differ. In the next
experiment the rats were isolated from sources of information outside the boxes. All
rats were trained and tested with stimulus panels in the corners of the boxes. No rat
distinguished the ends of the boxes. The two subjects previously trained with panels
present did not have any advantage due to perceived stability of the cue during earlier
training.
Gallistel (1990) drew the following conclusions from this series of experiments.
He argues that there is a neural system which creates a Euclidean representation of
space and distinguishes between right and left. It uses only geometric information,
the shape of the environment, to establish the rat's location and orientation. Featural
information is only used to check the result after a geometric congruence has been
established and only local features, close to the goal, are taken into account. The
system takes only restricted types of information, performs specialised computations
and only the output, not intermediate stages of processing, are accessible to other
processes. If the output must be rejected the system goes through the whole
computation again, with altered parameters. It is informationally isolated or
impenetrable, meeting Fodor's (1983) criteria of modularity. This geometric module
has several scale of representation. If orientation, or possibly location, at one scale is
ambiguous, information from a larger frame of reference may be used to orient and
place the smaller frame of reference correctly. Shape is ignored at a small scale, such
as texture or the holes in some of the stimulus panels, at least for the determination of
orientation.
Gallistel offered arguments for impenetrability on both computational and
evolutionary grounds. One argument is based on the computational properties of
image alignment or template matching algorithms. Those algorithms may be divided
into local correspondence and global parameter-matching algorithms. Local
correspondence algorithms try to minimise the overall discrepancy between points or
features (sets of points) in the two images or shapes. Unless there is at least one
unique point or feature the algorithm may have to go through all possible translations
and rotations until it finds the best match. Where time or computational resources are
at a premium this is clearly a disadvantage. A global parameter-matching algorithm
computes descriptive parameters for the shapes to be aligned. The most commonly
computed parameters are the centroid and principal axes. Knowledge of these two
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parameters determines the displacement and rotation necessary to bring two shapes
into congruence. As centroid and principal axes are only determined by the positions
of points within a shape, a system using such an algorithm must be impenetrable to
nonpositional information. Like Cheng's rats, global parameter-matching algorithms
return as many solutions as there are axes of symmetry. However, this type of model
has the same problem as that of O'Keefe (1990; see below); the points used in
calculating these global parameters must be consistent over time. Where the
environment does not sufficiently restrict possible choices, they must be stored in
memory. Then they must either be identified on some basis other than the global
parameters that are computed from their positions, or else an iterative procedure must
be used.
The evolutionary argument for using only shape is most graphically put by
considering the problems confronting foodstorers such as Clarke's nutcracker.
During autumn this bird hides seeds in up to 33000 caches (Vander Wall and Balda
1977, 1981), of which it has to recover at least 2500 to 3000 in order to survive and
breed (Balda and Turek 1984). Between the times of storage and retrieval much
vegetation will disappear or be covered by snow. Surface features will change while
the large scale shape of the environment is much more likely to remain unaltered.
Even animals with no need to remember specific places over long intervals will
benefit from building a permanent representation of space using invariant properties
of the environment. If surface features were considered, this would introduce another
computational consideration. How much weight should be given to, for example, a
change of odour compared to a change of colour? If all factors to be weighted are of
the same kind, in this case geometrical, this problem is vastly simplified. In addition
to Gallistel's arguments, many features, for example a species of plant or a particular
ground texture, are likely to occur repeatedly throughout an animal's home range.
This series of experiments only shows that geometry is important for determining
orientation. It has not been shown that the same principle would apply to the
determination of location. It was also the shape of a single object that was so
influential in determining orientation. Would shape alone have as much significance
if it had to be reconstructed from the positions of discrete objects in an array or if
orientation was known and location had to be determined?
Poucet et al. (1986) studied the exploratory behaviour of hamsters when
confronted with an array of familiar objects. The subjects first had 15 minutes
familiarisation with the apparatus, a circular open field with white walls and
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surrounded by white curtains. During a 10 minutes interval a striped pattern was put
on the wall and four different objects were arranged in a square array. Then the
hamsters were put back for the first exploration session. The configuration of
landmarks remained the same for all animals in the second session. In the third
session the control group carried on with the original array (Figure 2.10). The first
and second experimental groups experienced a displacement of one landmark. In the
first experimental condition the displacement destroyed even topological relations.
The second displacement preserved topological relations. The third manipulation
was a diagonal transposition. Taking only the square array of landmarks into account
this is equivalent to a reflection, preserving all properties of Euclidean geometry. If
the striped pattern is considered part of the array then the transposition destroys even
topological relations. As a measure of exploration, the number and accumulated time
of contacts with each of the objects was recorded.
Exploratory activity decreased significantly in all groups from session 1 to session
2. It was reinstated in the third session in all experimental groups, but not in the
control group. Only the first experimental group showed a significant increase in
exploratory behaviour directed at non-displaced objects. In the other two
experimental groups exploration was directed only at displaced landmarks.
Displaced objects were always explored more than non-displaced objects.
The hamsters reacted to changes of only the spatial location of stimuli with
renewed exploration, supporting the hypothesis that exploration serves to familiarise
subjects not only with the features of objects, but also with their spatial relations.
Experimental group 1 treated the altered array as a new situation, investigating all
landmarks again. It is not clear from the data whether this is due to merely to a
quantitative difference (the displacement in group 1 was larger than in groups 2 and
3) or whether it was due to the specific spatial relations that were affected. Group 1
encountered an array in which even topological relations were changed. They
remained unchanged in groups 2 and 3, at least if the array of landmarks is considered
in isolation. Group 2 reacted to the same transformation that made no difference to
Cartwright and Collett's (1983) honey bees in a preference test. Group 3 selectively
explored the exchanged landmarks in a transposition ignored by the rats of Cheng
(1986). Any of the following factors might account for that difference: (1) The
hamsters did not need to establish their orientation with respect to the four objects
because they were not disoriented and the striped pattern could be an effective
polarising cue. The diagonal transposition changed spatial relations relative to the
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Figure 2.10. The configuration of
objects during sessions 1 and 2
(common to each group) is shown
on the left side; the configuration
of objects during session 3 for
each of the four groups is shown
on the right side. The place of
introduction of the subjects into
the apparatus is marked with a P.
Adapted from Poucet et al. (1986).
Expl
Exp2
hamsters' established orientation. (2) Array shape may be relatively less important
when it must be determined from the positions of several discrete objects. (3) The
shape of the objects is at a sufficiently large scale relative to the array to be included
in computations. (4) Featural information is more important early in learning.
Thinus-Blanc et al. (1987) extended this experiment, using the same apparatus,
landmarks and dishabituation paradigm. As in Poucet et al.'s study the control group
experienced the same square configuration of landmarks in all three sessions (Figure
2.11). For the experimental group A all landmarks were shifted 10 cm to form a
larger square than before. The transformation for group B was the same as for group
2 in Poucet et al.'s experiment: one landmark was shifted outwards along a diagonal.
Groups C and D experienced movements of the same landmark along the same
diagonal, but into the array. Group E was tested with the same landmark removed.
The control group habituated further. Group B increased exploration of the
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displaced, but not the non-displaced, object, replicating the results of Poucet et al.
(1986). Only in group B, where the movement of a single object expanded the array,
was selective re-exploration of the displaced object found. In both groups C and D,
where the object moved towards the centre of the array, exploration was non¬
selective. In Group E removal of a landmark led to exploration not only of the
remaining objects, but also of the location of the missing one. This indicates that the
hamsters were able to reconstruct the configuration from partial information.
The expansion of the array of landmarks in group A, moving all four objects as
far as the single object in B, did not trigger exploration. A reversal of that sequence,
from large to small array in group F, gave the same result: no exploration of the
altered array. As long as shape is maintained, the hamster did not react to alterations
in array size.
To establish whether the configuration was encoded irrespective of the nature of
its constituent elements, or whether the differential characteristics of the objects play
a role in the detection of the transformations, another pair of groups replicated the
array transformation of Exp B with identical landmarks. There was less exploration
in these groups. While exploration of the displaced object did increase in the
Experimental group, G, both compared to session 2 and compared to the Control, the
change was significantly smaller than the reaction of group B to the same
displacement. It seems likely that the lesser extent of reexploration in the test session
is due to less exploration, and therefore less habituation, in the more homogeneous
environment. In this respect, the properties of landmarks seem more important than
indicated by Cheng and Gallistel's (1984) and Cheng's (1986) experiments.
Considering the experiments both of Poucet et al. (1986) and Thinus-Blanc et al.
(1987) a pattern becomes apparent. Though these authors did not use Cheng and
Gallistel's (1984) classification of geometrical properties it seems too useful to
ignore. First, the animals reacted only to changes of spatial relations within the array
of objects, ignoring the walls of the arena, the curtains and the striped pattern on the
walls. Second, the only changes that did not lead to a renewal of exploration
preserved the shape of the array of objects, i.e. angles and ratios of distances between
objects (in groups A and F). Third, manipulations that either destroyed even
topological relations, or introduced an object into the area of the original array and
changed the shape, led to non-selective exploration of all objects (groups 1, C, D and
E). Fourth, displacements that altered sense, or all geometrical relations between





the area within the
original array (groups 2,
3, B and G).
This last condition
may indicate that the
space within an array of





shape of the array not
only by the spatial
relations between the
landmarks, but also as
an empty area. If a
single object is moved
out of this area, spatial
relations between the
remaining objects and
the shape of the empty
area are unaffected.
This is treated as an
altered, but recognisable
situation. If a landmark _.. XT > ,• ^ • c a > i ,■Figure 2.11. No reexploration occurred in Exp A, selective exploration
is moved into the area on'y 'n Exp B, exploration of all landmarks in Exp D and C. Deletion
of a landmark in Exp E led to exploration of the empty spot E when
that should be empty, comPared to another neutral area of the same size, N.
the shape of the area now enclosed by the new landmark array does not fit memory.
The configuration is treated as completely novel. This hypothesis is especially
interesting because of a problem Worden encountered when implementing his
fragment fitting theory (1992) in a computer model. He found that he had to include
representations of empty areas to limit the number of fragments the system tried to
create to fit the available data (Worden, pers. comm.).
All the interpretations advanced above are based on the assumption that the
subjects' representation of space is allocentric. As the animals were always
introduced into the apparatus at the same point, whether exploration might have been
triggered by a mismatch in the view from the starting point. However, this does not
explain the lack of reexploration in groups A, C and F. The changes in the
configurations of their arrays should have been visible from the starting point. The
assumption of allocentric representation is probably correct.
Tomlinson and Johnston (1991) used a similar dishabituation procedure to study
hamster's knowledge about the spatial location of olfactory cues. Two objects were
placed 25 cm apart in a circular arena. They were identical except for the odour cue
they carried. The control group was exposed to the same arrangement of odours in all
three sessions. For the experimental group the odours swapped places in the last
session. In the first experiment the animals were always introduced into the arena at
the same location. The only procedural difference in the second experiment was
introduction of the animals at the opposite side of the arena, so that an egocentric
representation would trigger a change in the control, but not the experimental group.
In both experiments the control groups continued to habituate in the third session,
while exploration increased significantly in the experimental groups. The results
show not only that hamsters acquire knowledge about the location of olfactory cues,
but also that this knowledge is contained in an allocentric representation.
2.5. Mapping - Integrating landmark information
The next step in the integration of landmark information is to build a unitary,
internally consistent representation. O'Keefe and Nadel's (1978) characterisation of
cognitive mapping has for many years been the most influential one. Primarily
intended as a theory of hippocampal function, it has some weaknesses as a theory of
navigation. O'Keefe and Nadel's derivation of the properties of cognitive maps relies
strongly on analogy with physical maps and contrasting their properties with those of
routes.
Routes are goal-centered and not necessarily reversible. From a point A one may
be able to reach B simply by heading towards a conspicuous landmark located there.
While in this way B can be approached from any direction only one direction leads
back to point A. For a different example, to reach a cottage somewhere on a hill one
may start walking along an inconspicuous forest path until reaching an open valley,
turn and follow a stream until the cottage is in sight. When returning one may easily
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miss the entrance to the path. Routes are also inflexible. If a landmark has been
missed, was not recognised or has disappeared, the remaining information may be
useless. Only landmarks that can guide either directly to the goal or back to some
point on the route make it still possible to reach the goal.
Maps are relatively invulnerable to loss of information, are flexible, require
knowledge of the strategies used to encode spatial information and are slower. They
allow planning of novel routes, including shortcuts and detours. They are said to be
efficient storage devices that contain a great deal of information without redundancy.
As outlined above, explicit representation of distances between locations leads to
combinatorial explosion if all possible relationships are included. This implies that if
efficiency of storage is to be a characteristic feature of a map, then it must rely on
implicit storage of spatial relations. However, in that case all spatial relations must
be recovered from the map by a readout mechanism. In order to determine the cost of
an excursions in terms of time or energy, this mechanism must look up at least
distances between points, possibly also the type of terrain and how easy it is to
traverse, whether a detour is necessary, and what detour would be most appropriate.
That means that most of the interesting features of the system would be not in the
representation, but in the process that reads out that information. This point tends to
be overlooked, because map reading appears to be so easy and natural when using a
physical map that we tend not to notice it. O'Keefe and Nadel provide no
characterisation of map reading in computational terms. They only offer some
hypotheses regarding the physiological implementation. This is acceptable in a
theory of hippocampal function, which O'Keefe and Nadel intended to propose, but is
a major weakness in a psychological theory of navigational competence. When
trying to derive predictions from this theory, it is necessary to consider whether a
feature of interest is a property of the representation, the method of data acquisition,
or the readout mechanism.
O'Keefe (1990) developed a more detailed model of cognitive mapping.
Locations are assumed to be represented by reference to an origin and reference
direction for vectors with polar coordinates. The model does specify a readout
mechanism that can provide the displacement vector to a goal. The origin of the
coordinate system is the centroid, defined as "the geometric centre or centre ofmass
of the cues in the environment" (O'Keefe 1990, p. 306). It is calculated by taking the
grand mean vector of the cue vectors. The reference direction is the eccentricity,
determined by averaging the slopes of all possible lines between pairs of landmarks
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landmarks, b) The eccentricity is the average of slopes AY/AX. If the egocentric axis becomes
parallel to a line between two landmarks, AY approaches zero and the slope approaches infinity. As
defined the eccentricity is not invariant. A principal axis would be.
(Figure 2.12). The slope of the lines is defined as AY/AX where the y-axis is the
polar axis of egocentric space. Whenever the line between a pair of cues is
approximately parallel to this axis, AX approaches 0 and the slope approaches
infinity. As the eccentricity is the average slope of all these lines it will also
approach infinity and will be parallel to the polar axis of egocentric space whenever a
line through any arbitrary pair of landmarks is parallel to this axis. The eccentricity is
not invariant with rotation and therefore has little value as a reference direction in an
allocentric representation. I will therefore assume that instead it is equivalent to the
principal axis of an array of landmarks. It is not clear to me how the polarity of the
resulting line would be computed. The choice may be arbitrary.
The original theory of O'Keefe and Nadel (1978) emphasised the resistance of the
locale system to loss of information. The proposed model of O'Keefe (1990) is not
resistant to such loss of information if coordinates are assumed always to be
determined in relation to centroid and eccentricity, because both centroid and
eccentricity would systematically shift if landmarks were removed. Landmarks
farthest from the centroid would have the greatest effect. Consider the landmark
array in figure 2.13. Removal of the landmark at the apex of the triangle will change
the eccentricity by 90° and will move the centroid farther than removal of either
landmark at the base. A vector from the centroid to a goal should be displaced and




Figure 2.13a (above). Array of three landmarks, A, B, and C. CABC
= centroid of landmarks A, B, and C; CAB = centroid of landmarks A
and B; CBC = centroid of landmarks B and C; CCA = centroid of
landmarks C and A.
Figure 2.13b (right). Removal of landmark A moves the centroid
midway between B and C and rotates the principal axis or eccentricity
by + or - 90°. The centroid-location vector is displaced and rotated
accordingly. Whether this rotation would be clockwise or
anticlockwise is not determined by the model.
giving them lower weights. Weighting landmarks according to their distance from
the animal would make centroid and eccentricity dependent on the animal's location.
Weighting landmarks according to their distance from the centroid would necessitate
an iterative procedure, significantly adding to the processing demands.
Another problems becomes apparent when taking into account the influence of
measurement errors. Consider the arrangement of landmarks and goal in figure
2.13a. A subject tries to return to a location far from the centroid but close to a
landmark. Even if the location of the centroid has been determined without error, it is
likely to have a larger error than a vector from landmark A, at a smaller distance
(Weber's law, as observed by Cheng, 1990). Therefore this landmark should be given
more weight, but this is not possible because the model only allows the definition of a
location with respect to the centroid and the eccentricity. This problem could be
avoided if the animal determines its location by reference to the closest landmarks,
and uses knowledge of their coordinates to determine its own global coordinate. In
that case the location of the origin of the coordinate system can be arbitrary. There
would be no reason for calculating the centroid.
Most of the problems of the model originate in the insistence on the
representation of locations by exclusive reference to a global coordinate system.
Clearly, the model requires at least an extension so that it can use multiple frames of
reference for separate groups of landmarks.
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In another paper O'Keefe (1991) appears to make a move toward such an
extension. He attributes the calculation of the centroid to hippocampal CA3 cells,
"each ofwhich makes an estimate of the centroid on the basis of the limited subset of
cues available to it. These minicentroids form a matrix that uniquely identifies each
place in every environment" (p. 232). Knowledge of the location of some
minicentroids may allow the determination of the location of other minicentroids or
the overall centroid, perhaps by a process of pattern completion rather than averaging
minicentroids. There are two preconditions. First, the subsets of cues must be
consistent, else there can be no consistent matrix of minicentroids. Second, it must
be possible to specify a location without reference to the overall centroid. In this case
the overall centroid becomes again redundant and the model becomes similar to
Worden's (1992) fragment fitting model. In summary, the eccentricity as defined by
O'Keefe (1990) is not invariant with rotation and cannot provide an allocentric
reference. The centroid is redundant because location of the origin of the coordinate
system is arbitrary. The two main parameters of this model do not fulfil their
intended functions.
The central feature of Worden's (1992) fragment fitting model is the existence of
multiple frames of reference, though derived from considerations of computational
efficiency. Navigation requires the storage of a large amount of information and its
rapid processing. If processing capacity were distributed amongst the memory
storage, for example a topographic mapping of the environment to the surface of the
cortex or hippocampus, with an active area of processing around the current location,
only a small area would be active at any one time. This would waste much processing
capacity, in contrast to, for example, retinotopic maps whose whole area is used.
Worden proposes that processing would be separated from the long-term memory,
loading into a short-term memory only currently relevant information. Selection of
what is relevant requires breaking up information into smaller portions. A
compromise must be made between very fine divisions, making many decisions
necessary regarding what is relevant, and creating big chunks of information, where
at least portions of any one chunk are likely to be irrelevant. Worden suggests that
"fragments of terrain data ... may refer to large or small areas of terrain; but whether
large or small, a fragment gives information about only a small number of objects in
the terrain." As the selection process here matches consistent sets of landmarks in
long term memory to the perceived environment, the problems of 'Keefe's centroid
model are avoided. Worden also does not attempt to fix the origin of a global
56
coordinate system. The term "fragment" is synonymous to other's "reference frame".
As the information content of each individual fragment is relatively small there
must be a large number of them to cover all of an animal's navigable range. This, in
turn, necessitates an effective retrieval mechanism which is assumed to be
associative. The retrieval mechanism could select fragments containing features
matching those currently perceptible, or fragments containing a goal location.
Whether large- or small-scale fragments are chosen would depend on the range and
accuracy of navigation required. Knowledge which fragments are relevant and
perhaps even in which fragment the animal is located is not in itself sufficient. The
navigational processor must also determine position within fragments and assemble
fragments into a larger map. The assembly of a map is assumed to proceed in
parallel, in a number of loosely-coupled fragment fitters, each trying to optimise the
fit of one fragment at a time into the overall model.
Finally, this leaves the problem of how to allocate multiple fragments to multiple
fitters without duplication or assigning fragments relevant to the same area to the
same fitter, which could retrieve only one of them. Fragment fitters also create new
fragments when necessary. If this takes place only in a fitter left unoccupied after all
relevant fragments have been loaded in, this should only happen if that fitter's
memory contains no relevant fragment. If there is no fitter free, available information
should suffice to solve the problem. For that scheme to work the fitters need good
criteria for what information is relevant.
For the purpose of local navigation within a fragment the animal stores in short-
term memory two-dimensional vectors representing the positions of nearby objects
and its own position. Worden advocates position vectors from the origins of unique
allocentric coordinate system in each fragment, on the grounds that an egocentric
representation would require parallel updating of all subject-landmark vectors. This
could lead to different errors accumulating in each vector, thereby degrading the
quality of the map. This should not be a big problem. If a fragment covers a small
area the animal will not have much opportunity to accumulate errors before entering a
freshly fitted fragment. Also, the computational demands of direct landmark-subject
vectors are less than those of a single vector in a coordinate system. Before the single
vector can be used, the origin of the coordinate system must be determined by
reference to the egocentric positions of landmarks, adding one computational step.
Each fragment contains the following types of information: (1) the geometric
relations between objects, (2) non-geometric properties of each of the objects or
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places, (3) the bearings and other properties of visual cues visible from each of the
objects. A fragment can be retrieved because one of the objects forming its vertices
is matched, on the basis of its non-geometric properties, to an object already in the
map. The new fragment is displaced until the vertices containing the same object are
in congruence. It is rotated until the bearings of another object are the same in both
fragments. If the fragments have more than one object in common the new fragment
can be rotated until those objects are congruent. If this is not possible the fit can be
rejected. Computer simulations showed that these criteria did not always sufficiently
constrain the fitting process. If only some vertices matched a fragment already in the
map, then the remaining non-matching vertices would be treated as additions to the
map, predicting the presence and locations of new objects. The addition of
information about empty spaces allows the rejection of a fit that predicts the presence
of objects in places known to be unoccupied. Studies by Poucet et al. (1986) and
Thinus-Blanc et al. (1987) have shown that comparing the extent of empty areas to
previous experience may be a factor in deciding whether an environment is new or
familiar.
A variation on the fragment fitting process allows efficient retrieval of relevant
information when planning a route to a distant destination. Obvious criteria for the
selection of two fragments are the objects in the fragments that contain the goal and
the current position. Unless these two fragments have a common border the problem
arises how to select the intervening fragments. One possibility is to add on fragments
such that patches of fragments grow around current position and goal until a fragment
is found that joins the patches. The number of fragments selected by this process
would be proportional to the square of the ratio of the distance to the goal and the
average diameter of the fragments. Therefore a distant goal will favour retrieval of
large scale fragments. However, they may not provide sufficiently detailed
information to choose a route. Alternatively, fragments might overlap. Then large
scale fragments can contain small scale fragments, an interpretation consistent with
the results of Margules and Gallistel (1988), Etienne et al. (1990) and Dallal and
Meek (1990, see discussion below). Goal and current position would be connected
by large scale fragments. The retrieval of small scale fragments could then be limited
to those contained in selected large scale fragments.
Both these models share the problems caused by insistence on a coordinate
system, O'Keefe's model to a greater extent, because it is largely a model of how the
origin of the coordinate system is determined. The question arises whether it is
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possible to represent location without use of a coordinate system. The basic principle
of using a coordinate system in, say, a two dimensional space is to decompose
location into two components. In a polar coordinate system these are distance from
the origin and angle to a reference direction, in a Cartesian one two distances along
non-parallel directions. Its analog in using a physical map would be the specification
of location by the number pair of a grid reference. There is an alternative. On a
physical map one can specify a location by marking it, perhaps with a pen or by
putting down a token. Determination of spatial relations to other locations on the
map would still require a ruler and knowledge of scale, but is possible without using
a grid reference. In fact, many maps do not have a grid. Such direct analog
modelling, rather than decomposition of components, is also known in biological
systems. For example, the auditory system of the barn owl computes azimuth from
binaural sound delays and elevation from intensity differences. Then these two
components, rather than used directly as coordinates, are unified in a two-
dimensional map in which sound direction is marked by the location of a patch of
neural activity (Knudsen et al, 1987). The firing of hippocampal place fields can be
interpreted in the same way, as a travelling patch of activity, giving an analogue
coding of position in the environment. There is no topographic coding in the rat
hippocampus as there is in the inferior colliculus of the barn owl. I will attempt to
show, in appendix A, that this improves efficiency. In the meantime, for simplicity
and easier visualisation, it will be assumed that there is topographic mapping of
location of place fields onto locations of place cells. This analogue representation
without use of coordinates is a shared feature of several models of spatial
representation in the hippocampus.
Burgess et al. (1994) and Burgess and O'Keefe (1995) assume that place fields are
generated by the combination of input from cells with tuning curves responsive to
distance from a landmark (Figure 2.14). As a rat moves about an environment, its
place cells compete for sensory information. Normally, each cell ends up firing at
specific distances from two landmarks (though input from three or four landmarks
would prevent the multiple peaks that are possible with only two landmarks). Once
each cell that is to be used has a place field, the learning stage is over as far as the
map is concerned. In a new environment place cells can be recruited at random for a
new representation. Although this competitive learning establishes a link between a
pair of landmarks at specific distances, it differs from conventional associative
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Figure 2.14. Place fields in Burgess et al's (1994) model. (A) Each hippocampal place cell receives
input from two cells, each sensitive to distance from a specific landmark. Their receptive fields are
annuli round their respective landmarks. (B) The place field results from adding these inputs and
applying a threshold function that retains only the top 20%. In this example there are two
intersections of the distance-sensitive fields in the environment, resulting in a place field with a double
peak. The ambiguity could be resolved by either selecting landmarks that produce the second peak
outside the boundaries of the environment, or by adding directional information or input from a third
distance-sensitive cell.
does not need to predict place cell firing based on landmark distances, because which
precise place cell is assigned to a pair of landmarks is a completely arbitrary choice.
All that matters is that one cell does get assigned, and quickly. Which cell wins is
determined by the weights randomly assigned prior to any input. The determination
of place cell firing exclusively by pairs or subsets of landmarks has an experimentally
testable consequence. If the landmarks driving a particular place cell are moved, the
place field will move with them. Cells driven by non-overlapping sets of landmarks
will be completely unaffected. Those driven by some shifted and some other
landmarks will change their place fields in predictable ways. There should be no
systematic spatial relationship between the place fields that are influenced by a
landmark shift and those that are not.
The pattern of place cell firing can only provide information about present
location. The model includes a readout mechanism which, at the present stage of
development, consists of goal cells with firing fields large enough to cover the whole
environment. If there were a single cell, it would only be possible to determine
distance to the goal from the firing rate. A possible solution is to have a group of
cells whose fields surround the goal. The sum of their firing rates will specify
distance, their relative firing rates direction. If the goal cell with a field to the south
fires strongest, then the rat must be south of the goal (Figure 2.15). The fields of the
goal cells are placed appropriately through phase coding. Only in the middle of the
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theta rhythm is there maximal firing of
the place cell whose field coincides with
the rat's position. In the early phase cells
fire with fields behind the rat, in the late
phase cells with fields in front of the rat.
If learning of goal fields occurs only in
the late phase of the theta rhythm, and if
the rat turns in various directions once it Figure 2.15. At the goal the rat looks in several
directions and connects either directly the place
has reached a goal, fields in several cells, or intermediate cells with a large place field,
which lie ahead of it, i.e. those firing late in the
directions will be built up. The goal theta cycle, to goal cells. The sum of firing of all
the goal cells provides a measure of distance to the
fields must be large enough to cover the goal, their population vector specifies the
direction.
whole environment, because their
information is only accessible within their fields. In order to achieve that there must
be either an intermediate stage where input from many place cells converges to create
large fields (Burgess et al., 1994), or the model must make use of the different scales
of representation available in the hippocampus (Burgess and O'Keefe, 1995), with
cells in the ventral region having larger fields than those in the dorsal region (Jung et
al., 1994). In the latter case there could be separate sets of goal cells, some with
relatively small goal fields for accurate short range navigation, and others with larger
fields for displacements over longer distances. Alternatively, if place fields of all
sizes feed into a goal field, its shape will be asymmetric with a steep slope on the side
near the goal and a shallow slope on the other side. In all cases, each goal receives its
own set of goal cells, all utilising the same map.
In this model there are up to two learning steps. First, the assignments of two
landmark fields to each place cell, creating their place fields. Second, the assignment
of place cells to goal cells. Place cell firing is entirely driven by landmarks. Dead
reckoning has, at present, no place in this model. The fields of distance-sensitive
cells are taken as given. There is no learning of these fields. The map is
homogeneous, with no special location serving as the origin of a coordinate system.
The activity peaks travels on a two-dimensional surface, rather than being
decomposed into two one-dimensional variables. Only goal locations could be
considered as origins of coordinate systems, the coordinates specified by the relative
and aggregate firing rates of the goal cells. Coordinate systems are not necessary to
create a spatial representation.
A feature of the readout mechanism, rather than the map, is that multiplication of
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distances by sine or cosine of an angle is not necessary. Once a set of goal cells is
established, anchored to landmarks only through the place cells, distance to the goal
is only specified through the goal cells. Addition of self-landmark and landmark-goal
vectors is not needed. The procedure is analogous to marking a goal on a physical
map, determining its location relative to landmarks only when that mark is made, and
subsequently only laying a ruler onto the map from the current location to the goal.
The readout mechanism, as specified at present, has several limitation. It is not
possible by use of the goal cells alone to determine distances between multiple goals.
The relevant information is present in the output, but the necessary computation
would be vector additions, which would need to be performed on the output from the
goal cells. It is not possible to read out the location and extent of obstacles from this
map, unless that information is linked to other goal cells, which may have repellent
rather than attracting properties. In effect, the only information contained in the map
itself is the position of place fields in the environment. All information about what is
at such a location must be bound to goal cells. Although the map itself is
homogeneous, the information provided by goal cells may not be. That learning may
concentrate on the most important areas, minimising demands on processing and
storage. In this model O'Keefe and Nadel's (1978) prediction that the construction of
a map is not goal driven, and that all available information is incorporated, could
apply only to the locations represented in the map, not to the information bound to
the goal cells.
Despite its apparent limitations, this model offers several advantages over the
representations discussed above. First, it makes efficient use of information about
distance from landmarks. Each landmark-distance tuned firing field is used in the
specification of several place fields, each time in combination with a different second
landmark-distance field. Second, once the map is established, places can be quickly
linked to goal cells. Third, the number of goal cells required grows only linearly with
the number of places they cover, rather than quadratically. These uses of the map are
possible by having additional readout mechanisms downstream from the goal cells.
A possibly more fundamental problem is that a goal can only be established once
the animal has arrived at the goal location. It is not possible to specify a goal
remotely, as in open loop walking or in Cramer's (1995) experiment, where monkeys
watched grapes being hidden in a familiar enclosure. Spiders have also shown to be
capable of determining a goal from a distance, then following a path to that place
without being able to see the goal object (Hill, 1979). Likewise, toads plan a route to
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distant prey and execute at least a segment without further visual feedback (Lock and
Collett, 1979; Collett, 1982). However, in both spiders and toads this capacity may
not depend on familiarity with the environment. Though there was repeated testing
no data are shown indicating an improvement over time or a necessity for familiarity.
The timecourse over which this remote localisation of a goal occurs is in the order of
seconds. However, Bednekoff and Balda (1996) have found that some corvids can
recover seeds they observed being cached two days earlier.
A model proposed by McNaughton et al. (1996) uses essentially the same kind of
map, but assumes that place fields are primarily driven by dead reckoning and only
secondarily by landmarks. This apparently minor change of emphasis has some
important implications for the organisation, integration and acquisition of
information, and will therefore be discussed in chapter 3.
Brown and Sharp (1995) also proposed a model using a place cell map. The map
is derived from 'local view' input, with non-overlapping place fields. As in the
models discussed above, if size and density of place fields are, on average, uniform,
the map contains all information needed to read out distances and angles between
locations. However, the readout mechanism, based on stimulus-response
associations, is not able to access that information. Brown and Sharp assume that
while travelling to a destination rats associate each combination of place and
orientation, defined by the firing of a single hippocampal place cell, with a right or
left turn. Then the rat moves until hitting the next familiar place and turns according
to the association it retrieves there (Figure 2.16). There is no distance component to
the response; it is "ballistic". If the model rat made an error and failed to hit a place
that has a response associated with it, it would just keep going or would have to
respond at random.
In order to learn a path to a goal, the model rat must first find it through random
search. Then the most recent responses are strengthened. This ensures that when
Figure 2.16. "Ballistic"stimulus-response associations when there is a high density of familiar places.
Each place, defined by the firing of a hippocampal place cell, is shown by a hexagon. For simplicity,
and following Brown and Sharp, these are assumed to be non-overlapping, though that is only a
feature of their specific model and not necessary for all possible ballistic S-R models. The diagram
shows landmarks, a home
location, two paths and two
destinations. On arrival at a
destination the responses made
on the outward path are
stamped in, giving more weight
to more recent responses. As
there can be only one response
at each place, the learning
algorithm will remove loops, as
in the path on the right.
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there have been several responses where the search path crossed in one place, only
the response which leads on to the shortest following path segment is reinforced.
The neural implementation of the model assumes that hippocampal place cells are
connected through inhibitory interneurons to two sets of motor units (Figure 2.17).
Activity of a unit in one set turns the animal left, in the other set right. There are two
motor units for each hippocampal cell. Activity in one place cell inhibits, through the
interneurons, activity in all but two motor units, specific to that place cell. These
connections are all assumed to have fixed weights, although in practice learning will
be needed to assign to a place cell the corresponding set of 'local view' cells. Left
turn and right turn motor units are mutually inhibitory, so only one will fire. Which
one does is determined by adjustable input from head direction cells. When arriving
at the goal a competitive learning rule strengthens all connections that were recently
active and weakens all others. A short time horizon for this learning would limit the
spatial range of learning. A long horizon risks stamping in circuitous approaches, as
responses made long ago were probably wrong and led to detours. Having been
active, the connections would nevertheless be strengthened. The problem is solved
by raising the activity trace of all inactive connections by a constant amount. All
connections having a smaller activity trace, i.e. those that were active long ago, are
then weakened. The need to have a separate motor unit for each place cell arises
from the egocentric coding of the response. If response were defined as a geocentric
direction, each place cell could connect to a common set of motor units. But as the
model only keeps track of which egocentric responses were performed, not of their
sequence, the responses must be kept separate and assigned to specific place cells by
using separate motor units.
The model allows some degree of generalisation. The authors distinguish
Figure 2.17. Each place cell connects to two inhibitory interneurons. Here only the connection from
the currently active place cell (black circle) to the corresponding interneurons (black triangles) are
shown. Each interneuron
o inhibits all but one motor unit
O in a set of right turn or left turn
ion o unjts (grey lines). Motor units
Q receive modifiable inputs from
r-A-1 all head direction cells. Here
jt ki on'y inputs between activeiVIOGHTclDlC hptiH r1ir<=»r»Hnn finH mntnr ppIIchead direction and otor cells





populations of left turn and
right turn units ar not shown.
Adapted from Brown and
Sharp (1995).
Left turn Right turn
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between directional and spatial generalisation. Directional generalisation is knowing
whether to turn right or left in a familiar location when facing a novel direction. This
is possible because head direction cells are broadly tuned and four are active at any
one time. If a novel direction is sufficiently similar to the previously experienced one
that the learned response is appropriate, then it is likely that they will have
overlapping populations of active place cells. Inactive connections are weakened, so
if the model faces a direction without any overlapping head direction activity, the
non-adjusted connection to the other turn unit are likely to be stronger and the model
will turn in the opposite direction. This second mechanism of generalisation relies on
direction being bounded. Spatial generalisation is knowing which way to turn when
facing a familiar direction in a novel location not far from a familiar one. Coarse
coding would allow spatial generalisation, but may introduce problems in assigning
responses, as several motor units would be active at the same time. As location is not
bounded, suppression of connections to inactive motor units would not produce
appropriate generalisation.
In effect, this model use as stimulus a combination of place and direction, the
response is a turn. The S-R mechanism is "ballistic": turn in the right direction, then
keep going until hitting the next recognisable place that has a response associated
with it. In principle the place cell map is not necessary. The 'local view' neurons
could be connected directly to the motor units, but then the capacity for generalisation
would be lost. Brown and Sharp acknowledge that the model cannot account for
latent learning, as found by Keith and McVety (1988), or for place cell firing in the
absence of visual input (O'Keefe and Speakman, 1987). A characteristic they do not
mention is that the model has neither any need for information about distances
between places, nor is able to read distances from the place cell map in any way. In
contrast to the model of Burgess and coworkers, there is no way to extend the model
of Brown and Sharp to chose between routes or plan an efficient route between
multiple destinations.
2.6. Dead reckoning
Dead reckoning or path integration is the updating of position relative to a known
starting point by calculating displacement through the integration of speed and
direction. As errors inevitably accumulate, this requires periodic resetting to known
values at some familiar reference point. Regardless of the way in which the relation
between home and current location is represented, it is possible to use information
derived from path integration in several ways, classifiable by increasing versatility.
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1) Dead reckoning may be initiated and reset only at a home location. The system
will only ever have information about the spatial relationship between home
and the current location. If a coordinate system is used, home would be the
origin.
2) There could be several such path integration mechanisms working in parallel and
independently. An inactive path integrator may initiate dead reckoning at
some point of interest, to allow return there later. Each path integrator would
only be reset at its point of initiation. Errors in estimating distance and
direction would be shared between the path integrators. Random errors in
computation would be independent, and the location estimates of the path
integrators would drift relative to each other. This strategy would also be
limited in the number of locations it can keep track of.
3) There could be only a single path integrator whose output can be stored in long
term memory. Reversal of a remembered vector from a destination towards
home, and addition to the current home vector would provide a vector from
the current position to the remembered destination. The readout mechanism
would need to be capable of switching to this new vector while the path
integrator keeps updating position relative to home. Because different
locations are not kept track of independently, it is possible to increase the
accuracy of a location estimate by averaging across several visits. This will be
discussed in some more detail in chapter 3.
Path integration does not necessarily rely exclusively on internally generated
information such as proprioceptive and vestibular cues and efference copies. The
visual flowfield can contribute to estimation of linear and rotational speeds without
relying on specific and identifiable cues. Nevertheless, some species rely on external
compass cues in their estimation of orientation. There may be two reasons for that.
First, Seguinot et al. (1990) showed that path integration is more sensitive to errors in
the estimation of orientation than of distance. Second, compass cues such as the sun
tend to be perceptible throughout the whole possible range in which an animal may
need to navigate. Use of a compass therefore does not require location-dependent
cues. This independence from location-specific information is one of the major
advantages of path integration, allowing its use even in unfamiliar environments,
during exploration or unexpected displacements.
There are three basic ways of performing path integration or an approximation of
it. Jander (1957) suggested averaging direction of travel over time, making the
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assumption of travel a constant
speed. This method gives an
accurate homing direction for all
journeys with two outbound legs of
equal length. For example,
travelling equal distances north and
east one ends up northeast of the
starting point. Even in this simple FiS"re 2.18. Directions of homing in hamsters afteroutbound journeys with legs of lm and 2 m length in
example, the algorithm fails for orthogonal directions (Adapted from Seguinot et al.,
(1993). Home is shown as a large open circle, the points
legs of different lengths. It predicts where the return is initiated as smaller black circles. The
hamsters systematically overestimate the turn needed to
an overall travel direction of 60° take them back. Other species show a similar bias in
this situation (bees: Bisetzky, 1957; spiders: Gorner,
east if the eastbound leg is twice as 1958; ants: Muller and Wehner, 1988; humans: Sauve,
1989).
long as the northbound leg, instead
of the correct value of 63.4°. This would not matter if the results corresponded to the
errors found after such two-leg journeys in several species (see Seguinot et al., 1993,
and review by Maurer and Seguinot, 1995; Figure 2.18). However, Jander's
algorithm does not reproduce experimentally observed homing errors.
The next approach is to calculate position relative to the starting point. The
information available to a path integration mechanism is speed or distance travelled
within a finite time interval, As, and direction of travel relative to some compass cue
or internally generated reference direction (Figure 2.19). Using a Cartesian
coordinate system, As and "K are used to calculate the path components along x- and
y-axes. Assuming a polar coordinate system, location is defined by the angle g
between the current position, the nest and the reference direction, and by the distance
r from the nest. The animal must compute the increment of radial distance, Ar, and
the increment of the nest angle, Au The solutions for small increments are, assuming
Aq small compared to r:
Polar coordinates Cartesian coordinates
Ar = As cos(k - g) = As cos 8 Ax = As sin 1
Aq = As sin(k - g) = As sin 8 Ay = As cos 1
Ag = Aq/r = As sin(l - g)/r = As sin8/r
Mittelstaedt (1973, 1983, 1985) developed a model intended to account for the
interaction between a light source serving as external compass cue, and an internally
derived directional reference in spiders. The model consists of a mathematical





Figure 2.19. Information available for dead reckoning. A) Using a polar coordinate system, radial
distance from the nest r and nest angle u relative to some reference direction describe the position
(r, u) of the ant. Locomotion in direction 1 by a path increment Ds results in a new position (r + Dr,
u + Dl>), as long as Ds « r. B) Using a Cartesian coordinate system the same path increment Ds and
direction 1 are decomposed into increments Dx and Dy, added to the current position (x,y).
architecture that could implement this function. Mittelstaedt suggests that use of a
Cartesian coordinate system requires fewer assumptions to implement the required
coordinate transformations. He also specifies a readout mechanism that can create
motor commands directly from the components of the home vector, sensory input or
a remembered goal vector, without having to convert into direction and beeline
distance. X and y coordinates are combined with sine and cosine of the heading to
provide separate turn (right or left) and run (forwards or backwards) commands. For
a given heading each of these functions divides space into two halves with opposite
motor commands. The division by the two functions is orthogonal, and the lines on
which opposite commands cancel both run through the goal (Figure 2.20).
Mittelstaedt made no attempt to reproduce the systematic errors described above.
Matching these errors was one motivation for Muller and Wehner (1988). They
first examined an algorithm similar to Jander's, that summed angles weighted not
over time, but over (approximate) distance from the point of departure. They found
that even for simple trajectories of one outbound leg and and a second leg of different
length at some angle cx, the homing direction given by the mean-direction algorithm
only fit experimental data reasonably well for 90° < (X < 120°. They modified it by
taking the angle from home as a reference, using a polynomial rather than linear
function of angular deviation, and weighting it by distance from home, rather than
distance travelled. The output of the resulting model agreed well with the systematic
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Figure 2.20. Field of run and turn commands in Mittelstaedt's (1985) model. The animal moves
forward if x coscp + y sin cp < 0, back if the sum is > 0. Analogously, it turns right or left depending on
whether x sincp - y cos cp is mailer or largr than 0. This fields of commands is always aligned with the
orientation of the animal. It turns and moves until it is on a line where x sincp - y cos cp = 0 and there
are no turn commands, then moves until x coscp + y sin cp = 0 and there are no run commands.
Mittelstaedt uses a coordinate system rotated 90° clockwise from that in figure 2.19, so cp = 1 - 90°.
bias found experimentally. As Hartmann and Wehner (1995) later pointed out, the
functions used by Miiller and Wehner can be considered approximations to sine and
cosine functions. Hartmann and Wehner used a sequence of straight line segments,
derived from a neural implementation they proposed, to get similarly good
agreement. Hartmann and Wehner's model also has a readout mechanism to return
home, but it makes no provision for reading stored vectors.
Both these models use polar coordinate systems. In the absence of errors these
are exactly equivalent, though the apparent convenience of computation may differ.
Is it possible to distinguish between these two types of representation? Gallistel
(1990 has argued that using a polar coordinate system, any error is not only added to
the current estimate of position, it also enters into the computation of the next path
increment. This argument only applies if there is noise in that feedback loop, a
realistic assumption in any physical system, but especially biological ones.
Nevertheless, it is not clear that this would result in behaviour different from that of a
Cartesian system with more noise in the input. The coordinate systems do differ in
the effect of approximations to trigonometric functions. Computation in a Cartesian
coordinate system would have systematic biases that depend on the angle of the path
to the reference direction. No such effect has ever been reported. In a polar
coordinate system, the approximations lead to larger errors the closer a journey
passes to the origin. Seguinot et al., (1993) studied the homing of hamsters on
trajectories with either two or five outbound legs. The latter included conditions
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where the hamsters went through a loop either close to or far from home, i.e. 1 m
north, west, south and east either followed or preceded by a 2 m segment to the north.
This made no difference to the hamsters. They homed with similar bias in both cases.
The bias predicted by model of Miiller and Wehner did depend on whether the
journey passed close to the origin and failed to match the hamsters' behaviour only in
the case of a loop close to home. In contrast, any errors due to approximation in a
Cartesian system would be independent of location relative to the origin. The
seeming contradictions can be reconciled by noting that systematic biases do not need
to be accounted for by deviations from trigonometric functions. It is also possible
that animals systematically underestimate the angles through which they have turned
or that the bias is part of an error correcting strategy. The data of Seguinot et al.
cannot distunguish between Cartesian and polar coordinate systems without
approximations, but they suggest that if there are any approximations, their deviations
from the exact functions are below random noise level.
A third approach is use of a map as in the models of Burgess and coworkers (see
above) and McNaughton et al. (1996, discussed in chapter 3). They do not require
multiplication by sine and cosine even for an exact solution. All that is needed is the
distance and direction of each path increment, which must be added to the last
position in the map.
Regardless of the details of the representation, path integration has two features
that are relevant in the context of this thesis. First, the information is necessarily
metric. Because it does not use location-specific cues, it cannot just identify some
such cue from a distance and find a path taking the animal closer to that cue. The
available information is direction of travel and speed or the length of path increments.
The only way to use that information is to specify a location, where some place is.
Second, path integration is not possible by chains of associations. The reason lies
in the combinatoric of two or three dimensional space. The only information
available to a hypothetical associative path integrator is the sequence of steps leading
to the current location. It would need to use that sequence to give each location a
unique identifier. The problem is that each location can be reached by an infinite
number of different sequences of steps. On the other hand, if the associative path
integrator only looks back for a finite number of steps, then any given sequence can
lead to any arbitrary location, given a suitable sequence beyond those the path
integrator takes into account. Even if it could be made to work, this type of path
integrator would take a long time to learn and so would be useless in unfamiliar
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environments. Path integration must compute the current location of the animal. The
isomorphism between representation and environment provided by associative
learning cannot do that with the information used in path integration. Yet if learning
is defined as the storage of information in memory, path integration clearly is
learning. It is not possible to compute location unless the current path increment is
added to the location stored in memory. Path integration or dead reckoning is an
example of a navigational strategy requiring non-associative information storage.
Etienne et al. (1986) demonstrated that self-generated information (proprioceptive
and vestibular) was sufficient for path integration in hamsters homing from a food
hoarding site to their nest boxes. The hamsters lived alone in a nest box attached to
the outside of the wall of a circular arena, with free access to the arena before the
experiment. All experiments were conducted in the dark. The subjects were offered
a pile of hazelnuts in the centre of the arena, which they collected for hoarding. In
trials with an active outward journey the subject was led to the hoarding site,
following a bait. In trials with a passive outward journey the animals stepped directly
from the nest box into a transportation box and were carried to the centre of the arena.
The role of self-generated or idiothetic information, derived from vestibular and
kinesthetic signals, and of possible intra- and extramaze cues was investigated by
testing the animals' reactions to situations where these sources of information were in
conflict. In the first experiment the arena with nest box was rotated during the
subjects' passive outward journey. They homed in the direction of their start location
as accurately as in the control trials without rotation, implying that they did not rely
on intramaze cues. Passive transport to an adjacent arena did not affect the homing
direction. The hamsters either used an external compass cue or integrated only
passive rotations, but were unable to keep track of passive displacements. In a third
experiment the orientation of the return journey was not influenced by alterations of
the magnetic field. In the fourth experiment the arena and nest box were rotated by
90° before the passive or active outward journey, creating a conflict between self
generated information and potential cues indicating the normal location of the nest
box. The subjects' return to their actual start location indicates that they used only
self-generated information. There was no evidence for use of an external compass
cue.
The authors make the further interesting point that "experiments in progress show
that the animal's capacity to compensate for passive rotations decreases in
proportion to the amplitude of the angular displacements and ceases completely
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when the animal has been rotated over more than two complete turns (i. e. 720°)".
Further, "active rotations included in the outward journey are compensated for when
they are up to three or five full turns, but lead to random orientation if they exceed
this limit". Collett et al. (1986) did not mention any attempt to eliminate vestibular
cues. This may be their unidentified directional cue.
Etienne et al. (1990) investigated the effects of a conflict between a weak visual
cue and self-generated information. They distinguish between three different types of
spatial information: (1) location-based cues, which provide a stable and familiar
frame of reference in the environment; (2) internally generated signals
(proprioceptive and vestibular) used for path integration; (3) cues which are not in a
consistent position in the long term, but may serve as a short term frame of reference.
The latter two are classified as route-based cues.
The experiments were conducted in the same apparatus with similar procedures as
in Etienne et al.'s (1986) study. The major difference was the presence of a very dim
light source that served as a visual cue. It illuminated only a small area in the centre
of the arena. The strategy in this study was to create conflicts between route-based
and location-based information as well as between visual and idiothetic cues. If the
hamsters had no experience with the light before the experiment, it could only
Figure 2.21. Summary of experiments 1A to 1D3 of Etienne et al. (1990). Small open circles show the
location of the light cue during the outgoing trip, black circles the location from the moment hoarding
began. The locations of the light and direction of rotation were normally counterbalanced, but are not
shown here for simplicity. The arrowhead outside the arena shows the average homing direction. In
experiment 1A route-based visual and internal
information were put in conflict. In Experiment IB
location-based visual information had priority over
route-based internal information when there was a
90° conflict. A 180° conflict reversed this
preference. In experiment 1C, a 90° conflict, with
rotations of the arena during hoarding to reduce the
influence of vestibular cues, had no effect other
than to reduce variability. In experiment ID all
three types of cue were in conflict. Location-based
visual cues were weighted more than or roughly
equal to route-based
internal cues when the
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function as a short term route-based visual cue (Rv). Rotation after hoarding had
begun would put it in conflict with other cues. If the light had been experienced as
stable, it could provide both route-based and location-based visual information (Lv).
Visual information was exclusively location-based if the light was only switched on
after the outward journey. It could be put in conflict with other information by
putting the light cue in an unfamiliar direction. Idiothetic information must always
be route-based (Ri) and was always present. Therefore it was only possible to put
two combinations of two cue types in conflict (Rv/Ri or Lv/Li), or one type with the
other two (Lv/[Rv, Li] or Rv/[Lv, Ri] or Ri/[Lv, Rv]) or all three (Lv/Rv/Ri). The
results of the first series of experiments are summarised in Figure 2.21.
The animals gave roughly equal weight to visual location-based (Lv) and internal
route-based (Rj) information if the conflict was 90°, while visual route-based (Rv)
information has a minor influence. Increased conflict between the two preferred
categories of information leads to increased reliance on self-generated cues.
In summary, the results suggest that, (1) a single light, presented in a standard
position for some time before the experiment, comes to have a major effect as a
location-based cue. (2) The light spot has only a minor effect as a source of visual
route-based information. (3) Internal route-based information interacts with visual
location-based information. The greater the conflict between the two types of
information the more the hamsters rely on self-generated cues.
2.7. Summary
Models of navigational competence span the whole range from fairly simple
snapshot models, requiring only simple associative processes, to O'Keefe and Nadel's
definition of cognitive mapping, a rich representation supposedly constructed by
different processes. Both these "standard" models make links between contents and
conditions of learning that are not necessary. There are several models with at least
some map-like properties that use at some point associative processes for the
acquisition of information. Any conclusions regarding the relationship between
navigation and associative learning must take that factor into account. It has also
been shown that navigational systems may perform computations and construct
representations with richer isomorphisms than those possible in associative learning.
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3. Another (better?) way to make a map:
Integrating spatial information from dead
reckoning and landmarks
Navigation by use of snapshots, landmark-goal vectors or metric maps has so far
been discussed separately from dead reckoning. Dead reckoning necessarily uses
metric information, and its interaction even with non-metric landmark information
can give a spatial representation some of the properties normally expected from a
metric map. The various degrees of integration of spatial information from
landmarks and dead reckoning are the topic of this chapter.
3.1. Navigational strategies
Possible navigational strategies are summarised in Figure 3.1. Use of trails and
chemical gradients will be ignored here. The remaining strategies are ordered both
by the kind of information they use and by an intuitive measure of complexity and the
flexibility of behaviour they support.
Strictly speaking all dead reckoning must sometimes interact with location-
specific information in order to reset to a known value and so remove accumulated
randon errors. In its most basic form, a path integrator would only be able to reset at
one location, probably home. To aid navigation to other locations, dead reckoning
must be able to keep track of several location. The two methods mentioned in section
2.6 were use of multiple path integrators, each only resetting at one point, or else a
path integrator capable of taking vectors retrieved from memory as input and which
can be rest at any identifiable location. The latter method allows to improve the
accuracy of the estimation of a location (identified through landmarks) by averaging
the positions given through dead reckoning on separate visits to the same location.
As this location becomes more accurately defined, it can serve as a reference point
for resetting, and then improves the accuracy of navigation at neighbouring locations.
This is not possible if multiple path integrators work independently and are each
reset at only one point.
The purely landmark-based strategies (designated L in figure 3.1) could work in
parallel with dead reckoning (DR). The assumption here is that only the final outputs
of these systems would interact in determining behaviour. The integrated strategies
(DL) involve a richer set of interactions, for example correcting dead reckoning by
reference to landmarks, or using remembered metric information from dead
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Chemical trails Landmarks only (location-specific)
Beacons
Trail following is constrained to following the
path that was taken when a possible destination
was encountered the first time, no matter how
circuitous. To distinguish between destinations,
different kinds of trail have to be laid down.
There is no information at the outset how far
away a destination is. What happens if there is a
loop in that path? How does the animals decide
which part of the trail to follow at the crossing?







Beacons can be chained together into sequences. Where two
beacons in a sequence are seen, the one further on can be chosen.
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can be used to compute a direction
that takes the animal closer to the place where the snapshot was
taken. Navigation from beyond the catchment area of the
destination requires stacks or sequences of snapshots in S-S










final self-destination vector. Shortcuts and detours (novel paths
between familiar points) as well as instantaneous transfer (novel
path from a novel starting point to a familiar destination) are
possible. Vector lists may not be internally consistent.
L5 Maps
Burgess and O'Keefe suggest a readout mechanism that can get a
self-destination vector from a hippocampal place field map. It
can only read one vector at a time and goal cells can only be
generated while at the goal. Whether place fields are determined
by snapshots (Sharp) by distance-tuned cells (Burgess et al.) or
dead reckoning (McNaughton et al.) is not relevant to the
readout, same as for the ballistic S-R mechanism.
L2 "Ballistic" S-R chains
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gons in lower diagram), the resulting representation could
function as a map, but readout through S-R associations can only
access a small fraction of that information.
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d the path integrator must be able to take a remembered
ctor length as input. Vector addition is not necessary. An
ror can be detected and search can be initiated. Both this and
e ballistic S-R mechanism would benefit from snapshot
vigation for error correction, as it would often make the
arch shown here unnecessary.
Dead reckoning
(location independent)
DR1 Single path integrator
)
There is a single dead reckoning system or path
integrator, shown (arbitrarily!) by a polar
coordinate system, that can only be started and
reset at one location, here home. No other
locations can be tracked.
DR2 Independent path integrators
ki:
Multiple independent path integrators could keep
track of several locations. If each path integrator
can only be rest at one location, errors accumulate
independently.
DL3 DR and vector-sum navigation
:setting of the path integrator is possible at any point, not
lere a snapshot has been taken. Path planning can be based
both DR and landmarks. Vectors from both systems can go
:o a weighted vector sum.
DL4 Dead reckoning and map
me properties as purely landmark-based map, except that
vigation in unfamiliar areas is possible even without
;tantaneous transfer and even without seeing familiar
ldmarks.
DR3 Single PI and vector addition
■ \ /\
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If the home vector of a location can be stored in
long term memory, and later subtracted from the
current home vector, it is possible to return to any
location using the same path integrator. At any
one moment the same error affects vectors to all
locations. The location of the origin of a
coordinate system is irrelevant.
ijure 3.1. Classification of navigational strategies. Those labelled L4, L5, DL2, DL3 and DL4 are cognitive
lpping processes, by the criterion of including metric information and a capacity for vector addition, the
^requisites for chosing between several goals on the basis of distance.
DL2 DR, vector addition and snapshots
Dead reckoning







ctors computed on successive visits to a place, removing
ridom error from the estimated vector of that place. Addition
vectors based on dead reckoning allows path planning,
ror correction by snapshot navigation would speed up the
ocess, but using snapshots only for place recognition, and
itiating a random search, as above, is also possible.
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reckoning to plan a displacement if landmark information is non-metric. These
interactions require at least that the output of a path integrator can be stored in long
term memory, and that the readout mechanism can take vectors other than the current
home vector as its input.
A route may be followed through stimulus-stimulus chains, without use of metric
information, if at any recognisable place the next point of the route is perceptible,
either in form of a beacon (strategy LI in figure 3.1), or if the catchment area of the
next snapshot extends to the current location (L3). If the next stimulus is out of
range, the animal could use stimulus-response chains. The minimal requirement is
that the animal can identify the correct direction, and then either risk moving until
hitting the next familiar spot (L2), or moving for a known distance. The latter
depends on dead reckoning to determine that distance (DL1). In its simplest form
such an S-R scheme could rely exclusively on specific remembered vectors.
Direction could be identified by storing the appropriate egocentric orientation of the
snapshot. Each reference location would be the origin of a local coordinate system.
As discussed for vectors between landmarks, storing vectors between all places of
interest will lead to a combinatorial explosion. In the absence of a capacity for vector
addition, the system would be limited to chaining vectors (in possibly novel
sequences), but would have to follow each part of the resulting route rather than
shortcutting straight to the destination. The estimate of travel distance would be the
arithmetic sum of the lengths of the route components. It is also possible that a
vector from A to B would be known, but not from B to A. This is a route based
representation. These three strategies (LI, L2 and DL1) would not be considered
cognitive maps.
Vector addition provides more flexibility. If vectors from visible landmarks to
possible destinations are known, and the vectors from the current position to
landmarks can be determined, an animal can determine its location relative to any
remembered place (L4). As long as the relative locations and orientations of local
references are known a global reference is not necessary. If metric information is
derived from dead reckoning, it is not necessary to get it from landmarks. Assume a
home vector is associated with each snapshot (DL2), and that the current home vector
can be added to the inverse of the home vector of the desired destination (Cartwright
and Collett, 1987). Within the limits of accuracy of dead reckoning any arbitrary
path can be computed, including novel shortcuts and detours round obstacles, the
distances between locations, the shortest paths between multiple locations, etc. Due
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to the limited accuracy of path integration, resetting at locations other than home will
be necessary. A snapshot cannot be used directly to correct any errors in the home
vector associated with it because snapshots do not allow determination of distances
by reference to visual landmarks. It would be possible to average homing vectors
given by the path integrator on different visits to a place. This would improve the
accuracy of the homing vectors, but only if the averaging occurs at the centre of a
snapshot. At other points navigation by snapshot cannot determine the distance to the
reference location which the home vector specifies. Use of metric landmark
information (DL3) would only improve the accuracy of the system, but not change its
properties otherwise. These three systems already have most of the properties of
cognitive maps. Only two features are missing. One is that these vector based
representations may not be internally consistent (see chapter 1, section 1.7, last
paragraph). Second, as already mentioned, explicit representation of all possible
spatial relations would is not very efficient, leading to a combinatorial explosion.
Use of a global coordinate system would let the number of vectors grow only linearly
with the number of places remembered, but has other problems (see section 2.5).
Representing locations of objects and destinations only by reference to local
coordinate systems would avoid these problems, while still slowing down the growth
in the number of vectors to be represented. Use of vectors can introduce a binding
problem. There may be several places sharing the same coordinate on one axis or
direction. Each coordinate then would have several chunks of landmark information
associated with it, and which is relevant would depend on the other coordinate.
The binding problem and combinatorial explosion can both be avoided by using a
map rather than decomposing location into coordinates. A map would also be
internally consistent. This is the approach of both Burgess and coworkers (L5 in
figure 3.1) and of McNaughton et al. (1996; DL4). In Burgess' model an animal must
visit a location before it can assign to it either a place cell or a goal cell. Goal cells
can only connect to already established place cells. In McNaughton et al.'s model,
the locations of all place fields in a reference frame are fixed as soon as as the
location of one place field and the orientation of the frame are determined relative to
landmarks. It may still be necessary to visit a place before landmark information can
be associated with the place field. McNaughton et al are not explicit on that point.
They also do not commit themselves on either metric landmark information or use of
snapshots. Either is possible.
There is another capacity that could be added to all strategies using metric
77
landmark information, that is L4, L5, DL3 and, depending on assumptions, DL4.
Using distance information from landmarks in principle allows the creation of an
allocentric representation that could be used at any point where distance and direction
of at least some of those landmarks can be determined. In the scheme of Figure 3.1,
strategies L4, L5, DL3 and DL4 would be divided into two depending on whether
this capacity for immediate transfer of knowledge to novel areas is present. It is
taken to be a characteristic feature of cognitive maps by some authors (Whishaw,
1991; Alyan 1994). There is currently no evidence that this capacity exists.
Integrating landmark information with dead reckoning has some implications that
are not immediately obvious. It pretty much forces use of multiple reference frames
because a representation based on dead reckoning is necessarily preconfigured. It is
not possible, as for example in Burgess' model, to arbitrarily distribute location-
specific information all over the representing system. It must be assigned to specific
elements as determined by dead reckoning (the model of McNaughton et al., 1996,
provides a specific example and is discussed below). It is unlikely that the shape of
an animal's territory will correspond to the shape of a global preconfigured
representation it is born with. Parts of it may go unused while it may still not cover
the whole territory. Or take the example of a species in which offspring is reared in
the parents' territory, but disperses after some time. If the centre of the map were in
the parental territory, after dispersal either a large part will go unused, or all landmark
information will need to be replaced. The offspring may even go beyond range of the
original map. If landmark information were added only after dispersal, individuals
would have to make do without map while still in parental territory. It would also not
solve the problem of being displaced from an established and mapped territory. A
migrating species may need a map of two distant home ranges as well as of several
way stations on the route between. Another problem could arise if two relatively
close areas are normally reached via a detour, for example a central place forager that
always returns home between visits, and the areas then become connected by a
shorter route. Any cumulative errors in dead reckoning would introduce a
discontinuity between dead reckoning and landmark information on the new route. A
preconfigured global map would require realignment of all landmark information to
deal with these problems, presumably a slow, costly and error-prone process. Using
multiple reference frames, it is only necessary to pull out another frame. Their spatial
relations relative to each other are presumably determined by shared landmarks.
Multiple reference frames also naturally lend themselves to representation of the
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environment at various different scales. Davis (1986) argues that this is necessary, as
fine-grained representations have too much detail for large scale navigation and
coarse grained representations not enough for accurate short range navigation.
Evidence for the existence of multiple reference frames has been reported by Gothard
et al. (1996)
The model of McNaughton et al. (1996) would be classified as DL4 in the
suggested scheme. They proposed that navigational computations performed by the
hippocampus are based primarily on dead reckoning and only secondarily on
landmark information. The representation of space is essentially the same as the one
discussed for Burgess' model: location-specific firing fields form patches of activity
moving on a two-dimensional surface. As in Burgess' model, there is no coordinate
system. Unlike that model the interactions between cells and the relative locations of
their receptive fields are preconfigured. Even in the absence of any landmark
information the place fields have predetermined spatial relationships relative to each
other. McNaughton et al. also postulate the existence of multiple reference frames. It
is assumed that on arrival in a new environment a rat will pull out a "blank" reference
frame, consisting of an interconnected population of place cells not associated with
landmark information. A reference direction is established and a place field in that
reference frame is chosen as the initial location, according to unspecified criteria.
From that moment the locations of all other place fields in this frame of reference are
fixed, through their interconnections and their interaction with movement
information.
What remains is the addition of landmark information. This is not described in
any detail, but is assumed to be an associative process. In contrast to the Burgess
model, it is not possible to arbitrarily assign landmarks to any place cell. Because the
network is preconfigured, the learning rule must detect a given correlation between a
landmark arrangement and place cell firing. This is the same computation as in
conventional associative learning. Another difference to Burgess' model is that the
amount of landmark information, only added secondarily, is unlikely to be
homogeneous. Associative learning, being goal-driven, would ensure that only
necessary information is added to the map. Poucet (1993) argued that such
heterogeneity is a characteristic feature of spatial representations in relatively
unfamiliar environments. He postulated that cognitive maps are created in a two-step
process, first a topological representation linking a number of specific places, then
metric information is filled in. The model of McNaughton et al. could be interpreted
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as showing that the first step is based on dead reckoning and that the appearance of a
topological map is a consequence of the inherent inaccuracies of dead reckoning not
reset by landmark information. Alternatively, multiple reference frames could be
initially only loosely connected and the representation appears to acquire metric
information when the reference frames are bound together by shared landmarks or
when large scale frames are established. Landmark information could be added in the
form of snapshots, it could be vectors, or distances as in Burgess' model.
McNaughton et al. propose a neural mechanism for path integration. Direction
and location do not interact directly with their derivatives, angular and linear velocity,
but through intermediate cells, sensitive to both (Figure 3.2). The principle is easiest
to illustrate for direction. A head direction input H and an angular velocity input H'
converge on neurons that are sensitive to both, H'H. The signal for a particular
velocity goes to H'H cells regardless of their direction, but specific to those with the
correct velocity. The direction signal goes to all H'H cells responding to the correct
direction, regardless of their velocity tuning. The resulting subset of H'H cells then
can selectively activate the appropriate H cells, giving the new direction.
McNaughton et al. suggest that velocity would be frequency coded, though position
coding in a computational map (Knudsen et al., 1987; see appendix for illustration)
would also be possible.
The advantages of using a map are the same as discussed previously for landmark
maps: efficient storage of the spatial relations between large numbers of locations, no
binding problem, and if goal cells are used for readout, they can quickly be linked to
locations. For path integration there is the added bonus of avoiding multiplication of
path increment and direction by sine or cosine functions.
The authors only specify the nature of the representation and the process by which
it gets updated during dead reckoning. There is no description of a readout or
navigation mechanism. The model would be compatible with the readout mechanism
proposed by Burgess and O'Keefe (1995). It should be noted that in both models
there is an anisotropy of available information. In the Burgess model this arises from
the fact that information about what is at a place can only be accessed through goal
cells. The map itself is homogeneous. In the model of McNaughton et al. there is an
additional source of anisotropy in the distribution of landmark information. It would
only be necessary to add that information to the map at intervals sufficiently short to
allow resetting as often as required by the accuracy of navigation the animal needs. If
resetting is possible through vector addition, the map would be functionally
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p, sensitive to the direction of rotation. Velocity is frequency
P p coded. H'H are cells sensitive to both head direction andU Q w> direction of rotation. H are head direction cells. V is visual
information, P stands for place cells, M for movement (linear velocity and in the PHxM system cells
are sensitive to both place and direction ofmovement. Velocity is again frequency coded.
(B) The principle of updating is illustrated for the head direction system. In the H' system cells
sensitive to turning right give input to all cells in the H'H system with the same tuning to rotation.
Active head direction cells excites all cells in the H'H system with corresponding orientation tuning.
Only those cells in the H'H system with convergent input from both H' and H systems exceed
threshold. Their connections back to the H system goes to head direction cells with tuning appropriate
for the rotation signal, in this case to the right. The faster the rotation, the higher the firing rates of H'
and H'h cells.
(C) The PHxM system functions according to the same principle. Instead of two dimensions in the
H'H system (head direction and rotation) it must deal with four dimensions (two dimensions of place,
one of direction of travel, one of movement). Head direction information goes to all cells with
approriate directional tuning anywhere in the PhxM system. Place cell input goes to all cells with the
right place tuning, regardless of directional sensitivity. Only cells with convergent direction and place
input exceed threshold. Movement signals are not shown, but must be diffuse over the whole PhxM
system, regardless of place or direction tuning. That signal modulates the firing frequency of output
from PHxM and so the speed with which the activity patch in the P system travels. In all cases
topographic coding of location in space onto location in one of the systems is only for illustrative
purposes. No such topographic coding has been found. For a computational argument, see appendix.
Figure from Mcnaughton et al. (1996).
homogeneous.
3.2. Cognitive maps: Goal-independent
representations and planning ahead
According to O'Keefe and Nadel (1978) two of the defining features of cognitive
maps are their suitability for planning even novel routes, and their independence from
goals, their creation being curiosity driven. Planning is meant to imply not only
novel concatenations of elements, but the capacity to predict the cost of alternative
routes and create efficient paths between multiple destinations. That requires metric
information, as cost and efficiency are related to travel distance. With regard to the
second feature, not only routes, but also the landmark-goal vectors of Collett et al.
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(1986) are goal centered. In its simplest form a vector list would only contain
information about the spatial relations between goals and visible landmarks. The
spatial relations between landmarks or goals could be derived from addition of
landmark-goal vectors sharing common points. Whether a spatial representation is
goal-centered has implications for the kind of information that is added and the
conditions under which learning occurs. This last point will be the topic of chapters 4
and 5.
Is planning possible without metric information from landmarks?
As discussed in chapter 2, bees' use of landmarks shows little sensitivity to
distance, and what there is can be interpreted as matching by distance, rather than
using this information for localisation. It is also widely, though not unanimously,
accepted that bees have no cognitive map (Bennett, 1996; Collett, 1987; Dyer, 1991;
Wehner and Menzel, 1990; Wehner et al., 1996). Yet when bees navigate dead
reckoning and landmarks interact. Is that a case of S-R associations, with dead
reckoning only providing the distance component of the response, or is their system
more similar to a map built from integration of dead reckoning and snapshots, as
described above? If the latter, what explains the limitations of bees' behaviour that
have led to the assertion that they do not have cognitive maps?
In their waggle dances bees give both bearing and distance to food sources (von
Frisch, 1967). Srinivasan et al. (1996) and Esch and Burns (1996) have reviewed
evidence that the estimate of distance is derived from optic flow. In the experiments
described by Srinivasan et al. bees were trained to find food at a set distance along a
12 cm wide and 20 cm high tunnel. The tunnel walls displayed vertical gratings that
could be scrolled horizontally. It was found that bees kept constant the angular
velocity of the image, independent of the spatial frequency or contrast of the gratings.
Distance estimate depended critically on this angular velocity. When tested in a
tunnel wider than during training, giving lower angular velocity, bees systematically
underestimated the distance they had flown and carried on past the position of reward
during training. Narrowing the tunnel had the opposite effect. When the grating was
parallel to the length of the tunnel the bees were unable to estimate distance at all.
Esch and Burns (1995) trained bees to fly to feeding stations at various heights above
the ground, then observed their dances. First, they calibrated a distance curve by
training the bees to feeders on the ground at a range of distances. Then a feeding
station was suspended from a balloon at 70 m horizontal distance from the hive, and
gradually raised it to heights of 30 m, 60 m and 90 m above ground. Bees flew
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directly to the feeding station. As the straight line distance increased from 70 m over
76 m and 92 m to 114 m, the bees estimate of distance as communicated in their
dances decreased from 70 m over 55m and 45 m to 25 m. This is despite the fact that
the climb to the raised feeder station increased energy expenditure beyond that
required for horizontal flights of the same length. Optic flow decreases with altitude,
so distance estimates based on optic flow must decrease accordingly. Esch and Burn
(1996) review other experiments along similar lines and argue that earlier studies
claiming evidence for distance estimation by energy expenditure are consistent with
the optic flow hypothesis if all experimental conditions are accounted for. Optic flow
is location-independent information as it is not necessary to identify objects to
measure optic flow or to know the distances between them. Optic flow is one of the
inputs for dead reckoning, in bees probably the main input. Bees therefore use both
distance information from dead reckoning and information from landmarks. Collett
et al. (1993) also found that bees can learn sequences of motor responses and could
retrieve them depending on the visual cues present. But do they simply combine this
information in S-R associations, or are they capable of adding vectors, as suggested
by Cartwright and Collett (1987)?
Menzel et al. (1996) describe a study (in prep.) of the interaction between vectors,
motivational state and visual context. In a first experiment bees were trained to fly to
a feeding station F1 in the morning and to a different feeding station F2 in the
afternoon (Figure 3.3). F1 was in a fairly homogeneous environment, F2 in a more
heterogeneous one. The motivational state depended on the point at which bees were
captured before release from another site. Hive departing bees (HD) would have a
goal vector pointing to F1 in the morning and to F2 in the afternoon. Feeder
departing bees (FID and F2D) would have the hive as destination. Hive arriving bees
(HA) would have no destination stored in short term memory. Bees were captured
and released at F2 in the morning and at F1 in the afternoon, the opposite of the
training conditions. Hive arriving bees retrieved the bearing back to the hive at both
F1 and F2, presumably cued by visual features. All hive departing bees retrieved the
home vector at F2. From Fl, where the surroundings were more homogenous, some
bees flew back to the hive, some persisted flying on the bearing that would take them
from home to their original destination F2. Feeder departing bees showed a
distribution of departure bearings that at first sight appear counterintuitive. Fl
departing bees kept kept to their original bearing even at the visually rich

















figure 3.3. Bees were trained to fly to feeding site Fl, 790 m from the hive, in the morning and to
feeding site F2, 630 m from the hive, in the afternoon. For testing bees were captured on departure
from the hive (HD), departure from a feeding station (FID), and arrival at the hive (HA). They were
released at F2 in the morning and Fl in the afternoon, the opposite of training. The destination for
feeder departing bees in the morning was vector 1. For hive departing bees it was vector 2. In the
afternoon the respective vectors were 3 and 4. Hive arriving bees had no destination vector in
memory. The diagram on the right shows the departure bearings for bees released at F2 and Fl for
testing. Adapted from Menzel et al. (1996).
keeping their bearing, some adjusting it and flying directly towards the hive. This
makes sense if it is assumed that the relative weights to be given to visual cues and to
the currently stored vector are determined at the point of departure and not adjusted
immediately after release somewhere else. Then some F2 departing bees, leaving a
visually rich environment and giving more weight to visual cues, adjust when at Fl.
The Fl departing bees, lacking good visual cues at their point of departure, are set to
rely on the remembered vector and do so even at F2. An important feature of these
results is that hive departing bees do not add up vectors when finding themselves at
the wrong feeding station. They either persist on the same heading or fly home.
They never take the direct route between feeding stations. Judging by that
experiment, bees seems to use S-R associations, retrieving vectors flexibly according
to their surroundings.
However, another experiment in the same environment shows some capacity for
vector addition. If hive departing bees, trained in the same way as before, are
released at a site between Fl and F2, some persist flying on the Fl bearing in the
morning and on the F2 bearing in the afternoon. Others added the two home vectors
from Fl and F2 and successfully head back to the hive. Again, even though hive
departing bees were motivated to fly to one of the feeding stations, they could not
take the shortcut. The constraint seems to be that only home vectors can be added,
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not a home vector and an outward vector. Menzel et al. suggest this is a restriction on
the vectors that can be retrieved from memory. The classification in figure 3.1 does
not have enough subdivisions to cover that. Using vector addition only on limited
subsets of vectors puts it between DL1 and DL2. That behaviour was due to vector
addition and not due to using the hive or some nearby landmark for a beacon, was
shown by two controls. Bees released at a distant site did not just combine the two
home vectors they had available, but persisted flying on the hive-Fl bearing. Bees
trained only to F1 likewise had only one vector and experience with only one of the
two sites. When released at the site between F1 and F2 they had no vectors to add up
and no basis for generalising between F1 and F2. They persisted in flying on their
original bearing.
Another line of evidence comes from studies of vector addition in bees (Collett
and Baron, in press; Figure 3.4). Bees were trained to fly along two distinct vectors
distinguished by two different background patterns serving as discriminatory stimuli.
When given an intermediate background pattern, the bees averaged the two complete
vectors, rather than direction and distance separately. If the length of the flight path
had been determined visually, the bees should have averaged distance from the
background pattern on the circular wall. The results not only show that whole vectors
were averaged, they are also evidence that distance was determined by dead
reckoning. Von Frisch (1967) found that bees trained to fly to a feeder via a detour
nevertheless gave the direct bearing and distance in their dances.
Bees appear to have a spatial representation based on dead reckoning and
snapshots (Cartwright and Collett 1987). Vectors can be retrieved by reference to
visual information and combined. Sometimes this combination takes the form of
Figure 3.4. (A) Bees entered the arena at the centre. The curved wall was covered by a background
pattern of slanted lines, which served as discriminatory stimulus. (B) Predicted results when
averaging distance and direction separately (top row) or whole vectors (bottom row) after training to
either vectors of equal lengths (left column) or different lengths (right column). The results of Collett
and Baron (in press) were consistent with averaging of whole vectors.
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concatenation or S-R chaining (Collett et al., 1993), sometimes vector addition or
averaging are possible. The flexibility of the system appears limited only by
constraints on the retrieval of vectors. Without those contraints this method of
navigation should be capable of most planning postulated for a metric cognitive map.
Shortcuts
The most common test for the planning of routes is to offer subjects the
opportunity of making novel shortcuts or forcing them onto detours. Many shortcut
experiments are open to interpretations that do not require the postulation of a
cognitive map. For example, Tolman et al. (1946) trained rats to traverse an L-
shaped runway to a goal location directly under a bright light. When offered a choice
between 12 routes, one of them replicating the familiar route, rats preferred a shortcut
to the goal. While this distinguishes between repeating a motor programme and use
of a landmark, it does not require use of a spatial representation. The rats only
needed to recognise the light bulb and use it as a beacon. Likewise, Gould (1986)
argued that bees were capable of making novel shortcuts that were only possible
through use of a map, but Dyer (1991) found that bees could only make the shortcut
if the destination was visible from the release point. The bees must have recognised
landmarks at the destination and either used them directly as beacons, or they were
within the catchment area of the relevant snapshot. Bennett (1996) concludes from
this refutation of Gould's claim, a similar interpretation of the results of Chapuis et al.
(1983, 1987) and the general argument that shortcuts can be accounted for by
previous experience, recognising landmarks at the destination or dead reckoning, that
no truly novel shortcut has ever been conclusively demonstrated. He argues that
therefore there is no conclusive evidence for the existence of a cognitive map as
described by Tolman and O'Keefe and Nadel. His argument that dead reckoning is an
alternative method for making shortcuts relies on the assumption that it is an
alternative strategy, simpler than mapping and used only in parallel and in
competition with mapping. It does not allow for the possibility that dead reckoning
may be an integral part of a cognitive map, as suggested, for example, by O'Keefe
(1976), McNaughton et al. (1996) and discussed here in section 3.1.
In fact, one feature of the results of Chapuis and Varlet (1987) suggests an
interesting interaction between use of landmarks and dead reckoning. Dogs were led
24 m to a point A where they were shown a piece of meat. They were led back to the
starting point and then along a 40 m path, at a 30° angle to the first one, to a point B
with more meat. The locations of A and B were varied so that the dogs were never
86
led to any point more than twice, and points were selected so that there were no
conspicuous landmarks at or near them. When released at the starting point, the dogs
normally ran to A and from there took a shortcut to B. If the path deviated no more
than 5° from a straight line between A and B it was classified as a direct shortcut. If
it deviated by more than 5° towards the starting point it was an inside shortcut, if it
deviated in the other direction, an outside shortcut. Both in a homogeneous and a
heterogeneous environment there were more inside than outside shortcuts.
Interestingly, there were fewer direct and more inside shortcuts in the heterogeneous
than in the homogeneous environment, although landmark-based navigation should
be easier in the heterogeneous environment and shortcuts more accurate. Chapuis
and Varlet suggest that this is an error correcting strategy. The inside shortcut takes
the dog onto the path from start to B, which it has traversed a short time before. In
the homogeneous environment there was less information available to recognise the
path, so this strategy would not have been useful. The dogs took more direct
shortcuts, presumably relying more on dead reckoning. This would be an example of
an error correcting strategy, sensitive to how much information is available for
correction. It is presumably dependent on information regarding the likely size of the
random error due to dead reckoning, and the paradigm might be used to study the
representation of uncertainty in navigation. The result also raises the possibility that
the systematic errors found in dead reckoning (see section 2.4) are part of such an
error correcting strategy, rather than errors in computation.
Other path planning
Bennett's emphasis on shortcuts as a defining feature of cognitive maps appears
misplaced. Shortcuts are not the only possible example of planning trajectories, as
shown by the approach of M. F. Brown and coworkers. Brown (1992) compared the
performance of rats in a 12-arm radial maze with a model that assumed that after
leaving an arm a rat would chose the next arm to investigate at random (within their
average arm separation bias). Visual inspection (a microchoice) will result in
rejection or walking down the arm (a macrochoice). Choices can be further
subdivided in hits (correct macrochoice), false alarms (incorrect macrochoice or false
positive), misses (incorrect microchoice or false negative) and correct rejections.
Using empirically established response biases, mean hit rates and false alarm rates,
the model closely matched the rats' behaviour without assuming that microchoices
were guided by prior knowledge of unvisited arms. Reference to a map was not
necessary to explain performance.
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However, two later studies (Brown and Huggins, 1993; Brown and Lesniak-
Karpak, 1993) showed that maze arm length, angle of inclination and brightness can
influence choice criteria. If a lax choice criterion is applied, for example, to short
arms because the cost of walking down to the end is low, then hit rates should rise
and correct rejection rates should fall. In contrast, if short arms are harder to
discriminate, then both hit rates and correct rejection rates should fall. By analogy,
rats may have a map, but the cost of microchoices may be so low that the rats prefer
to sample the visual scene and compare it to memory rather than referring to the map
and restricting their microchoices to those arms that are likely to be unvisited. If the
cost of sampling is sufficiently high, guidance of microchoices by a map will result in
greater efficiency. There will be fewer microchoices leading up to a correct
macrochoice.
Brown et al (1993) investigated this possibility by manipulating access to visual
cues. They found that guidance of microchoices depended strongly on the cost of
access to extramaze cues. Some data suggested that this was an effect of choice
criterion. Guidance did not differ between reference and working memory. Under
restricted view conditions intramaze cues had some influence, but did not exclusively
control behaviour. It appears that there is a representation that allows planning of
spatial behaviour, but it is not used for that purpose if relevant information is easily
available at the choice point.
A different approach was pursued by S. W. Brown and Mellgren (1994), who
attempted to distinguish representations of paths and destinations, in order to test a
particular type of cognitive mapping theory, the world graph model (Lieblich and
Arbib, 1982). It predicts that more information is available about places of interest
than about the paths leading there. They let rats forage on a two-storey four arm
radial maze. The rats started from a central platform on the lower level. Each of the
four arms had a ladder leading either to a central platform or to four peripheral or
dispersed platforms. The rats could take four different routes to the same place, or to
four different places. The information available at the choice point was the same in
either case. If food was replaced after each visit there was no incentive to alternate
choices. The Dispersed group nevertheless showed spontaneous alternation while the
Central group was at chance. Rewarding alternation in the Central condition raised
alternation, but not to the level of the Dispersed group without reward contingency.
Partitioning the central platform raised spontaneous alternation to the same level as in
the Dispersed group, above the level of a group foraging at an unpartitioned central
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platform. In this case the partitioned and unpartitioned Central groups had not only
the same information at the choice point, but their routes were also identical. The
results show that information about destinations is available when choices are made.
In Rescorla's terms, they exclude a pure S-R model and require at least an association
of the stimulus with a response-outcome complex.
Instantaneous transfer
Another aspect of the planning of novel trajectories is the question of transfer of
knowledge to unfamiliar areas. In the shortcut studies the question was whether
animals could find a novel route between familiar points. Here the question is
whether animals can reach a destination from an unfamiliar starting point. Morris
(1981) trained rats in the watermaze to find the escape platform from the same start
point in trial after trial. When some animals were started from other positions their
latencies to reach the platform were no longer than those of a control group. Morris
argued that this instantaneous transfer to a novel starting point favours a cognitive
mapping account, but Sutherland et al. (1987) pointed out that the starting points
were not entirely novel in that they had been traversed by the rats early in training,
when their search paths still covered much of the pool. Consequently, in one of their
experiments they used clear or opaque partitions to restrict rats' access to either visual
cues or parts of the pool or both. They found that a clear partition, dividing the pool
and making continuous trajectories between the two halves impossible, was sufficient
to prevent transfer to a new starting position, even if rats had been given separate
swimming experience in that area. Sutherland et al. concluded that to exhibit transfer
of efficient navigation to a novel start position rats must "(1) be familiar with the
distal cues viewed from the region of the novel starting location, and (2) swim
through the vicinity of the novel starting location as part of a swim path associated
with the invisible goal". However, close examination of their figure 3 suggests this is
not the case. The group of interest is one that had a clear partition, and swimming
experience in both halves of the pool. Only swimming in one half could lead to the
platform during training. This group therefore satisfied criterion 1, but not criterion
2. If Sutherland et al. are correct, then rats in this group should be inaccurate while in
the half of the pool from which they could not swim to the platform during training,
but should be accurate once they reach the half where swim paths were associated
with the goal. The swim path selected as representative shows the opposite pattern.
The rats head for the correct quadrant from the novel starting position, but are
inaccurate when in that quadrant. The experimental design has a problem that may
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account for this behaviour: removal of even a clear partition alters the shape of the
environment, which Cheng (1984) claims to be an important feature of spatial
representations. For this reason I do not accept Sutherland et al.'s interpretation, or
the argument by M. A. Brown and Sharp (1995) that this result supports an S-R
account of navigation.
Keith and McVety (1988) investigated instantaneous transfer using a latent
learning paradigm. Rats were trained in a watermaze for three days, each day with a
different platform position. Three groups were placed on the platform before each
trial to view the environment from the goal. A fourth group did not have this
opportunity. In a second phase rats searched for a platform in a pool in a completely
unfamiliar room. Those who were placed on the platform before this test showed
substantially shorter latencies compared to a group without placement in phase 2 (less
than 10 s versus 33 s), as well as a higher probability of entering the target quadrant
first. This did not depend on their receiving platform placements in phase 1. A
group placed on a platform in a different location from the one during the actual test
trial showed intermediate latencies, presumably having learned something
nonspecific such as that a platform is present or its distance from the wall. Keith and
McVety therefore argued that "the knowledge system that subserves place learning is
independent of the behavioural actions the animal must initiate to find the platform".
In other words, rats can locate the platform without learning a path first, contrary to
Sutherland et al.'s argument.
This claim was disputed by Chew et al. (1989) and later Whishaw (1991), who
argued that instantaneous transfer meant not merely significant improvement in a
novel environment after a single placement trial, but "accurate navigation". This they
defined as reaching the platform within 4 - 5 s while travelling in a straight line, i.e.
an asymptotic performance level. The definition confuses the properties of a
representation with the conditions of acquisition of information. First, it assumes that
all relevant information can be obtained from a nearly static view, despite the fact
that a swim trial would give additional distance information from motion parallax and
looming. Second, even given that information, there is likely to be some sampling
error under most conditions. A cognitive map could only be used to create accurate
trajectories once it contains accurate information.
Whishaw (1991) also used a latent learning paradigm, in an extensive series of
experiments varying the number of platform placements and the interval between
placement and swimming. Single placements improved performance and were found
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to be as effective as 5 placements prior to swimming, but after 15 placements there
was no benefit compared to a no placement group. To keep the following discussion
simple, only results from groups that benefited most from placement will be
compared to the no placement control group, without distinguishing between
placement intervals. Whishaw first trained rats for 15 days in the same pool,
swimming twice per day from the same starting point, to a different platform location
each day. Placement groups had lower latencies and fewer deviations from a straight
line, but comparison of their first trials with the no placement group's second trials
showed that placement was less effective than a swimming trial. Still, even that
single swimming trial did not lead to accurate performance by Whishaw's criteria.
Latencies were above 10 seconds and the probability of errors mostly above 0.5.
Swimming and placement were additive, as shown by comparing the second trials of
all groups. Placement groups performed better in that comparison. A placement trial
also improved performance in a new environment, but the improvement was less and
latencies in placement groups higher than those found by Keith and McVety.
Whishaw argued again that the lack of instantaneous transfer by his criteria and
the additive effects of placement and swimming constitute evidence against a
cognitive mapping account. For the reasons outlined above, this is wrong. Further,
swimming even in a familiar environment to a new location did not lead to accurate
performance, demonstrating that there were sampling errors after a single exposure.
Therefore a placement trial, giving less opportunity to use motion parallax and
looming, could not even in principle be expected to lead to accurate performance by
Whishaw's criteria. Finally, a cognitive map is not the only alternative to an S-R
model. A sufficiently detailed snapshot could, in principle, be used to generate even
an "accurate" trajectory after a single exposure. The latent learning paradigm used by
Keith and McVety and by Whishaw cannot distinguish between associative and
cognitive mapping accounts, only between use of information acquired while moving
or stationary at the destination. Distinction of information specific to a particular
route from use of motion parallax to create a spatial representation would require
further modification of experimental design. One possibility is adding a second trial
in the novel environment to Keith and McVety's experimental design. Only rats that
had a trajectory not leaving the target quadrant would be selected for the second trial.
Half would be started from the same point as in the first trial, half from the opposite
location. If an S-R mechanism were exclusively responsible for navigation, the
trajectory from the novel starting point would be as long as that in the first trial after
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placement. If path-specific information contributes, then the path from the novel
starting point should be longer than that from the familiar one in the second trial. If
the use of motion parallax makes the difference between placement and swim trials,
there should be no difference between novel and familiar paths in the second trial.
All transport of rats would have to control for dead reckoning, which none of these
experiments has done.
This is relevant because Alyan (1994) found that mice could home after passive
displacement in an environment only familiar from a stationary view (similar to a
placement trial in the studies discussed above), if optic flow was available. If they
were transported passively while eliminating optic flow and other possible
information for path integration, homing direction was random. A snapshot was not
sufficient to support homing under these conditions. In a further experiment, mice
had 24 hours to explore a rectangular arena with full view of visual cues in the room.
Then they were transported, while eliminating dead reckoning, to a nearby arena.
Each mouse spent another 24 hours in a nest box with an exit at the periphery of that
arena, enclosed by a transparent cylinder that only allowed a static view of arena and
landmarks. If mice were then displaced to the centre of the arena, without
opportunity for path integration, their homing directions were random. Therefore
comparison of information acquired in one region of the room with a static view of
another region was not sufficient to include it in an overall map. This kind of
capacity has, to my knowledge, not been conclusively demonstrated, while Alyan's
study offers evidence against it at least in mice.
There is one other aspect of path planning that can, in principle, distinguish
between use of snapshots and S-R models on the one hand and metric representations
of space on the other. That is planning of optimal trajectories between multiple
goals. Menzel (1973) found that chimpanzees who were carried by a human who was
hiding food at 18 locations in a familiar area were able to recover the food following
a completely different and more efficient path. These data were not analysed as to
how far ahead the animals must have looked in their choices. They may have simply
picked the next closest location.
Implications ofmemory loadfor maps and lists
One aspect of whether representations are goal-centered or not concerns the kind
of information that is acquired. It appears reasonable that a goal-centered
representation should only include as much information as is necessary to find the
goal. In the case of vector lists, one might expect that only landmark-goal vectors are
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stored, and perhaps just enough vectors between landmarks to identify an array. If
spatial information is stored in a map, memory load is only proportional to the
numver of locations stored. The presence of a very rich representation might be
taken to favour maps over vector lists. The patterns of exploration in the experiments
of Poucet et al. (1986) and Thinus-Blanc et al. (1987) led to the speculation that
animals may represent spatial relations that do not directly correspond to the relations
between perceptible objects in the environment. In this specific case hamsters may
have had knowledge of the shape of an empty area inside an array of landmarks and
were able to reconstruct this shape even when a landmark was missing or had been
displaced away from the empty area.
A similar effect was found by Dallal and Meek (1990), when they trained rats
with a consistent pattern of eight baited and four unbaited arms on a radial maze.
After initial training there was an interval of approximately three weeks, then the rats
were housed, trained and tested in a different environment. They were split into
Reversal and Nonreversal groups. The former was tested with a different pattern of
baited and unbaited arms, leading to a reversal of status of 50-67% of arms. The
Nonreversal group was tested with the original pattern of baited and unbaited arms.
Rats in the Nonreversal group showed no significant decrement as a result of transfer
to a new environment, while the Reversal group's performance was worse than during
the final days of training in the original environment. The difference between groups
was significant. If the rats had coded the pattern of baited and unbaited arms only
with reference to visible features, information regarding the locations of food items
relative to each other could only be retrieved in the presence of those features. The
fact that transfer of information to a new environment occurred favours the
alternative, a representation that includes information of the relative locations of all
points of interest. A related effect was reported by McLaren (1991), who found that
after making four forced choices in a radial maze rats performed better in the
following four free choices if the forced choices had been in a symmetrical pattern.
This could only make a difference if spatial relations between chosen arms were
represented, rather than only between arms and landmarks. If all such spatial
relations were stored as a list of vectors, there would be the danger of combinatorial
explosion discussed previously. A map storing metric relations only implicitly would
not suffer from this problem. Therefore evidence that information is available about
spatial relations not only between unmarked locations and visible landmarks, but also
between different unmarked locations, can be taken to favour map-like
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representations over vector lists. However, this is only an efficiency argument, not
conclusive evidence. The conditions of learning will be discussed in chapters 4 and
5.
3.3. Summary
Information from dead reckoning and from landmarks has complementary
properties. Dead reckoning uses information that is not location-specific and can
therefore be used immediately even in unfamiliar environments. The information is
metric, permitting determination of where places are and, given the capacity to
perform vector addition, also how far apart and what the cost of travelling between
them. Dead reckoning's disadvantage is the accumulation of random errors. It needs
to be reset by reference to location-specific information, available from landmarks.
Even if that landmark information is not itself metric, it can still give a reference for
resetting by providing an anchor point where the dead reckoning information on
successive visits can be averaged, removing most of the random variation.
Several possible ways of integrating landmark information and dead reckoning
allow planning of novel routes, one of the features said to define a cognitive map.
Other possible criteria are efficient coding, with the number of stored variables only
growing linearly with the number of stored places, and perhaps no decomposition of
location into the components of a coordinate. Each of these criteria would narrow
down the number of systems that would be called a map. There is evidence that bees
reset dead reckoning by reference to landmarks and add vectors based on dead
reckoning, though with limited flexibility. As reviewed in the last chapter, rodents
and birds use metric information from landmarks, and are able to complete planned
trajectories without visual feedback, presumably using path integration. There is also
evidence for choice between multiple destinations based on a spatial representation,
and that this includes information about destinations, not only routes. I suggest that
much of the dispute over what constitutes evidence for the existence of a cognitive
map (for example, Bennett, 1996) stems from the use of different and not explicitly
defined criteria. The proposed classification of possible cognitive maps might form
the basis of definitions sufficiently precise to convince even Bennett that the term
'cognitive map' is meaningful.
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4. Landmark Stability
In order to achieve good cue control for a blocking experiment, initially the
procedures of Collett et al (1986) were followed by moving landmarks from trial to
trial to establish them as the only reliable predictors of reward location in an open
field maze. After two unsuccessful pilot studies it was found that animals did show
focused search, controlled by the landmarks, if the landmarks were stable throughout
training. This conforms to O'Keefe and Nadel's (1978) prediction that "variability
makes it difficult, if not impossible, to build a useful map". The studies, by Kraemer
et al. (1983) and Spetch and Honig (1988), also indicated a detrimental effect of
instability on spatial learning. In contrast, it is usually found in associative learning
that animals concentrate on the best predictor of a stimulus, to the detriment of
learning about other signals. The classic exemplars of this latter principle are the
experiments by Rescorla (1968) and Wagner et al. (1968). Rescorla varied how well
a target stimulus predicted that reinforcement would occur. Wagner et al. varied how
well other stimuli predicted reinforcement while keeping constant the conditional
relationship between the target stimulus and reinforcement. In that respect, the
following experiments on landmark stability, conducted with Dr. R. G. M. Morris, are
analogous to those of Wagner et al., excepting that we explored the effects of
systematic variation of spatial, not conditional, relationships. As in Wagner et al.'s
experiment, the relationship between the target cue and reward, in our case the
distance to landmark(s), and the direction relative to landmark(s) and polarising cues,
were the same in a stable or Fixed and in an unstable or Varied condition. The
difference between conditions lay in how informative the non-target cues were with
respect to the location of reward. The less informative cues other than the landmarks
were, the less they should be able to compete with the landmarks. A further
difference to Wagner et al's experiment lies in the fact that our non-target cues must
be the larger frame of reference, rather than another landmark. Only if there is that
larger frame of reference is there any basis for classifying the target landmark(s) as
stable or unstable. In other words, we explored a spatial analog of relative validity
and not, strictly speaking, relative validity itself. The experiments also differed
crucially from those of Kraemer et al and Spetch and Honig, where there was no clear
separation of stable and unstable landmarks, and the tasks only required
discrimination of discretely marked locations, rather than navigation to unmarked
ones. If a stable reference frame were clearly separated from the unstable one,
without spatial overlap, that limited stability might be sufficient to support spatial
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learning. If there was still no learning, this result would provide a stronger argument
that stability is an important feature in spatial learning. Furthermore, it cannot be
taken for granted that the processes engaged by a spatial discrimination are in all
respects identical to those used in navigation. The effects of landmark stability or
lack of it had not been established and it was decided to investigate this issue before
returning to the study of blocking in the spatial domain. The experiments described
below were designed to test the effect of instability on learning rather than asymptotic
performance, to clearly separate stable and unstable cues, and they required
navigation rather than discrete choices.
4.1. Experiment 1: Landmark stability and
dissociation of spatial learning and
discrimination
Methods
Subjects The subjects (N=16) were experimentally naive male Lister hooded rats
which, through controlled feeding, were maintained at 85% of their free feeding
weight. One animal in each group was dropped from the experiment after day 4
because they failed to eat the reward, leaving group sizes of 7.
Apparatus The experiments were conducted in a 3.3m by 3.3m square arena, with
40cm high white walls and filled to a
height of 5cm with wood shavings. This
arena was set within a larger square room
with black walls and surrounded by
movable ceiling-to-floor curtains. These
curtains were black on three sides and
white on the remaining side. The
orientation of the white curtain - the
polarising cue - was varied between days
in a random sequence, with the constraint
that all orientations occurred equally often
and none twice in a row. Although not
geocentrically stable, it will be referred to
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The feeders were made of chrome tube, 5cm long and 19mm diameter, mounted
on a plywood base Both contained an equivalent amount of the cereal "Kellogg's
Coco Pops" as reward. In one feeder, designated F+, this reward rested on a 4.1cm
long wooden dowel and was thus accessible to the rats. In the other feeder, F-, the
dowel was only 8mm long, and the food consequently inaccessible. When in place,
all but the top surface of the feeders was beneath the wood shavings.
The two landmarks had distinctive shapes, textures and odours. LI was a
tetrahedron with unequal surfaces, covered with sandpaper on which 1ml of
strawberry flavouring was added at the beginning of each training session. L2
consisted of two low carpet-covered plywood walls arranged in an L-shape with 1ml
of added coffee flavouring. Either of these landmarks could be L+, defined as the
landmark nearest the feeder with the accessible reward. In each group of 7 rats, 4
were trained with LI as L+ and L2 as L- and 3 were trained with L2 as L+ and LI as
L-. Two near-identical copies of each landmark were used alternately throughout
training in order to equate exposure prior to an end-of-training "identical landmarks
test".
Each feeder was located at a distance of 40 cm from its corresponding landmark.
F+ was always to the south (ie. opposite the white curtain) of L+ and F- to the north
of L-. The spatial relations within each landmark-feeder array and its orientation
relative to the polarising cue were always constant.
The movements of the animals in the arena were monitored by an overhead video
camera, connected to an HVS image analyser and an Acorn A5000 microcomputer
housed in an adjacent room. Custom software recorded the time taken to find the
food and displayed, in real-time, the paths taken by the rats as a series of x,y
coordinates (Spooner et al., 1994). Analysis of time spent searching at specific
locations was later conducted off-line.
Procedure Pretraining: Before the start of training the rats had 10 days of
handling and, in a separate cage in the animal house, were trained to eat from the
feeder. This was followed by two days of 30 min habituation in the empty maze (no
landmarks or feeders), first in pairs, then individually.
Training: The animals were divided into 2 groups. In Group Fixed, both
landmark-feeder arrays (L+F+ and L-F-) stayed in a consistent position in the arena
throughout training. In Group Varied, the two landmark-feeder arrays were moved to
a new position after each trial with their orientation relative to the polarising cue the
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same in all trials. The sequence of positions of the L+F+ and L-F- arrays was
random, within the central 7x7 grid, subject only to the constraint that a landmark
was not allowed to occupy a position adjacent to that of a feeder (in a completely
random positioning sequence, this would have been possible as the two arrays moved
independently). The adequacy of this design and those of the following experiments
relies on subjects extracting a location-independent reference direction from the
polarising cues (Taube et al. 1990a; Taube et al. 1990b).
The training procedure lasted for 22 days with 5 trials per day. The rats started a
trial at the centre of and facing one of the walls in a quasi-random sequence, with the
constraints that the start positions were used equally often and each at least once a
day. A trial ended when the rat found the food, or after 120 sec, whichever was the
shorter. A rat which failed to find the food within 120 sec was picked up and placed
in front of the feeder up to 3 times or until it ate. The feeder was then refilled and the
bedding thoroughly shuffled before the next rat was put in the maze. One
nonrewarded trial, of 60 sec duration in which neither food nor landmarks were
present, was intermixed with normal training trials each day. Thus, of the 5 trials per
day, 4 were rewarded and 1 nonrewarded.
The animals were run in groups of 7, so the intertrial interval (ITI) for each
particular animal depended on the latency of the others, declining from about 30 min
at the beginning of training to about 20 min at the end. The subjects were transported
to the start locations in an opaque, slowly rotating box to prevent them from using
vestibular cues or any other directional cues outside the arena. They were removed
from the arena at the end of a trial in the same box.
Transfer Tests Once a stable level of performance had been attained, a series of 5
different tests was conducted to explore the animals' search behaviour and,
specifically, how well they had learned the location of the reward in the presence and
absence of the landmarks.
Tests with landmarks : These took place on days 18, 19, 21 and 22. They were
numbered in logical rather than chronological order. Tests 1 - 3: These were tests
with both L+ and L- landmarks to establish whether the animals discriminated
between the landmarks and whether they had learned the spatial locations of the food
relative to the landmarks and/or relative to the arena. The F+ and F- feeders were
absent until the test ended after 60 sec, at which point the F+ feeder was placed in the
appropriate location and the animal allowed to eat. The positions of L+ and L- were
always the same for both the Fixed and Varied groups. In Test 1 (day 18), the
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landmarks were in the same positions as they had occupied during training for group
Fixed (ie. Fig 5.1.); for Test 2 (day 19), the landmarks were displaced a small distance
(20 cm along each axis) from this same training location; and, for Test 3 (day 22), the
displacement of the landmarks relative to this training location was large (20 cm east-
west and 120 cm north-south). We reasoned that the landmarks must be determining
search location if the search pattern was seen to be displaced equivalently. This may
prove to be easier with a small landmark displacement, for which the position of L+
within the arena would appear to the animals to have hardly changed, than it would
with the larger displacement. Test 4 (day 21) was a test with identical copies of the
L+ landmark placed in the same locations as during training in group Fixed. It
provided an additional control for spurious cues. The white curtain was replaced by a
black curtain, as the presence of the polarising cue would have disambiguated the two
landmark locations in group Fixed.
Tests without landmarks : In Test NL (for No Landmarks), both the landmarks
and the feeders were absent, this being procedurally identical to the nonrewarded
trials conducted throughout training. This test served to indicate whether the animals
were using context cues to identify the feeder location. We noticed that, in the
absence of the landmarks, the animals only moved slowly away from the starting
position, resulting in a bias towards the area in the immediate vicinity. To
counterbalance for this, we decided to consider Test NL as the average of the
performance on day 20 with that seen on day 13 using an opposite starting location
(both days were during the period of asymptotic performance).
Data collection and analyses: Acquisition. Latency was recorded as the time
taken by the animal from being placed into the arena until it found the food at F+.
Latencies were averaged across trials in 2-day blocks (8 rewarded trials).
Proportion of correct first choices: An animal was considered to have made a
"correct choice" if it found F+ without first checking F-. These were also averaged
across trials in 2-day blocks.
Tests In addition to a display of the paths taken on individual trials, the software
included a facility for computing the times spent searching in circumscribed areas of
the arena. Several different measures were computed to examine discrimination
learning and spatial learning. The first step was to measure the times spent in 20 cm
x 20 cm squares, hereafter called "cells", arranged in the 11 x 11 grid centred within
the arena (defined in Fig 4.2.). Of these 121 cells, we focused upon the time spent in
23 cells around L+ and 23 around L- (2 cells of the 5 x 5 grid around each landmark
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being left out because of Figure 4.2. The distribution of time was recorded in an 11 x 11
grid of 20 cm x 20 cm cells. Areas A+ and A- are crosshatched.
overlap of these two grid Spatial bias compared time at F+ with those in three cells at the
same distasnce, but in the whitp riirtoJn
areas in some tests).
Discrimination Learning
: The total time spent in
the 23 cells around L+
(called A+, because it was
the rewarded area) was
compared to the total time
spent in the corresponding
area around L- (ie. A-).
These times were calculated for all tests, but data from Tests 1-3 were averaged. In
Test NL, the A+ and A- locations in both groups were as defined for group Fixed had
the landmarks been present.
Spatial Learning : We computed 3 separate measures of spatial learning. The first
was Time at F+. The second, called Spatial bias, involved comparing the time spent
at F+ with the times spent in the 3 cells having equivalent (E) spatial relations to L+,
ie. 40 cm to the north, east or west (the E cells in Fig 1A). These times were entered
into a ratio of the form (A/A+B), where A was the time at F+ and B the sum of times
at the other locations (chance = 0.25). The third measure, relevant only to Test 2 with
the small landmark displacement, is the ratio (A/A+B) of time spent by group Fixed
at F+ compared to the time at the adjacent location which F+ had occupied during
training (chance = 0.5). This shows whether search shifted with the landmark in that
test. As both ratio measures are undefined in rare instances when both A and B are
zero, the ratio was assumed to be at chance in such cases.
Results
The presentation of results is split into three parts. First, following a brief
qualitative description of the behaviour of the animals in the arena, we outline the
choice and latency data during acquisition. Second, the search patterns during the
transfer tests are described qualitatively. Third, a detailed statistical analysis of these
search patterns is presented. Though based on the same raw data, it is more extensive
than the analysis in Biegler and Morris (1993) and modified to take account of
comments.
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Blocks of two days Blocks of two days
Figure 4.3. (A) Latencies to finding food during acqisition. (B) The proportion of first choices to F+
rather than F-.
Acquisition
Despite habituation, the rats were initially reluctant to leave the walls of the arena
and often remained in the corners for long periods. When they did venture into the
centre, they usually investigated the landmarks. Next came a phase marked by
frequent visits to both landmarks and search in their near vicinity. As the number of
visits to landmarks declined, a difference between groups became apparent. Animals
in group Fixed developed a tendency to take more direct paths to the goal (F+) than
those in group Varied.
There was a decline in latency (F 10/120 = 60.05, p < 0.0001) and an increase in
the number of correct choices (F 10/120 = 4.66, p < 0.0001) across blocks, but no
overall difference between groups on either measure (ps > 0.2; Fig 4.3.). Analysis of
the choice data showed a significant Groups x Blocks interaction (F 1/10 = 2.03, p <
0.05).
Tests - Qualitative description
Fig 4.4. shows the paths taken by the animals as they moved around the arena
during Tests 1, 2 and NL. There was a striking difference in the search pattern when
the landmarks were absent (Test NL) compared to when they were present. During
Test NL, neither group searched predominantly in the central area of the arena, nor
did group Fixed search in the vicinity of F+. This indicates that the "context" cues,
on their own, had little if any control over search behaviour. In Test 1, by
comparison, the animals moved to the central area of the arena and spent virtually all
of their time searching at or around the landmarks.
The search patterns shown in Test 1 also reveal that both groups spent more time
in the vicinity of L+ than in the vicinity of L-. That is, although both landmarks were
present on all training trials on which food was available, the animals discriminated
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Fixed Varied
Test 1, Landmarks in the training position of group Fixed
Test 2, L+ shifted 20 cm North and West, L- shifted 20 cm South and East
Test 4, no polarising cues, two identical copies of L+
Test NL, No Landmarks. Paths from two tests superimposed.
Figure 4.4. Paths during transfer tests. All diagrams have been rotated so that the white curtain is up
in this figure. The small grey squares in Test 2 show the location of F+ during training and after the
landmark shift. Rats did not search at the training location.
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between them based on their relative proximity to F+ and F-.
There is, however, a further difference. Group Fixed spent a lot of time at F+,
indeed it is the longest time in any cell. In comparison, group Varied spent most time
around the L+ landmark, with no visible concentration of search at F+. This striking
difference in the search pattern of the two groups suggests that spatial learning
occurred only in group Fixed, while both groups learned to discriminate the
landmarks.
In Test 2, with a small displacement of the landmarks, group Fixed searched at the
location now specified by L+ in preference to where the feeder had been located
during training. This reveals that accurate search was directed by the landmarks and
not merely triggered by them. However, during Test 2, the rats spent less time
searching at F+ than during Test 1, indicating that they had detected the small
displacement of L+. In Test 3, with a large displacement, performance in group
Fixed deteriorated further. In Test 4, using two identical L+ landmarks and no
polarising cues, discrimination fell to chance in both groups.
Tests - Quantitative analysis
During transfer tests, search became more diffuse over time. Of the total time at
F+ and the equivalent (E) locations around L+, 63.8 ± 3.7% occurred during the first
30 sec of the 60 sec tests with landmarks (Tests 1-4 inclusive). It therefore seemed
most appropriate to focus on the first half of each transfer test because it gives a more
accurate picture of performance.
Discrimination learning
Varying the landmark location across trials did not affect discrimination learning
(Fig 4.5). In Tests 1 - 3, the discrimination between landmarks, defined as the
difference in search time in A+ and A- respectively, was highly reliable (averaged
A. Different landmarks (Tests 1 - 3) B. Identical landmarks (Test 4) C. No landmarks present (Test NL)
18-,
I, rh (I Hi HqII II ii
Fixed Varied Fixed Varied Fixed Varied
A+ A A+ A- A+ A A+ A A+ k A+ A
Figure 4.5. Discrimination between landmarks: Times in A+ and A- areas during transfer tests.
103
across tests, F 1/12 = 22.23, p < 0.001) with groups Fixed and Varied discriminating
equally well (F < 1, p > 0.8; Fig 4.5). In Test 4, using identical landmarks and no
polarising cue, discrimination fell to chance as expected (F < 1; Fig 4.5B). The two
groups did not differ in this respect (F 1/12 = 1.16, p > 0.3). In Test NL, neither
group showed a preference for the A+ area over the A- area (F < 1; Fig 5C), but the
overall time spent at both areas was slightly less in group Fixed (F 1/12 = 10.90,
p < 0.02). Note that the A+ and A- areas are of no special significance to group
Varied in the absence of landmarks.
Thus, when present, the landmarks controlled discrimination performance. In
tests without landmarks, the rats of group Fixed did not search in any one location
and did not discriminate between landmark locations, indicating that the context cues
on their own did not guide search behaviour. Paradoxically, group Varied appears to
rely to a small extent on context cues to search the central area in which food could
have been hidden, although this area is, in principle, predicted less accurately by the
context cues than the single location in group Fixed.
Spatial Learning
Varying the landmark location did, however, disrupt spatial learning completely
(Fig 4.6.). Group Fixed spent significantly more time at the F+ location (F 1/12 =
19.77, p < 0.001) and its spatial bias was more pronounced (F 1/12 = 33.97, p <
0.0001).
With respect to Time at F+ (Fig 4.6.), the overall difference between tests was
significant (F 3/36 = 10.88, p < 0.0001) due to more time being spent at the feeder
location in Test 1 than in any other test (ps < 0.01). A significant Groups x Test
interaction (F 3/36 = 15.28, p < 0.0001) was caused by group Fixed spending more
time at F+ than group Varied only in Test 1 (p < 0.001) and by a decline in the time
Figure 4.6. Time at F+ during tests. In group fixed
performance depended strongly on the size of
landmark displacment. In Test 4, with identical
landmarks, search time was distributed between F+
and F- (not shown).
Fixed Varied Fixed Varied Fixed Varied Fixed Varied Fixed Varied
Testl.no Test 2, small Test 3, large Test 4, identi- TestNL.no
displacement displacement displacement cal landmarks landmarks
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spent at F+ across tests by group Fixed (p < 0.001). In Test NL, the search
distribution was far more diffuse. The maximum average time in any of the analysed
121 cells (ie. the largest pixel shown in Fig 3) was 0.39 sec for group Fixed and 0.54
sec for group Varied, compared to 7.71 sec (at F+) and 2.57 sec (near the L+
landmark) respectively in Test 1. However, the critical measure, in assessing the
control of search by context cues in the absence of the landmarks, is the time spent at
F+. In Test NL, this was 0.22 + 0.14 sec for group Fixed and 0.16 + 0.05 for group
Varied. Neither differed from the chance level of 0.11 sec (t< 1; t=1.18; ps > 0.10,
respectively).
With respect to Spatial bias (Fig 4.7.), Group Fixed performed above chance in all
four tests with landmarks, group Varied in none. The difference between the groups
was significant (F 1/36 = 33.97, p < 0.0001). There was no effect of Tests (F < 1),
nor a Groups x Test interaction (F 3/36 = 1.72, p > 0.1). The similar scores for
spatial bias in Test 4 (identical landmarks) were to be expected as the spatial relations
between the two L+ landmarks and their respective F+ locations remained unchanged.
Test 2, with a small landmark displacement, was conducted to investigate whether
search for F+ would occur at the location specified by the now shifted L+ or at that
defined by context cues (Fig 4.4.). Six of seven rats searched at the former location,
none at the latter, giving a ratio of search at these two locations of 0.93 ± 0.07, well
above chance (p < 0.0001). It should be noted that this concentration of search at the
F+ location specified by the shifted landmark occurred despite the animals having
detected that the landmark had moved (see above).
Discussion
The main findings of Experiment 1 were: (1) the dissociation between spatial and
discrimination learning, and (2) that landmark stability affected spatial learning. Both
Testl.no Test 2, small Test 3, large Test 4, identi- TestNL.no
displacement displacement displacement cal landmarks landmarks
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groups searched preferentially around the L+ rather than the L- landmark,
discriminating equally well between the landmarks with respect to their proximity to
the accessible food. However, only the group with the landmarks in fixed locations
learned their relation to food. Group Fixed spent far more time searching at the F+
location during Test 1 with the landmarks present than in Test NL when they were
absent; it also showed a clear Spatial bias to F+ rather than any other location around
the L+ landmark. Group Varied spent little time searching at F+ and showed no
spatial bias. The greater time at F+ in group Fixed cannot have been due to context
cues because time at F+ in the absence of the landmarks was very low and did not
differ from chance. If anything, the contribution of context cues to search in the
central area of the arena was greater in group Varied.
It was intended that the groups should only differ in the accuracy of distance
information available from landmark or context cues. Under this assumption the
effect of landmark stability is surprising from the perspective of associative learning
theory. Learning about the relationship between discrete cues (such as lights or
tones) and the events they may predict (such as food), proceeds most effectively
under conditions in which a cue is the sole predictor of reward. In this experiment the
probability of receiving food was the same for both groups, but in group Fixed use of
the walls and curtains could restrict search to a much smaller area than in group
Varied. Therefore control by the landmark should have been best in group Varied,
yet search was most focused during Test 1 in group Fixed. This result could be
explained in associative terms if that focused search was an additive effect of both
context cues and landmark. But the random search in the absence of landmarks
establishes that this was not the case. An alternative associative explanation is that
the landmarks were mere conditional signals, or occasion setters, triggering search at
the F+ location as defined by context cues. This is ruled out by the results of Test 2,
in which the location of search was determined by the displaced location of L+. It
follows that the better learning of the landmark/F+ spatial relationship by group Fixed
cannot be explained by competition between landmark and context cues for a limited
sum of associative strength or attention. Such additive interaction is assumed to be
the basis of contingency effects, overshadowing and blocking in conditioning.
Instead the results may be interpreted in terms of a principle of landmark stability: "If
it moves, don't use it as a landmark". The assumption is that navigational processes
evolved to build a stable representation of the world, and if an object moves, there is
no reason to assume that other items of interest will move with it. Therefore it should
106
be ignored. Obviously, there must be a limit below which movement has no effect,
even if it is only a limit of detecting movement. If the decision is not an all-or-
nothing process, the rule may be similar to that found when creating a discrepancy
between sources of spatial information after training in a stable environment:
Classify information according to accuracy and reliability. When there is a
discrepancy, give relatively less weight to unreliable information the larger that
discrepancy is. This would a multiplicative, rather than additive interaction.
There are two factors limiting the necessity to appeal to a principle of landmark
stability in this experiment. First, it was intended that the only difference between
groups should be in landmark displacement, not in directional cues. However, after
publication of these data (Biegler and Morris 1993), we realised that the consistently
asymmetric placement of L+ and its stable relationship to L- may have given group
Fixed directional cues not available to group Varied. If distance and direction from
landmarks were learned independently, this would make no difference. If there was
no landmark stability effect, group Varied would still be expected to search at least at
the right distance from L+. On the other hand, if it is only possible to represent
complete landmark goal vectors, with both distance and direction or distances in two
axes, lack of a good directional cue would mean group Varied simply had no spatial
relationship available that it could learn.
Second, an account within the framework of associative learning theory may be
possible if it is assumed that spatial representation requires configural associations
(Sutherland & Rudy, 1989). In each landmark location in the arena, the view of the
L+ landmark from the goal would form a unique configuration with background cues.
Slower learning by group Varied would follow because it would need to learn as
many different configurations as there are landmark locations. The contextual
retrieval hypothesis (Hall & Honey, 1989) gives a similar account, with neither being
concerned with the spatial arrangement of the landmarks in an array. Altering the
spatial arrangement of landmarks across groups would not change the number of
configural associations to be formed, and so have no effect on rate of learning. In
contrast, an interpretation of cognitive mapping that allows the formation of small-
scale local maps (O'Keefe, 1991; Worden, 1992) would regard such a parameter as
critical. A directional cue, a single landmark and a feeder only specify two spatial
variables. A triangular array of two separate landmarks and a feeder has at least six
variables, three angles and three distances. A directional cue will add three angles.
Local stability of these variables may be sufficient to support spatial learning even in
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the absence of global stability relative to a larger frame of reference.
In summary, a simple associative theory incorrectly predicts that landmark
stability should reduce the strength of the association between the landmark and
reward through competition by other cues. A configural or context-retrieval
hypothesis may be able to explain the results od Experiment 1, but predicts that rate
of learning would be independent of the spatial arrangement of landmarks. The
availability of directional cues must not be confounded with landmark stability. The
next experiment was designed to address the issues of directional cues and local
versus global landmark stability.
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4.2. Experiment 2: Local and global stability
In Experiment 2 the L+ landmark or array was placed in the centre of the arena
(on average) to avoid giving a directional cue through asymmetric placement. This
was only an average placement, as in group Varied the landmark had to move. To
avoid accumulation of olfactory traces in one spot, the landmark or array also moved
in group "Fixed", but the size of displacement was smaller by a factor 5. No L-
landmark was used to remove any effect of its relationship with L+. Arrays of a
"Single" landmark and feeder were compared with triangular "Spaced" arrays of two
landmarks and feeder. To control for possible effects of greater salience of two
landmarks there was a third "Clustered" landmark arrangement, where the two
landmarks were as close side by side as physically possible.
Methods
Subjects The subjects were 42 experimentally naive male Lister-hooded rats,
maintained at 85% of their free feeding weight. These were selected from a total of
64 animals run until the second day of training. The rats continuing the experiment
were those that searched reliably for food. Animals were assigned at random to
groups before this selection was made.
Apparatus The experiment was conducted in the same apparatus as Experiment
1. The only changes were the use of "Kellogg's Ricicles" as reward (which are the
same colour as the sawdust) and the presence of a loudspeaker behind the centre of
each wall. During training the speaker to the "north" (behind the wall under the white
curtain) emitted white noise to mask potential acoustic cues and to provide an
additional directional cue.
There were two landmarks (Fig 4.8). LI was a steep pyramid with a 15 cm wide
base and 29.2 cm high. At 19.4 cm and 11.6 cm height were two protruding
"terraces" of 2 cm and 2.5 cm width. Between the two terraces, the landmark was
covered with rough sandpaper with a black stripe of 2.2 cm width below the lower
terrace. The rest of the landmark was painted "signal red". Inside the tip of LI was
some carpet to which 1 ml of almond essence was added before each session. Holes
in the top allowed the odour to escape. Landmark L2 consisted of a stack of four
layers of four golf balls each on a wooden base, with a green tennis ball on top. The
lower half of the tennis ball had 1 ml of strawberry essence added. L2 was 25.5 cm
high with a maximum diameter of 9.8 cm. In a pilot study these landmarks had been




configurations, arena and areas
included in the quantitative
analysis. In the Single landmark
configuration, the identity of the
landmark was counterbalanced
within groups. In Clustered and
Spaced configurations the
identity of the landmarks in Test
3 was counterbalanced. Time at
F+ was recorded in all groups.
Directional bias, compared
cumulative time in the three light
grey cells in the direction of F+
with the cumulative time in the
corresponding cells in the three
other cardinal directions. The
chance level is 0.25. Distance
ratio, compared the average time
in the F+ and E cells with the
average time in the "background"
- this being defined as including
all cells in a 5 x 5 grid centred on
the landmark, excepting those of
the landmark location itself (dark
grey) and the F+ and E cells.
Chance level is 0.5. The analysis
of Directional bias and Distance
ratio in Single and Clustered
configurations is identical. In the Spaced configuration only 2 cells are at equivalent directions from
both landmarks and the chance level of Directional bias is therefore 0.5.
alternation throughout training in anticipation of the test with two identical
landmarks.
Only one feeder, containing accessible food, could be present during training (F+).
It was placed 50 cm south of a single landmark or two landmark cluster, and 50 cm
south of LI and 50 cm west of L2 in the Spaced landmark array condition (see below
and Fig 4.8.).
Procedure Pretraining: The rats had 10 days of handling and training to eat from
the feeder in a separate cage in the animal house. This was followed by 3 days of
habituation in the maze. During the first 2 days, they spent 2 half hour sessions per
day in the empty arena, in groups of 4 rats. On the third day of habituation,
individual animals had one 10 min habituation session during which 4 feeders were in
the arena, arranged in a square of lm each side. We recorded which feeder was
visited first and the latency until the correct feeder was found.
Training: Training conditions differed along two independent dimensions:
Landmark Stability and Landmark Arrangement. In the Stability dimension, groups
were again divided into Fixed and Varied. For the Varied groups, the landmarks were
moved randomly between 15 possible locations in a 4 x 4 grid with 50 cm spacing (ie.








groups, the landmarks were not literally
immobile, but moved in a similar grid with
10 cm spacing between adjacent positions
(ie a 30 cm x 30 cm area; Fig 4.9). In the
other dimension, groups were trained with
one of three landmark arrangements -
Single, Clustered and Spaced. The Single
arrangement consisted of only one landmark
50 cm north of F+, Clustered of two
landmarks side by side replacing the one
landmark of the Single arrangement, and the
Spaced arrangement of landmarks and
feeder forming a right-angled triangle with
both landmarks 50 cm from the feeder (Fig
4.8). For a given trial, the landmark(s) were
placed on the target position of the grid for
groups Single and Clustered, and the centre
of the landmark array for group Spaced.
Thus, there were six groups: Fixed-Single
(example in Figure 4.9), Varied-Single,
Fixed-Clustered, Varied-Clustered (Fig 4.9),
Figure 4.9. In the Varied condition the
Fixed-Spaced, and Varied-Spaced (Fig 4.9; location of the array varied rasndomly
between 15 positions in a 4 x 4 grid with 50
cm spacing. The 16th position, indicated by
dashed lines, was used only in a test. In the
and feeder were fixed condition the array moved between the
corresponding positions in a grid with 10 cm
introduced on the first day of training. The spacing. In Single and Clustered
arrangments, the landmarks were placed
array of landmarks and feeder was moved directly on grid positions, in the Spaced
. . .... . arrangement the centre of the landmark array,
before each trial, in a random sequence, to a
different grid position, with the constraint that the array was not in one of the two
positions closest to the start location. The orientation of the polarising cues and
arrays was changed between trials in a random sequence.
Training protocol: The subjects were again transported to the start locations in the
opaque, slowly rotating box. They started a trial facing one of the walls in a random
sequence, with the constraint that each of the 4 start positions was used once a day.
They were run in groups of 6 - 8 animals, so the ITI for each particular rat depended
on the latency of the others. ITI varied from about 80 min at the beginning of training
N=7 for all groups).
The landmarks
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to about 60 min at the end.
The rats were trained for 25 days. During the first two days there were 2 trials per
day, both rewarded, on all other days 4 trials, 1 of them unrewarded. A training trial
ended when the rat found the food or after 300 sec, whichever was the shorter. A rat
which failed to find the food within 300 sec was picked up and placed in front of the
feeder until it ate. The feeder was then refilled and the bedding thoroughly shuffled
before the next rat was put in the maze. During the first 5 days, the top of the feeder
was 2 - 3 cm above the bedding. On days 6 to 8, this margin was reduced to about 1
cm. On all subsequent days the bedding was level with the feeder. Rats were
removed from the maze before they stopped eating. The unrewarded trial of 60 sec
duration, in which neither food nor landmarks were present, was intermixed with
normal training trials.
Transfer tests: There were four types of test, all of 60 sec duration. Test 1 (day
21), was conducted with polarising cues and with the landmark array in a position
previously used in training (familiar location). At that point in training, there had
been exactly 60 rewarded trials, with 4 in each of the 15 positions used in training. In
Test 2 (day 23), the landmark array was in a novel position, the 16th location of the
grids not used during training. Test 3 (day 25) was conducted without polarising
cues. There were black curtains on all sides, all four speakers emitted noise, and two
identical landmarks were used for the Spaced and Clustered groups (LI and L2 were
counterbalanced within groups). Test NL (no landmarks) was the average of 3 tests
on days 20, 22 and 24.
Data collection and analyses The image analyser was replaced by a digitising
board that performed video frame grabbing at 10Hz; this gave better tracking of the
animals (Spooner et al., 1994). Otherwise, data collection proceeded as in
Experiment 1.
Acquisition. Latencies: These were averaged across trials in 2-day blocks. As
there was an odd number of training days, day 25 was excluded from the analysis.
Transfer tests. Search distribution was computed for 29 cells around the
landmarks, 25 in a 5 x 5 grid whose centre coincided with those of the respective
landmark arrays, plus 1 cell beyond this grid in each of the four cardinal directions.
Each cell measured 25 cm x 25 cm. Three measures of performance were calculated.
First, Time at F+ provides a measure of commitment to search at the correct
location, but confounds knowledge of direction and distance. These two components
were assessed separately in the two other measures.
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Second, Directional bias, which took the form A/(A + B), was calculated for the
Single and Clustered conditions by comparing total time spent in the three cells in the
direction of F+ (ie. F+ itself and the cells closer to and further from the landmark;
area A) with the sum of times spent in the corresponding cells in the other three
cardinal directions (area B). The chance level is 0.25. Directional bias may be less
sensitive than Spatial bias used in Experiment 1, as it includes some of the time the
animals spend walking round the landmark, but has the advantage of being
independent from distance (Spatial bias reflects knowledge of direction at the correct
distance only. It was used in Experiment 1 because the landmarks extended into cells
adjacent to the central one and, in some tests, the landmarks were sufficiently close
together that search at L- could have influenced directional bias at L+. In
Experiments 2 and 3, these constraints no longer applied). In the Spaced landmarks
condition, only two cells are at equivalent directions from both landmarks (F+ and E
in Fig 7A). Therefore, in calculating Directional Bias using the ratio A/(A + B), A
was taken as the time at F+ and B as the time at the opposite location (E).
Consequently, the chance level changes to 0.5 and so parametric statistical
comparisons with Single and Clustered arrangements are not possible.
Third, Distance ratio was an analogous A/(A+B) ratio, where A was the average
of time at F+ and at the equivalent locations (E in Fig 4.9.) and B the average time in
the "background". The background consisted of all locations in a 5 x 5 grid of 25 cm
x 25 cm cells around the landmark, excepting cells containing landmarks, F+ or E




Although initially reluctant to leave the walls, only 3 rats (out of 42) failed to find
reward unaided during the first trial (day 1). Performance improved steadily before
(blocks 1-4) and after (blocks 5-12) the feeder was flush with the surface (Fig 4.10).
Systematic search patterns appeared within a few days in groups Fixed-Single and
Fixed-Clustered. Most frequently, the rats of these groups would check a location at
the correct distance from the landmark(s), return to the landmark(s) and then turn and
visit the next location until finding food at the correct place. Such patterns were
much less frequent in the Varied-Single and Varied-Clustered groups for which the
animals adopted apparently random searching near the landmark(s). In the Spaced-
landmarks groups, preferential searching on the appropriate side of the 2 landmarks
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Figure 4.10. Latency to find food (sec ±1 S.E.M.) during training with a visible feeder (blocks 1-4)
and with a hidden feeder (blocks 5-12). Note faster times to find food in groups with two landmarks
during the early stages of training with a hidden feeder.
emerged relatively early with the accuracy improving during training. Visits to the
symmetric location opposite to the feeder occurred only rarely.
While the feeder was visible, analysis of latencies showed neither an effect of
Arrangement nor Stability (Fs < 1). The improvement across Blocks was highly
significant (F 3/108 = 84.19, p < 0.0001) as was the Arrangement x Blocks
interaction (F 6/108 = 3.51, p < 0.01). Differences between arrangements existed
only during the first block, when the Spaced-landmarks groups' latencies were longer.
When the feeder was hidden, effects of Arrangement (F 2/36 = 6.44, p < 0.005)
and Stability (F 1/36 = 16.54, p < 0.001) appeared. Single landmark groups had
longer latencies than Clustered and Spaced groups (p < 0.05, t-test) and Varied groups
took longer than Fixed groups. The rats improved over blocks (F 7/252 = 24.70, p <
0.0001), with a Stability x Block interaction (F 7/252 = 4.53, p < 0.0001). In an
analysis of blocks 10-12 (ie. the transfer test days), the effects of Stability (F 1/36 =
7.39, p < 0.01) and Arrangement (F 2/36 = 8.96, p < 0.001) were still significant, but
the Spaced groups had lower latencies (p < 0.01, t-test) than either Single or Clustered
groups, which in turn did not differ from each other. Thus, search latency with a
hidden feeder appeared to be influenced by the number of landmarks early in training,
and by their spatial arrangement later on.
Tests - Qualitative description
The paths taken by all rats during Tests 1 and 2 are shown in Fig 4.11. Three
qualitative features of the paths are apparent: First, the most focused searching at the
correct F+ location was in the Fixed-Spaced group (Fig 4.11, bottom-left), although,
even in this group, search accuracy was much lower than in Experiment 1. Second,
the Fixed-Single and Fixed-Clustered groups showed no obvious directional
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distance and direction relative to the walls (the geometry of the arena defines 4
equivalent locations). Third, the Varied-Single and Varied-Clustered groups searched
with a more diffuse pattern and closer to the landmark(s). The paths taken during the
three tests without landmarks (constituting Test NL) are shown in Fig 4.1 IB. All
animals spent a great deal of time near the side walls. Other than in group Fixed-
Single, there is relatively little searching in the general area of the arena where food
might have been found. The quantitative analysis bears out this qualitative
description.
Tests - Quantitative analysis
There are two preliminary considerations. First, it was decided to base the
analysis on only the first half of each transfer test. The reason is that, as in
Experiment 1, search was more focused at the appropriate distance during the first
half of the 60 sec tests; averaged across all groups and tests, 61.6 ± 2.1% of search at
the F+ and E locations occurred during the first 30 sec. Second, we treated the
landmark cluster (2 landmarks side-by-side) as if it were a single landmark defining
four, not two, equivalent directions. The reason is that, had the animals used the axis
of symmetry of the 2 clustered landmarks, they would have been expected, in Test 3
(without polarisation and with identical landmarks), to have spent more time at the F+
and opposite locations than at the E locations to the right or left of the landmark
cluster. The proportion was 0.43 ± 0.07 - no different from chance. That is, the
animals ignored the breaking of the maze's fourfold symmetry by the single symmetry
axis of the landmark cluster and it can therefore be treated as if it were a single
landmark.
Time at F+ : With the landmarks present, the animals spent virtually all of the
first 30 sec of each test searching near them. Groups Fixed-Spaced and Varied-
Spaced spent the most time at F+, 5.4 + 0.9 and 3.7 + 0.5 sec respectively. An
analysis of Tests 1 and 2 revealed that Fixed groups spent more time at F+ than
Varied groups (F 1/36 = 5.90, p < 0.05) and that there was a significant effect of
Landmark Arrangement (F 2/36 =8.18, p< 0.005). A subsequent analysis of the
effect of Arrangement revealed that the Spaced landmark groups spent more time at
F+ than the mean of the Single and Clustered groups (F 1/36 = 16.12, p < 0.001)
which, in turn, did not differ from each other (F < 1). There was no difference in the
performance during Test 1 (F+ in one of the training locations) from that in Test 2
(F+ in a 16th novel position) and, for simplicity, the results of these two tests have
therefore been averaged in Fig 4.12. Time at F+ is influenced by both landmark
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Fixed Varied Fixed Varied Fixed Varied
Single Clustered Spaced
Figure 4.12. (A) Time at F+ (sec ±1 S.E.M.). Data are averaged across Tests 1 and 2. (B) Normalised
Time at F+ (No landmarks) plotted to same scale as A.
stability and landmark arrangement.
Normalised Time at F+ (No landmarks): An important step in the analysis is to
establish the relative degree of control over searching by the context cues and by the
landmark(s). Fig 4.12B shows the Normalised Time at F+ (No landmarks) for all
groups to the same scale as in Fig 4.12A. A key point is that the absolute values of
these times are very low, never exceeding 0.65 sec per square. In addition, the scores
for the two Spaced groups - 0.10 + 0.04 and 0.08 + 0.02 sec - were 1.5 orders of
magnitude lower than those for Time at F+ in Tests 1 and 2 (see above). An analysis
of variance did, however, show effects of Stability (F 1/36 = 13.42, p < 0.001),
Arrangement (F 2/36 = 6.98, p < 0.005) and a Stability x Arrangement interaction (F
2/36 = 4.82, p < 0.025). The pattern giving rise to this interaction was different from
what was observed with the landmarks present. Significantly greater searching was
found in the groups with one landmark than in those with two landmarks, and analysis
of the interaction showed this difference was only apparent in groups Fixed (p <
0.001). The Clustered and Spaced groups did not differ (p > 0.05). Likewise, the
effect of landmark stability occurred only in the single landmark groups, with greater
control by context cues in group Fixed-Single than group Varied-Single (p < 0.001).
Control over searching by context cues alone depended on stability and the number of
landmarks rather than their arrangement.
Directional bias : Fig 4.13A shows the directional bias averaged across Tests 1
and 2, together with the chance level of performance which was 0.25 for the Single
and Clustered groups and 0.5 for the Spaced groups (see Methods). The analysis of
the Single and Clustered groups showed no significant difference between the Fixed
and Varied groups (Stability F 1/24 = 3.05, p = 0.094), no difference between Single
and Clustered Arrangements (F < 1), and no Stability x Arrangement interaction (F 1/
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Fixed Varied Fixed Varied Fixed Varied
Single Clustered Spaced
Fixed Varied Fixed Varied Fixed Varied
Single Clustered Spaced
Figure 4.13. Directional bias. A) Test conducted with polarising cues and the landmarks used in
training. Data are averaged across Tests 1 and 2. (B) Test with identical landmarks but without
polarising cues. ±1 S.E.M.
24 = 1.59, p > 0.2). However, the above chance performance of group Varied-Single
was unexpected (0.41 + 0.03, t=5.48, p < 0.001). Examination of the paths revealed
that this group searched closer to the landmark than group Fixed-Single and that its
search distribution was displaced away from the polarising cues. Displacement alone
cannot account for the above-chance performance, as directional bias is insensitive to
distance.
A separate analysis of the two Spaced landmark groups revealed no effect of
Stability (F 1/12 = 1.48, p > 0.20) but, as shown in Fig 4.13A, both groups had
directional bias scores that were well above chance (ps < 0.001). In combination with
the apparent ineffectiveness of the polarising cues this seems to suggest that animals
trained with a Spaced landmark array derived their reference direction from the two
landmarks. Comparison with animals trained in a different experiment shows that
this inference is too simple. The procedures of group Fixed-Spaced were exactly
replicated up to the first test, with the exception that there were no polarising cues.
Directional bias was at chance at significantly lower than in the Fixed-Spaced group
of Experiment 2 (t = 7.15, df = 10, p < 0.001), while distance ratio was
indistinguishable (t = 0.71, df = 10, p > 0.4). The Spaced groups in Experiment 2
may have benefited from mutual potentiation of directional information from
landmark array and polarising cues (see Experiment 3).
Because directional bias is calculated in a different way for the three
arrangements, we cannot compare the Spaced-landmark groups with the Single- and
Clustered landmark groups. It was important to establish, however, that directional
bias would fall to chance for all three landmark arrangements when the polarising
cues were removed and, for two of these conditions, the landmarks were identical.
This was checked in Test 3 for all groups. None of the groups differed from chance
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(Fig 4.13B). Furthermore, two
separate Anovas showed that the
groups did not differ from each
other (Fs < 1).
Distance ratio : The results
described so far indicate that the
polarising cues (white curtain and
localised sound source) were less
salient than we had anticipated.
chance
Fixed Varied Fixed Varied Fixed Varied
Single Clustered Spaced
It this is true, it means that the Figure 4.14. Distance ratio averaged across all tests. ± 1
S.E.M.
animals had relatively little
directional information except in the Spaced-landmark groups. The question
therefore arises of whether distance information can still be processed effectively in
the relative absence of directional information, and of how such processing is
influenced by landmark stability.
Fig 4.14 shows the mean distance ratios of the 6 groups averaged across Tests 1 -
3 (Test 3 can be included because the computation of distance ratio is independent of
directional information). The overall analysis revealed a highly significant effect of
Stability (F 1/36 = 27.15, p < 0.0001), Arrangement (F 2/36 = 17.13, p < 0.0001) and
a significant Stability x Arrangement interaction (F 2/36 = 5.58, p < 0.01). While the
Fixed groups performed better than the Varied groups in the Single and Clustered
landmark conditions (ps < 0.05), there was no such difference in the Spaced groups (p
> 0.20). These contrasts were established using separate F tests and Scheffe's method
of adjusting error-rate for multiple comparisons (Myers, 1966, p 333). A
complication in this otherwise striking pattern of results is that the overall analysis
also revealed a significant change in distance ratio across successive transfer tests (F
2/72 = 3.46, p < 0.05) and a significant triple interaction between Tests, Stability and
Arrangement (F 4/72 = 3.48, p < 0.025; data not shown). Inspection of the data
showed that the performance of group Fixed-Clustered decreased markedly from Test
1 (landmarks in a training location) to Test 2 (landmarks in a novel location). We
have no explanation for this effect.
Discussion
The main findings were: (1) the polarising context cues exerted little control over
searching on their own, but an effect of relative validity was observed; (2) an effect
of landmark stability was again observed - spatial learning was impaired when a
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single landmark moved locations during training, and (3) the square geometry of the
arena and the spatial arrangement of a pair of landmarks were both important
determinants of learning.
The overall performance of the groups was poorer than in Experiment 1. Most
strikingly, the Fixed-Single and Fixed-Clustered groups showed no directional bias
suggesting that, in Experiment 1, the consistent spatial relationship between L+ and
L- in group Fixed provided an important directional cue (compare Figs 4.4 and 4.11).
It also indicates that, under the conditions used in both Experiments 1 and 2, the white
curtain was not a very effective polarising cue, consistent with Cheng's (1986) and
Margules and Gallistel's (1988) observations. This implies that in Experiment 1 the
consistent spatial relationship between L+ and L- and/or the asymmetric placement of
L+ in group Fixed probably provided an important directional cue. As group Varied
did not benefit equivalently, the conclusion drawn then that landmark stability
influences spatial learning would be insecure on the basis of that study alone.
Only a speculative account can be given for group Varied-Single showing
directional bias. It requires the assumption that overshadowing can work on two
levels, that of cues and that of 'hypotheses', as suggested by Krechevsky (1932, 1933)
and later by O'Keefe and Nadel (1978). Then group Fixed-Single would not show
directional bias because landmark stability allows a distance-based strategy to
overshadow the weak directional cues. In group Varied-Clustered use of directional
cues would be overshadowed by the greater salience of two landmarks.
In Experiment 2 context cues did have a small but significant influence on
searching patterns when the landmarks were absent. As expected on the basis of
associative learning theory, greater control was observed in group Fixed-Single than
Varied-Single, and there was a decline in control as the number of landmarks
increased, independent of their arrangement. This pattern is in accord with a principle
of relative validity - context cues showing greatest (albeit rather weak) control in a
situation in which the context most informative and the landmark(s) least salient. The
control by context cues is insufficient to account for the much larger differences
between groups observed with the landmarks present.
The significant effect of landmark stability in the groups with either a single
landmark or clustered landmarks was shown in the Time at F+ measure and, most
clearly, in the Distance ratio measure of Fig 4.14. The paths taken by the rats in
Fixed-Single and Fixed-Clustered indicate that direction (relative to the walls) and
distance (from the landmark) had been learned. That is, these two groups had learned
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the geometrical arrangement between food and landmark relative to the walls of the
arena. Had they learned only the appropriate distance, they would have searched
around the landmark in a circle; had they learned only to walk towards or away from
the landmark(s) parallel to one of the walls, not knowing at what distance to stop,
they would have spent a substantial proportion of time too far away from the
landmark. Neither pattern was observed. Thus, landmark stability can positively
influence performance even when directional information is ambiguous or weak.
The contrast between the Single and Clustered arrangements, and the Spaced
Landmark arrangement, both in overall performance and in the lack of a difference
between Fixed-Spaced and Varied-Spaced, is also of interest. The pattern of results
contradicts the prediction of contextual and configural associative theories that the
effect of moving a landmark array should be independent of the spatial arrangement
of the landmarks. It is consistent with predictions of O'Keefe's (1991) and Worden's
(1992) mapping theories that local landmark stability should be sufficient to support
spatial learning given a minimum of either two or three landmarks. Note, however,
that if spatial relations are assumed to be elements of configural associations
(Sutherland & Rudy 1989, p. 130), this theory may become equivalent to cognitive
mapping theory. Processing within the configural association system is not described
in sufficient detail to allow a definitive interpretation.
Finally, in group Fixed-Clustered, distance ratio decreased in the test with a novel
position (Test 2). We are unable to explain this result. Had it occurred in the Varied
group, such an effect would have strongly suggested that the search for food
constituted a separate task for each individual landmark position. Navigation might
have proceeded by matching a remembered view to the currently perceived view of
the environment, with background cues and the landmark both being essential parts of
this remembered view. However, not only did this decline in distance ratio not occur
in the Varied groups, but, in the Fixed groups, adjacent landmark positions within the
grid used in training were only 10 cm apart. There is no evidence that the rats can
detect such a small displacement of the landmarks relative to walls that are 15 times
as far away.
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4.3. Experiment 3: The effects of directional cues
The primary weakness of Experiment 2 is the apparent lack of effective polarising
cues for the Single and Clustered groups. These groups largely disregarded the
polarising curtain and noise source and so did not have an unambiguous directional
reference. In a study of hippocampal place cells and thalamic directional cells,
Knierim et al. (1995) found that a disorientation procedure similar to ours made rats
disregard a cue card in a small circular open field maze and frequently led to random
remapping of place fields. Vestibular and visual cues had to be mutually consistent
(see also Etienne et al., 1993). In Experiment 3, this was achieved by omitting
disorientation of the rats' vestibular system at the start of each trial and by not rotating
the polarising cues between trials. In addition, the polarising cues were absent on the
unrewarded trial of each day, thereby increasing their correlation with reward.
Posttraining tests explored the relative contributions of vestibular and visual cues as
well as the role of landmark stability.
Methods
Subjects The subjects were 12 male Lister hooded rats, selected from 18 after day
2 of training. They were treated exactly as the animals in Experiment 2.
Apparatus The Apparatus was identical to that in Experiment 2.
Procedures The training procedures were identical to those in the Single
landmark condition of Experiment 2 with the following exceptions: (1) The animals
were carried to the starting point without rotation of the transport box; (2) The
polarising cues (curtains and noise source) always occupied the same wall of the
laboratory room; they were rotated by 90° for two of the transfer tests (see below);
(3) The polarising cues were absent during the non-rewarded trials; the noise was
switched off and the white curtain replaced by a black one; (4) The feeder was placed
50 cm East of the single landmark (rather than South as in Experiment 2), to exclude
the simple strategy of withdrawal from polarising cues North; (5) There was a series
of 8 transfer tests with landmarks (numbered consecutively) beginning on day 21
(Tests 1-8), 1 transfer test without landmarks but with polarising cues (Test PO, for
Polarising cues Only) and 6 intermixed days of testing without either landmarks or
polarising cues which, when averaged, were considered as Test NLP (No Landmarks
or Polarising cues). These 15 tests were scheduled daily (day 21-35). Tests with
landmarks were always 2 days apart. The procedures for these tests were as follows:
Tests 1 and 2 were identical to the corresponding tests in Experiment 2 except that
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vestibular cues were available. In Test 1 landmarks were in a familiar location, in
Test 2 in a novel location not used during training. Tests 7 and 8 were duplicated
these conditions at the end of the test series. The purpose of these 4 tests was to re¬
examine the notion of landmark stability, to test the effects of familiarity of the
landmark's position, and of repeated testing.
Tests 3 to 7 were designed to investigate the effects of polarising and vestibular
cues with the landmark in a familiar location. In Test 3, polarising cues were absent
but vestibular cues present. In Test 4, both polarising and vestibular cues were
present, but with the polarising cues rotated 90° counterclockwise relative to their
orientation during training, ie. these two directional cues disagreed. In Test 5, the
polarising cues were rotated 90° clockwise (relative to training) and vestibular cues
were disturbed by at least 10 slow rotations of the transport box (we shall refer to this
as vestibular cues "absent" and justify this description in discussion below). In Test
6, neither polarising nor vestibular cues were present. In Test 7, both polarising and
vestibular cues were present and in agreement.
Test PO (day 22) was conducted with polarising cues but without landmarks. Its
purpose was to explore whether polarising and background cues alone were sufficient
for focused search.
Test NLP (days 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34) was conducted with neither polarising cues
nor landmarks. It was the usual extinction trial used throughout training.
Results
Acquisition
During the first 4 blocks, while the feeder was visible, there was a significant
decline in latency across Blocks (F 3/30 = 37.94, p < 0.0001), no difference in latency
between the Fixed and Varied groups (F 1/10 = 1.42, p > 0.2) and no Landmark
Stability x Block interaction (F 3/30 = 1.58, p > 0.2). Landmark stability had no
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effect on task difficulty while the feeder was visible (Fig. 4.15).
When the feeder was hidden, from block 5 onwards, the effects of Stability (F 1/
10 = 12.58, p < 0.01), Blocks (F 12/120 = 7.14, p < 0.0001) and the Stability x Blocks
interaction (12/120 = 2.32, p < 0.02) were all significant. Further analysis showed
that the faster latencies in group Fixed were only present on Blocks 5, 7 and 8 (p's <
0.02) and that the decline in latency across Blocks was significant only in Group
Varied (F 12/120 = 8.07, p < 0.001) but not Group Fixed (F 12/120 = 1.38, p > 0.1).
Group Fixed appears to have learned the spatial relationship between landmark and
feeder while the feeder was visible and there was, therefore, little opportunity for
further improvement when the feeder was hidden.
Tests
The paths taken during Tests 1 & 7 (combined) and Tests 2 & 8 are shown in Fig
4.16. These show relatively focused search at F+ in Group Fixed and a more
dispersed pattern in Group Varied. Analysis of the time at F+ revealed a significant
effect of Stability (F 1/10 = 7.34, p < 0.025; Fig 4.17A). There was no difference
between early and late tests (F < 1) but, surprisingly, there was a decrement in search
at F+ if the landmark was in a novel location (F 1/10 = 9.42, p < 0.02; Fig 4.17A).
The distance ratio measure followed a similar trend, but the effects of Stability and
Familiarity narrowly failed to reach significance (F 1/10 = 4.05, p = 0.072, and F 1/10
= 4.19, p = 0.068 respectively, all other Fs < 1; Fig 4.17B). In the analysis of
directional bias, only the effect of Familiarity approached significance (F 1/10 = 3.85,
Figure 4.16. Paths during the
first 30 sees of tests with
familiar and novel landmark
positions. Paths from early
and late tests have been
superimposed. Only the
portion of the paths close to
the landmarks is shown. The
cell where F+ was placed
during training is marked by
a square. Other cells at
equivalent distance and
directions (relative to the
walls of the maze) are
marked by broken squares.
Polarising cues (location not
to scale) are situated towards
the top of the page. For
illustrative purposes, both
landmarks are shown. They
were counterbalanced within
groups, but any individual rat
was only trained and tested
with the same landmark.
Fixed Varied








p = 0.078; all other ps > 0.2; Fig 4.17C).
The paths taken during Tests 3-7 are
shown in Fig 4.18. Test 3 (polarising cues
absent, vestibular cues present) shows
focused search to the east of the landmark - as
in Tests 1, 2, 7 and 8 of Fig 4.16. (above). In
Test 4, rotation of the polarising cue by 90°
counterclockwise (ie. from north to west)
failed to shift the direction of maximal search
from that shown in Test 3; the rats appeared,
therefore, to determine the location of F+
using vestibular in preference to polarising
cues. However, in Test 5, with vestibular 8 0 5 -
cues absent, rotation of the polarising cues by .2 0.4
Q
90° clockwise did result in the location of
preferential search rotating by an equivalent
amount. That is, instead of searching in
predominantly the same direction as in Tests
3 and 4, the animals focused within a cell to
the south (in room coordinates) of the
landmark. Thus, while vestibular cues may
.2
be used in preference of explicit polarising :f0-6
§0.5
cues, the polarising cues are sufficiently |04
salient on their own to direct focused search go.3
appropriately. In Test 6, with both polarising °-2
0.1
and vestibular cues absent, search was no Q0
longer focused in any one direction. This
Fixed Varied Fixed Varied
Tests 1 and 7 Tests 2 and 8
Familiar Novel
Fixed Varied Fixed Varied
Tests 1 and 7 Tests 2 and 8
Familiar Novel
Fixed Varied Fixed Varied
Tests 1 and 7 Tests 2 and 8
. . . Familiar Novel
indicates that the animals were not using any Figure 4.17. A. Time at p+ (sec ±1 S.E.M.)
_ . ... T „ , _ . ... for Tests 1, 2, 7 and 8. B. Distance ratio. C.further uncontrolled cues. In Test 7, in which Directional bias.
the two sets of cues were in agreement, search was focused in the correct direction to
the east.
An ANOVA of Tests 3, 5, 6 and 7 for Time at F+ revealed significant effects of
Polarising cues (F 1/10 = 25.65, p < 0.0005) and of Vestibular cues (F 1/10 = 8.98, p
< 0.02; Fig 4.19A). Distance ratio was higher in the presence of polarising cues (F 1/
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Figure 4.18. Paths during tests examining the relative influence of directional cues. Polarising cues
(white curtain and loudspeaker) are shown, when present, in their actual orientation during the test
(location not to scale). In Test 3, vestibular cues only were present. In Test 4, two cells are marked as
F+ as the polarising cues predicted F+ to be North of the landmark, whereas vestibular cues predicted it
to be in the East. The rats gave priority to vestibular cues. Test 5 shows that polarising cues could
define a reference direction in the absence of vestibular cues. In Test 6, the absence of either
polarising or vestibular cues resulted in the rats showing no directional preference. In Test 7, both
polarising and vestibular cues were present and in agreement. Preferential search returns to the
original F+ location indicating that the series of tests has not resulted in an irreversible disruption of
performance. Both landmarks are shown. They were counterbalanced within groups, but any





shown for time at F+ : the effect of Polarising cues was reliable (F 1/10 = 24.18,
p <0.001), while that of Vestibular cues was only marginally significant (F 1/10 =
3.87, p = 0.078).
In the single test with polarising and vestibular cues only but no landmarks (Test
PO), the mean time in the area where food had been hidden during training was no
different from chance in either group (chance = 8.4 s; group Fixed = 6.7 ± 1.8 s;
group Varied = 8.5 ± 1.1 s; note that the chance level varies across experiments
A. 9 P = Polarising cues present
NP = No Polarising cues
Vt = Vestibular cues present
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because of the variation in training protocols). In Test NLP (no landmarks or
polarising cues) that time was below chance in both groups (Fixed: 2.8 ± 0.3s, Varied
3.5 ± 0.9s). Interestingly, time in the area where food could have been hidden was
significantly higher in the presence of polarising cues (Test PO) than in their absence
(Test NLP; F 1/10 = 22.90, p < 0.001).
Comparison ofExperiments 2 and 3
Two comparisons between Experiments 2 and 3 are of interest. The first concerns
the focus of this paper - Landmark Stability - examined as a function of the
effectiveness of directional cues. Examining the data from Tests 1 and 2 in both
experiments revealed that Time at F+ was higher in Experiment 3 (F 1/22 = 13.80, p
< 0.002; Fig 4.20). Fixed groups spent more time at F+ than Varied groups (F 1/22 =
6.48, p < 0.02). The Experiment x Stability interaction was also significant (F 1/22 =
5.26, p < 0.05), reflecting the improvement from Experiment 2 to 3 in the Fixed
condition (F 1/22 = 18.05, p < 0.001) but not the Varied condition (F 1/22 = 1.01, p >
0.3). There was also an effect of Landmark Stability with respect to Distance ratio (F
1/22 = 18.05, p < 0.001), but no change between Experiments on this measure.
Finally, while Directional bias was stronger in Experiment 3 (F 1/22 = 10.75, p <
0.01), the Fixed and Varied groups did not differ overall (F < 1). The Experiment x
Stability interaction was significant for Directional bias (F 1/22 = 6.45, p < 0.02),
with groups Fixed (F 1/22 = 16.92, p < 0.001) but not groups Varied (F < 1)
improving between experiments, as happened with the Time at F+ measure.
The second comparison examined whether the effectiveness of the polarising
cues, considered in isolation, changed between experiments. The key differences
were that these cues were differentially reinforced and that vestibular cues were also
present in Experiment 3. We compared the average of Tests 1 and 2 in Experiment 2
with Test 5 in Experiment 3 (Fig ??). Both Time at F+ (F 1/22 = 13.06, p < 0.002)
and Directional bias (F 1/22 = 22.01, p < 0.0001) were higher in Experiment 3. Thus,
polarising cues were more effective in Experiment 3 than in Experiment 2 even
though the simultaneously present vestibular cues took precedence when both cues
were available and in disagreement.
Discussion
The main findings of this study were: (1) landmark stability was again seen to
influence spatial learning positively, although significant learning was observed in
group Varied; (2) augmenting the effectiveness of the directional cues improved the
accuracy of search; (3) the same polarising cues as used in Experiment 2 were found
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to be effective in this experiment, although vestibular cues normally had priority; and
(4) placing the landmark in a novel location not used in training was associated with
lower levels of performance.
Three changes in procedure were made in this study, compared to Experiment 2,
with the intention of improving the effectiveness of the directional cues. The result
was that, instead of searching preferentially in four discrete locations (Fig 4.11),
group Fixed now concentrated its search at one single location (Fig 4.16). While we
do not know which of the three changes was the most important, we have
nevertheless realised a condition in which rats, given a single radially-symmetric
landmark and effective directional cues, will focus their search accurately. This
finding is consistent with Collett et al's (1986) observations on gerbils, but our control
of the directional cues and explicit manipulation of landmark stability have provided
additional information. Performance was better in group Fixed than group Varied,
with control of search by context cues alone at or below chance. This finding is
consistent with our proposed principle of landmark stability.
The rats' use of directional cues has some theoretical implications. First, if the
increase in the correlation between the polarising cues and reward is what has
improved their effectiveness, analogous to the results of Rescorla (1968), O'Keefe and
Nadel's interpretation of cognitive map theory would appear to be incorrect. Their
theory makes one of two predictions in a circumstance in which a cue is only
sometimes present: either the subject constructs one cognitive map of the
environment but excludes this cue because it is not a stable feature - in which case
the location of the food relative to the landmark could not be encoded within the map;
or, two separate maps would be constructed, one with the cue and one without - and
learning where the food is with the cue present should be unaffected. The theory does
not predict that removing a cue from the environment on some trials could ever
improve learning - the outcome that we may have obtained.
On the other hand, second, Etienne et al. (1993) have suggested that mutual
correlation between visual cues and dead reckoning causes them to potentiate each
other, while Knierim et al. (1995) found that creating a conflict between visual and
vestibular information led rats to ignore visual cues. The latter argued that
disorientation through rotation of a transport box resets vestibular cues at random.
Our results are also consistent with the idea that visual and vestibular cues should be
mutually consistent to be effective. There was no overshadowing of the weaker by
the stronger cue. Test 4 of this experiment showed that vestibular cues have a higher
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priority than polarising cues, although, in Test 5, polarising cues alone were found to
be sufficient to provide a directional reference. However, when the stronger
vestibular cues were made unreliable in Experiment 1, control of search direction by
the polarising cues was weaker. This is consistent with the results of Jackson and
Fritsche (1989) who found in taste aversion conditioning that if the salience of an
overshadowing cue was weakened sufficiently, it could be potentiated. Our results do
not allow us to determine definitively whether there was mutual potentiation of
vestibular and visual cues. That effect would be expected from an application of a
landmark stability principle to directional cues and would go beyond the results of
Jackson and Fritsche (1989).
On the basis of the present data, it is impossible to decide whether increasing the
contingency between polarising cues and reward, or the mutual agreement between
vestibular and polarising cues, or both of these factors, were responsible for the
greater effectiveness of the polarising cues in this experiment.
While I agree with Knierim et al. (1995) that vestibular disorientation can cause
random resetting of rats' directional system, at least as represented by thalamic 'head-
direction' cells, I believe that the resulting conflict between directional cues cannot, in
this experiment, be the only factor in the devaluation of local visual cues. Test 4 of
Experiment 3 established that the rats relied more on vestibular than visual and
auditory polarising cues. Everything else being the same, random resetting of
vestibular cues in Test 5 should have brought the group means for both Time at F+
and Directional bias to chance, while increasing variance for both measures because
individual rats should have shown idiosyncratic directional preferences as strong as in
Test 4. Instead, the rats disregarded vestibular information (this justifies the
description of vestibular cues as functionally "absent" in tests with disorientation,
rather than merely "disturbed"). I suggest that rats can reclassify vestibular
information as unreliable when they are disoriented, and that this does not require
previous experience (provided the disorienting rotation is above detection threshold).
In other words, both the value of information and an estimate of its reliability are
represented. If this interpretation is correct, it would represent a challenge to
associative learning theory. A defining characteristic of associative learning is that its
output is restricted to a single variable - an associative strength. Explicit
representation of the reliability of a variable is not possible with existing models.
Neither have models of cognitive mapping yet attempted to account for the possible
representation of reliability. Obviously, a single result cannot establish this
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interpretation of the data as a general feature of learning, and the question must
remain open for the moment.
The performance decrement in the tests with a novel landmark location to some
extent conforms to predictions of a configural or context-specificity associative
account. The puzzling feature is that the Fixed group was as affected as group
Varied. In the Fixed group, the novel location of L+ was only 10 cm from the two
nearest familiar locations, while the nearest arena wall was 1.5 m away. However, as
the search distributions of group Fixed gave no indications that localisation was
accurate to within less than 10 cm when search was guided by a landmark only 50 cm
away, it is puzzling that a 10 cm shift relative to walls 1.5 m away was detected. In
group Varied, the novel location was 50 cm from the nearest familiar location and 95
cm from an arena wall. Accordingly, if the rats in both groups learned each training
location separately, even with only 4 or 5 training trials at each location, a greater
decline in search accuracy for the novel location might have been expected in group
Varied, ie. a Stability x Familiarity interaction. This did not occur. The decrement in
the novel landmark condition is also inconsistent with the results of Experiment 2
where only group Fixed-Clustered showed a decrement.
4.4. General discussion
The primary purpose of these experiments was to explore whether aspects of
allocentric spatial learning can be understood in terms of established principles of
associative conditioning. These include the idea that learning proceeds most readily
between a stimulus and reinforcer when that stimulus is the most reliable predictor of
reinforcement (Rescorla, 1968; Wagner et al., 1968). Some of the results are
consistent with that principle, namely that the ability of context cues to direct
appropriate searching in the absence of landmarks was greatest when they were most
informative with regard to the location of the food. However, the absolute magnitude
of this control was too weak to account for the effect of landmark stability, and it
depended on the number of landmarks rather than their arrangement as the effect of
landmark stability does. Accordingly, the results are consistent with the principle of
relative validity being applicable within the spatial domain, but they suggest that
varying landmark location has additional effects not predicted by associative learning
theory.
In Experiment 1 the requirement for landmark stability appeared to be an all-or-
nothing effect. Experiment 2 showed that local landmark stability in an array of
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feeder and two separated landmarks is sufficient to support spatial learning. In
Experiment 3, more effective directional cues reduced the effect of landmark stability
to a quantitative difference even in a single landmark array. Nevertheless, moving
landmark arrays does have some consistent effects. In contrast to the most
straightforward interpretation of associative learning theory, learning about the
landmark's spatial relationship to reward was impaired, not aided, by the spatial
inconsistency between context cues and the landmark-feeder array. In contrast to one
possible application of configural associative or context-specificity theories, landmark
stability did depend on landmark arrangement. That local landmark stability can be
sufficient to support spatial learning supports theories that explicitly take spatial
constraints into account (Cheng, 1988, 1989; Collett et al, 1986; Gallistel 1990;
O'Keefe 1991; Worden, 1992). In Experiment 2 the only difference between
Clustered and Spaced landmark arrays was the number of spatial relations. In the
Spaced triangular array up to nine stable spatial parameters, three distances and three
angles between landmarks and feeder and three angles between landmarks, feeder and
directional cues. In the Clustered array there were effectively only two stable
parameters, the landmark-feeder distance and its angle to directional cues. This
should only have an influence if these parameters are explicitly represented.
Novel location tests. In Expt 2, in group Fixed-Clustered, distance ratio decreased
in the test with a novel position (Test 2). In Expt 3, time at the goal decreased in the
novel position tests, while in the other two measures the decrement approached
statistical significance. Had this effect occurred only or to a larger extent in the
Varied condition, it would have strongly suggested that the search for food
constituted a separate task for each individual landmark position. Navigation might
have proceeded by matching a remembered view to the currently perceived view of
the environment, with background cues and the landmark both being essential parts of
this remembered view. However, it is surprising to find it in Fixed groups, where
adjacent landmark positions within the grid used in training were only 10 cm apart.
There is no evidence in these experiments that the rats can detect such a small
displacement of the landmarks relative to walls that are 15 times as far away.
Overall, the results from these tests do not fit any of the possible predictions we could
think of and we must regard them as inconclusive.
Other studies. Studies that investigate the influence of changes of the
configuration of cues on spatial behaviour may differ in several independent
dimensions: (1) the maze can have an internal structure that makes choices discrete
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(for example radial mazes) or search location could vary continuously; (2) the
unstable cues may form a frame of reference spatially distinct from the stable cues, or
they may overlap; (3) the experiment may employ a working memory or a reference
memory paradigm. Not all of these combinations have been explored yet.
Kraemer et al (1983, Experiment 2) compared the acquisition rates in a working
memory task in the radial maze, in which rats were trained in alternating trials with
only extramaze cues or only intramaze cues available. One group received training
with the intramaze cues in a consistent arrangement throughout training. For the
other group the arrangement changed randomly between trials. The rearrangement
was found to delay acquisition in the intramaze cue task.
Spetch and Honig (1988) trained pigeons in an open field analogue of an eight-
arm radial maze. Four landmarks were placed between the eight cartons serving as
food sites, and three pictures were hung on the walls. The cartons differed in colour
and patterning. The pigeons in Group Constant experienced training with landmarks
and pictures in consistent positions. For the animals in Group Variable the locations
where landmarks and pictures were placed were the same, but they were randomly
interchanged between trials. In a forced-choice test both groups were found to be
above chance, but Group Constant performed better. The rearrangement of
landmarks affected performance although local cues were available in the colours and
patterning of the food sites.
In both these studies unstable cues did not form an internally consistent
arrangement. In order to use a moving landmark array independently from other
stable external cues, internal stability and spatial separation may be necessary, or at
least helpful. It would create instability between two internally consistent frames of
reference. In addition, it is not clear whether a choice between discrete locations
makes the same computational demands as navigating to a location not marked by
local cues.
Gould-Beierle and Kamil (in press) trained Clark's nutcrackers to find food near
the edge of a square tray, midway between the corners and close to a landmark.
When the birds were trained with the landmark in a stable position in phase 1, the
peak of search followed landmark shifts parallel to the edge, but not perpendicular to
the edge and only parallel component of a diagonal shift. A second phase showed
that the birds relied at least partly on global cues. In an attempt to make all cues
outside the tray unreliable, the tray was moved and rotated between trials. In
subsequent tests the nutcrackers not only followed parallel, but also perpendicular and
133
diagonal shifts. This raises the intriguing possibility that the birds gave less weight
than in phase 1 to the edge of the tray as a cue for distance, but still used some cue
associated with the tray to determine the correct direction from the landmark. Due to
the rotation of the tray during training, global cues could not provide a directional
reference. Unless the birds learned each of the four orientations and tray locations
separately, only the tray could give them a reference direction.
This dependence of relative weight given to a cue depending on the discrepancy to
other sources of information has already been mentioned in discussion of the studies
of Cheng (1988) with pigeons, Cheng et al (1987) with honey bees and Etienne et al.
(1990) with hamsters (see chapter 2). The same effect has also been found in two
further studies. Mackintosh (1973) investigated the recognition of territory
boundaries by mice. In one experiment landmarks in a square enclosure were rotated
by 35°, 60° or 90° relative to the original arrangement. The territorial boundaries
followed the first two rotations. Although the 90° rotation offered a better match
relative to the enclosure, mismatch to external reference increased and "boundaries
ceased to follow the movement of the objects and returned to a position substantially
the same as that at the beginning of the experiment" (p. 465). Chittka and Geiger
(1995) trained bees to fly along a straight row of landmarks until they found a feeder
between the third and fourth landmark. When an alternative feeder was placed at the
same distance, but at a compass bearing 7.5° to the left, all bees flew to the original
feeder, both under clear and overcast skies. When the row of landmarks was also
shifted 7.5° left, bees started searching at the alternative feeder. This proportion of
search there decreased as the landmarks were shifted to 15°, 22.5° and 30° from the
original bearing. In sunny weather, offering good conditions for use of the sun
compass, search at the alternative feeder was less at the smallest discrepancy and
declined faster with increasing discrepancy than in cloudy weather.
Animals may classify cues according to both the accuracy and the reliability of
information they can provide. In the case of visual landmarks, large and often distant
features are less likely to be altered or obscured by random changes in the
environment and are therefore more reliable, but only allow less accurate navigation
than close small scale features. The amount of discrepancy then indicates whether the
more accurate information should be trusted. The same argument applies to dead
reckoning, for example in Etienne et al. Dead reckoning is prone to cumulative errors
and likely has a lower angular resolution than the visual system. However, if time
since the last navigational fix was short and there is a large discrepancy to a visual
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cue, reliance on the visual cue would imply that the substrate over which the animal
travelled has moved without it noticing, while leaving the part of the world containing
the visual cue in place. In the absence of other information, it is a simpler assumption
that the visual cue has been mismatched with another similar feature. It seems
reasonable to assume that the same principle is at work during learning, and gives rise
to the landmark stability effect.
In these examples accuracy and reliability are negatively correlated. If it could be
shown that such a constraint is built into animals' navigational systems, and its
appearance in such diverse taxa suggests it is a general constraint, it would be
interesting to investigate the same issue in conditioning tasks. There it appears
reasonable to expect that accuracy and reliability would be independent factors.
Brodbeck (1994) demonstrated a hierarchy of spatial information in black-capped
chickadees, a food-storing species, but not in juncos, a non-storer. The birds were
trained in a spatial delayed matching to sample task. In the sample phase they were
exposed to four trial-unique feeders in a trial-unique array. Food was hidden in one
of the feeders. During training the array was the same in the test phase. In
experimental trials the global spatial location, the array-based spatial location and the
colour and pattern of the previously baited feeder were dissociated. Chickadees
showed a strong tendency to search first the feeder in the correct global location, then
in the correct array location, then the correct pattern. Juncos showed no preference
for any type of cue, but chose last the feeder that did not match any criterion.
If hierarchies of cues are a consequence of a general constraint, why was none
found in juncos? A possible explanation is that Brodbeck's task required only
discrimination of discrete places or objects, not navigation to an unmarked location.
If the experiment were repeated with the food hidden at some distance from one of
four landmarks, both juncos and chickadees should search in the location specified by
the shape of the array when array displacement is small, and in the location defined
by global cues when the displacement is large. The hierarchy appears in chickadees
even in the discrimination task because, as food storers, their memory is predisposed
to store places and because the discrimination task does not require the accuracy
offered by nearby landmarks.
Factors other than discrepancy may also have an influence on the weight given to
landmarks. While nearby local cues are sometimes preferred (Bennett 1993; Cheng
1989; Cheng et al., 1987; Collett et ah, 1986; Spetch and Edwards, 1986; Spetch &
Wilkie, 1994; Spetch, 1995), this is not always the case. Margules and Gallistel
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(1988) found that rats who ignored cues that uniquely specified a location in a
rectangular environment could use a larger frame of reference to orient themselves
and distinguish otherwise ambiguous locations. The often reported preference for
extramaze cues (Kraemer et al., 1983; Olton & Collison, 1979; Olton, Collison &
Werz, 1977; Olton & Samuelson 1976: see O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978 and Restle, 1957
for reviews) may reflect a strategy of using large-scale features to distinguish
locations marked by similar looking landmarks or landmark arrays (Brodbeck 1994;
Collett & Kelber, 1988; Spetch & Wilkie, 1994). The configuration of hills or the
shape of a clearing is less likely to be duplicated than the presence of a nearby bush.
Any duplication that does occur is likely to be at a sufficiently large scale that dead
reckoning can resolve the ambiguity. Besides the presence or absence of discrete
goal locations and the relative salience of cues, an additional confounding factor is
the difference between determining either distance or direction. Many studies
reporting a preference for extramaze cues have been conducted in radial mazes, where
the multiple goals are distinguished by direction, while studies that found greater
weighting of nearby landmarks have more often used open field mazes with landmark
arrays that are usually translated, but rarely rotated. Nearby cues allow more accurate
determination of distance (Cheng, 1990) while distant cues are more useful for
determining direction.
The results of our experiments and of those discussed above are all consistent with
the proposition that spatial representations are organised in two opposing hierarchies,
with proximal landmarks being treated as more accurate and distal large scale features
as more reliable. When a conflict arises, the weight given to each source of
information depends on the amount of discrepancy and on its a priori reliability. That
this phenomenon is found in taxa as diverse as bees, bird and mammals suggests it is
a general constraint on spatial learning.
Conclusions
The results of the three experiments on landmark stability are inconsistent with the
two applications of associative learning theory to navigation that have been outlined.
The most straightforward associative model predicts better control by a moving
landmark than by a fixed one in our conditions. This was never found. The
configural interpretation predicts worse control by a moving landmark array under all
circumstances, regardless of landmark arrangement. This is also inconsistent with
results. However, more complex applications of associative learning to navigation
may well be able to account for our data. The vector navigation models of Collett et
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al. (1986) and Cheng (1988, 1989) can be interpreted as two-stage associative
processes, first an association of landmark distances and directions with a place, then
association of that place with reward. The model of McLaren (1995) seems to fall
into the same category. McNaughton et al. (1995) have described a model of
cognitive mapping and dead reckoning which postulates that landmark information is
added to the map by associative processes. The interactions between processes in
such two stage models have not yet been specified in sufficient detail to derive
predictions regarding our experimental paradigm.
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5. Blocking in the spatial domain
The study of blocking and overshadowing in spatial learning tests whether the
acquisition of spatial representation is goal-driven and parsimonious, adding
information only where necessary, or whether it is curiosity-driven, including all
information that is available. A heuristic description of blocking is that subjects do
not waste resources processing redundant stimuli. If an event of interest is already
well predicted by other stimuli, there is no need to divert resources to stimuli giving
the same information. This principle applies in standard blocking designs where the
pretrained and the blocked stimulus have the same relation to the US.
Phase 1 Phase 2 Test
Exp. Group A -> US AB -> US B
Control Group C -> US AB -> US B
Under these conditions there is less learning about stimulus B in the Experimental
than in the Control group; B has been blocked by A. Unblocking, i.e. learning about
the added stimulus, occurs when the predictive relationship changes, in which case
the added stimulus is informative in that it signals a new relationship. Not only
increases, but also decreases in US magnitudes can cause unblocking (Dickinson et
al. 1976; Dickinson and Mackintosh, 1979; Mackintosh and Cotton, 1980).
Temporal relations also can have an effect. A real-time model of conditioning by
Sutton and Barto (1981) predicted that if the added stimulus commences earlier, but
terminates at the same time as the pretrained stimulus, then it will not only acquire
associative strength, the pretrained stimulus will also lose it. This was confirmed by
Kehoe et al. (1987). Barnet et al. (1993) found that different timing of pretrained and
added stimulus generally caused unblocking, even if the added stimulus was not the
earliest predictor of the US, as required by Sutton and Barto (see also Schreurs and
Westbrook, 1982). Barnet et al. conclude that organisms detect and encode temporal
relationships, and that even simple associations are not so simple.
Even if accepting that a principle of parsimony applies in spatial learning, these
considerations suggest two reasons why blocking might not occur. Both are
consequences of the fact that navigation occurs in two or three dimensions, rather
than the single dimension of either predictive relations or temporal relations. First,
use of additional cues is likely to increase the accuracy of navigation. In that respect
an added cue in a blocking design would not be redundant, as long as it is in a
location sufficiently different from those of pretrained cues. Second, even if
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pretrained cues offer enough information that added cues will not improve accuracy,
in two dimensions it is possible to put an added cue in a spatial relationship that is
different from that of pretrained cue and reward, but equivalent. Specifically this
would mean putting an added cue at the same distance but in a different direction
from reward, as there is evidence for weighting according to distance (see general
discussion in chapter 4), but not according to direction. When giving pretrained and
added cue different predictive or temporal relationships, these cannot be equivalent
because there is only a single dimension to change. Altering temporal relations will
make the added cue either an earlier, or a closer and more accurate predictor than the
pretrained cue. In the two or three dimensions of space, an added cue can be at the
same distance as a pretrained cue, and therefore offer the same accuracy of navigation
on its own, yet it can be in a different location. This suggests that blocking might
occur if a landmark is placed directly adjacent to a pretrained one, the equivalent of
the Clustered condition of Experiment 2, but not if the added landmark is at some
distance, in a Spaced arrangement.
There are, then, three possible predictions regarding blocking in the spatial
domain. Associative learning theory doe not consider landmarks to be different from
any other cues, so there should be blocking. A consideration of available information
and task requirements in navigation requirements suggests that blocking should
depend on the spatial relations between goal, pretrained and added landmarks.
Blocking should occur when the added landmarks are very close to pretrained
landmarks, so that the spatial relationships are nearly identical. When the spatial
relations are different, and the added landmarks can make navigation more accurate,
there should be no blocking. O'Keefe and Nadel (1978) argue that the cognitive
mapping or locale system is not goal driven and that the representation is updated
whenever changes in the environment are detected. Blocking should not occur within
the locale system, regardless of the placement of added landmarks. It is even possible
that learning about added landmarks would be faster in a Blocking than in a Control
group, because the former only needs to insert these landmarks into an existing
representation rather than create one from scratch.
Experimental designs for the spatial domain
The adaptation of a blocking experiment to the spatial domain is not entirely
straightforward. To specify a location unambiguously, the landmark or landmarks
must provide information about distance and direction or else two distances and a
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possible design is the use of a directional cue and a single pretrained landmark, then
adding a single second landmark (Figure 5.1). Experiments 2 and 3 showed that it is
not easy to get good performance with such an array. Therefore a blocking study
conducted in summer 1995 involved the use of three arrays of two landmarks each
(Figure 5.2), replacing the A, B and C cues in the experimental design above.
Unfortunately, for unknown reasons, performance declined drastically in all groups
on transition from the compound phase, with four landmarks, to the test phase, with
two landmarks. Even the Experimental group was at chance in tests with the
pretrained landmarks, despite good performance in a test at the end of the pretraining
phase. No analysis of blocking was possible under these circumstances, and the
results are not reported.
To avoid this performance decrement, a new design was developed that
minimised differences between compound training and testing. To that purpose the
landmark array contained up to four landmarks of which two were present throughout
all training and testing. These two landmarks were identical. On their own they
could not unambiguously define reward location. Other landmarks provided that
disambiguating directional information. To make sure that the rats would use
primarily the identical landmarks to determine distance from food, these landmarks
were closer to F+ and the rats were trained with only L3/L3 for a few days before the
beginning of phase 1.
A further elaboration on the standard blocking design is that the rats were tested
with both cues. In the Experimental group that means that both pretrained and novel
cues are tested. In the Control group both cues are novel. This makes it possible to
test whether the Experimental group reached asymptote in phase 1, by comparing
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Figure 5.2. (A) Design of a
L blocking experiment conducted in4 summer 1995. Arrays of two
,, landmarks each replaced the A, B
and C cues of the standard design.
The L1/L2 array and L3/L4 array
were mirror images, apart from the
identities of their landmarks, making
4 spatial relations to food and between
landmarks equivalent. Both a
spaced and a Clustered arrangement
of added landmarks was used.
(B) Locations included in the
analysis of tests. The design of the
landmark array makes it possible to distinguish between several aspects of pretrained and added array
the rats may learn. These components are: (1) distances and/or angles between landmarks and F+, (2)
sense (right and left) and landmark identity, (3) discrimination of the landmarks on the basis of their
proximity. If the rats have learned all three components they will search only at F+. If they know
distances, angles and which landmark should be closer, but not sense (whether this landmark should be
right or left) they will search equally at F+ and its mirror image. If they know only distances, angles
and sense and landmark identity they will confuse F+ and its rotational equivalent. If they have
learned only angles and distances they will search in all four locations. Knowledge of angles and
distances is necessary for focused search. If blocking affected only some components of the task, it
would show up in this design, given good enough performance of controls and of Experimentals with
their pretrained cues.
performance with the pretrained landmarks in both phases, as well as pretrained




Phase 1 Phase 2 Test 1 Test 2
A AB B A
B AB A B
C AB B A
In the final design (see figure 5.3 for landmark arrangements), the landmarks used
as cues must not only be distinguishable by their features, they must also be placed in
two different positions. That gives four combinations of landmark and position in
phase 1 and the tests. To reduce variability, each test was repeated. Ignoring the two
identical landmarks which are always present, the initial training with those
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Figure 5.3. Landmark arrays and summary of the experimental design up to the second test. Rats were
trained first with two identical L3 landmarks. The include radius of the F+ feeder is shown as a circle.
The dashed circle opposite the L3/L3 array is the equivalent area surrounding the F- feeder. Animals'
performance is measured as the preference for the F+ over the F- include radius.
For simplicity, some of the counterbalancing is not shown. Only the landmark arrays corresponding to
groups Experimental 1 and 4 are presented. Each of the tests with LI or L2 was repeated once. The
sequence of landmark locations and identities in those four tests was counterbalanced.
Three more tests with all four landmarks from phase 2, with LI and L2 changing places, and with only
the two L3 landmarks, as well as two tests at the end of phase 1, are also not shown here.
blocking is as follows, where LI and L2 are the landmarks, North and South are their
positions in the array:
Phase 1 Phase 2 Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4
Exp. Group 1 LI N LI N/L2S L2S LI N L2 S LI N
Exp. Group 2 L2 S LI N/L2S LI N L2 S LI N L2 S
Control Group 1 L4 N LI N/L2S L2S LI N L2 S LI N
Control Group 2 L4 S LI N/L2S LI N L2 S LI N L2 S
Exp. Group 3 LI s LI S/L2N L2N LI S L2 N LI s
Exp. Group 4 L2 N LI S/L2N LI S L2 N LI S L2 N
Control Group 3 L4 N LI S/L2N L2N LI S L2 N LI S




Subjects The subjects were 20 experimentally naive male Lister-hooded rats,
maintained at 90% of their free feeding weight. 16 were selected from these after the
second day of training. The rats continuing the experiment were those that reliably
searched for food. 8 animals were assigned at random to each group before this
selection was made. The two animals in each group with the longest latencies on
days 1 and 2 were dropped, and the experiment continued with N = 8 per group. A
further animal in the experimental group was dropped on day 22, and so N = 7 by the
time of the first test. The excluded rat stopped searching for food when the dwell
time was raised from 2 sec to 2.5 sec (see below).
Apparatus The arena was the same as in the previous experiments, except that
there were no polarising cues. All curtains were black, and masking noise emanated
from all four speakers. The reference direction was provided by landmarks. Four
landmarks were used. LI and L2 were the same as in Experiments 2 and 3. L3 was a
white plastic cylinder 36.3 cm high and 7 cm diameter. There were three horizontal
red stripes of 3.6 cm width. This landmark smelled of lemon. L4 consisted of a red
sphere of 11.6 cm diameter above a black cylinder 5 cm high with 3.1 cm diameter,
that contained cotton wool soaked in violet essence. The total height was 27 cm.
The array always included two L3 landmarks at 50 cm distance from each other.
LI and L2 landmarks were placed at 100 cm N or 50 cm S of the westernmost of the
L3 landmarks. L4 could be placed 75 cm N or S of the centre of the L3/L3 subarray.
The landmark arrangements in the various phases are summarised in Fig 5.3.
A new type of feeder was used that could be buried completely under the bedding
and which would raise the food above the surface when triggered by a signal from the
computer. It consists of an aluminium box with a sliding lid that covers a food well,
connected via parallel arms to an air cylinder and damper. The air cylinder raises the
box from a rectangular aluminium frame 4 cm high x 5.8 cm wide x 31.4 cm long.
The total vertical movement is 5 cm. There were two feeders, F+ and F-, in the arena.
Procedures Pretraining: The rats had 10 days of handling and training to eat
from the feeder in a separate room. This was followed by 2 days of habituation in the
maze. They spent 2 half hour sessions per day in the empty arena, in groups of 4 rats.
Training: The subjects were transported to the start locations in an opaque box.
They started a trial facing one of the walls in a random sequence, with the constraint
that each of the 4 start positions was used once a day. They were run in groups of 7
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or 8 animals, so the ITI for each particular rat depended on the latency of the others.
ITI varied from about 80 min at the beginning of training to about 60 min at the end.
During the first two days of training there were 2 trials per day, both rewarded, on
all other days 4 trials, 1 of them without either landmarks or reward, 3 with reward
delivery in the presence of landmarks. The feeder rose automatically once the rat had
spent a minimum "dwell time" within a maximum distance from the feeder ("include
radius"). If these conditions were not met within 60 sec the feeder was raised
automatically. A rat which failed to eat within 300 sec was picked up and placed in
front of the feeder until it ate. The bedding was then thoroughly shuffled and the
feeder was refilled, lowered and buried before the next rat was put in the maze. The
include radius was set at 20 cm throughout the experiment. The dwell time was
raised from 0 sec to 2.5 sec in steps of 0.5 sec. The feeders were placed so that the
when the food well was raised it would be 25 cm from the line between the two L3
landmarks, at 35 cm distance from each L3 landmark (Fig. 5.3). Both food wells
were baited to make sure potential olfactory cues were equivalent, but only one, F+,
would rise while the other, F-, would remain under the surface. Which food well
would rise was varied in a sequence that randomised whether the rising well or the
other well was most recently baited, handled by the experimenter or touched by
another rat in the preceding trial.
During Phase 0, from days 1 to 5, two identical copies of L3 were in the maze.
Phase 0 training was intended to establish these landmarks as a discrete but
ambiguous subarray. The two L3 landmark were present during all training and tests
with landmarks. In later training phases other landmarks provided directional
information that allowed an unambiguous solution. The orientation of the landmark
feeder array changed in a random sequence. "North" will refer to the direction of the
rising food well from the centre of the array. After day 5 the rats were matched for
latency and assigned to the Experimental and Control group.
During Phase 1, from day 6 to day 28, all rats were trained with three landmarks.
The Control group was split into two subgroups (N = 4) with L4 placed 75 cm either
north or south from the L3 array, 79 cm from each L3. L4 north was 50 cm from F+
and 100 cm from F-, L4 south the reverse (Fig. 5.3). The Experimental group was
split into four subgroups (N = 2 and N = 1 where a rat was dropped). For four rats
either LI or L2 was placed 100 cm north of the western L3, 79 cm from F+. For the
other 3 rats either LI or L2 was placed 50 cm south from the western L3, also 79 cm
from F+.
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The dwell time was raised by 0.5 sec on days 10, 13, 15, 17 and 19. After the last
rise two rats consistently failed to find food within 60 sec. For both the dwell time
was temporarily lowered. One rat did not resume searching and was dropped.
The transition to phase 2 occurred on day 28. The first two trials were with the
landmark array as in phase 1, the other two trials with the full 4 landmark array. The
Experimental group had one landmark added to the array of phase 1. The four
subgroups collapsed into two, with either LI north and L2 south or L2 north and LI
south. For the Control group, landmark L4 was replaced by LI and L2. Assignment
of animals trained with L4 north or south to the two arrays in phase 2 was
counterbalanced. Training continued until day 49, with testing beginning on day 38.
Tests: There were two tests in phase 1, on days 24 and 27, each of 60 sec
duration. As search was more focused during the first half, only the analysis of the
first 30 sec reported, and all subsequent tests lasted only 30 sec. In phase 1 rats were
trained and tested with the same set of landmarks.
In phase 2 there were 4 types of test. On days 38, 40, 42 and 44 rats were tested
with 3 landmarks: both L3 landmarks and either LI or L2. The sequence of testing
was counterbalanced across rats. Results of these tests are reported according to
landmark array, not chronological sequence. On day 46 followed a test with all 4
landmarks in their training positions. On day 48 LI and L2 exchanged places. On
day 49 animals were tested with only the two L3 landmarks, to control for possible
spurious cues.
Data collection and analyses: The movements of the animals in the arena were
monitored by an overhead video camera, connected to a video recorder and an Acorn
A5000 microcomputer equipped with a Hawk V12 digitising board and housed in an
adjacent room. Custom software recorded the time taken to find food, and the path
taken by a rats as a series of x,y coordinates (Spooner et al, 1994). It was displayed,
in real-time. The times spent in the F+ and F- include radii were recorded. The
fraction of time at F+ out of the total time in those two circles was the preference
score in tests. Because of the additional tests in phase 2, the design is not balanced.
The difference between pretrained and added landmarks is a within subjects factor
present only in Experimental, but not in Control groups. To deal with this unbalanced
design, variances were estimated by regression and then used in t-tests to determine
effects of landmark Identity (LI vs. L2), landmark Position (north vs. south), Group
(blocking) and Tests (early vs. late). This applies only to the analysis of blocking.
The later tests with 4 or 2 landmarks are subjected to analysis of variance. Latencies
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were not analysed, because the repeated increase of dwell time and the rising
demands to search persistently would be confounded with any effect of training.
Results
Qualitative description
The main findings were as follows: (1) Whether blocking occurred depended on
the landmark array. Experimental animals trained with L1S/L2N showed blocking,
those trained with L1N/L2S showed an enhanced preference for F+ when compared
to Controls. (2) Landmarks LI and L2 were equally effective when only one of them
was present, but LI was more salient than L2 after compound training, when the array
included both. (3) Performance was better with a landmark in the North position than
in the South. Navigation appears to be easier when the goal location is within the
landmark array. (4) When LI and L2 exchanged places, behaviour was not affected.
The shape of the array is more important than the identity of the landmarks.
Tests in phase 1
The Experimental and Control group were analysed separately, because in the
Control group the two possible L4 locations were not at the same distance from F+.
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were analysed together.
In the Experimental group performance was good with any combination of
landmark Position (North or South) and landmark Identity (LI or L2) and in both
tests (Figure 5.4). There were no significant effects of any factor (all p > 0.2). Rats
in the Control group searched longer if trained with L4 in the North, the position
closer to F+ (F 1/6 = 25.3, p < 0.005). This is most likely weighting according to
distance. On transition to phase 2 there was extensive and selective exploration of the
new landmarks, in the Experimental group either LI or L2, in the Control group both
(Figure 5.5).
Tests in phase 2, with either landmark LI or L2
In the Experimental group two of the first four tests were with the pretrained
landmarks, so a comparison with phase 1 was possible. First, considering phase 2
tests with pretrained landmarks on their own, there was a trend towards better
performance with a landmark in the North (F 1/3 = 9.77, p = 0.052; Figures 5.6 and
5.7). The interaction of landmark Position and landmark Identity was significant (F











Figure 5.5. Transition from phase 1 to phase 2 on day 28. The last trial of phase 1 is shown in the
upper row, the immediately follow-ing first trial of phase 2 in the lower row. In both groups the novel
landmarks are selectively explored. In Experi-mentals this is only one landmark, in Controls both.
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Comparing phases 1 and 2, it was found that the animal pretrained with L2 in the
South shifted search from F+ in phase 1 to to F- in phase 2, when tested with the
same landmark. This lead to a significant triple interaction of Position, Identity and
Phase of testing (F 1/3 = 18.89, p < 0.05). It is inconsistent with blocking, as phase 2
training reversed the preference learned in phase 1, instead of being blocked. A
replication of the experiment will show whether this is a robust effect.
Nevertheless, this and the significant preference for F- in the Control animals
tested with L2 in the south (t = 2.23, p < 0.05) suggests that to examine blocking, data
from animals trained with L1N/L2S may have to be analysed separately from that of
animals trained with L1S/L2N in phase 2. This is confirmed by analysis of data from
Controls and from Experimentals with both pretrained and novel landmarks. The
effects of landmark Identity and of landmark Position are both significant (t 36 =
2.34, p < 0.02 and t 36 = 2.99, p < 0.01). The preference for F+ was stronger in tests
with LI or with a landmark in the North position (Figures 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8).
None of the double or triple interactions of Identity, Position and Group reached
significance (all p > 0.1). Further examination of the data suggested that this lack of
interactions is a consequence of mutual cancellation of different effects in tests with
pretrained or added landmarks in the Experimental group, a first hint that pretraining
had some sort of effect. To test this, the analyses were repeated for three separate
kinds of comparison: first, in the Experimental group comparisons of pretrained and
added landmarks; second, comparisons of pretrained landmarks in the Experimental
group with the Control group; and third, comparisons of the added landmarks in the
Experimental group with the Control group.
The general pattern is that the interaction of Identity and Position is the same in
Controls as in Experimentals tested with the pretrained landmarks (t 36 = 3.2, p <
0.002; interaction Identity x Position x Group t 36 = 0.837, n. s.). It differs between
Controls and Experimentals tested with added landmarks (Identity x Position: t 36 =
0.393, n. s.; Identity x Position x Group: t 36 = 2.76, p < 0.01) as well as between
Experimentals tested with pretrained or novel landmarks (Identity x Position: t 26 =
0.382, n. s.; Identity x Position x Group: t 36 = 3.09, p < 0.005). In Control and
Experimentals tested with pretrained landmarks the preference score is lowest when
tested with L2 south, with other scores being similar. In Experimentals tested with
novel landmarks, the score for LI North is higher, with the other three scores similar.
Put another way, when LI South and L2 North are added landmarks, their scores are
lower.
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L2 South LI North I I Experimental, added cues | Control
Experimental, pretrained cues
LI South L2 North
L1NL1NL2S L2SL2SL1N LIS LIS L2N L2NL2NL1S
Figure 5.7 (above). Preference scores in blocking tests,
which are the fractions of time spent at F+, out of the total
time spent in the F+ and F- include radii. Note that the bars
are ordered by array (L1N/L2S and L1S/L2N) and by rat,
not by landmark within the array. A rat for which LIN was
the added cue, has L2S for the pretrained cue.
Experimentals trained with L1N/L2S had higher scores with
the added landmarks than their respective controls, while
Experimentals trained with the L1S/L2N array had lower
scores, showing blocking.
Figure 5.6 (left). Phase 2 test of Experimental animals with
pretrained landmarks. The preference for F+ is as strong as in phase 1, except for the rat pretrained
with L2 in the South. This animal showed a preference for F-.
Experimental Control
Ll North L2 South Ll North L2 South
L2 North Ll South L2 North Ll South
1 m
Figure 5.8. Tests in phase 2. animals in the Control group perform well unless tested with L2 South.
For the Experimental group only the test with added landmarks is shown.
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Experimental Control
North, L2 South LI South, L2 North LI North, L2 South LI South, L2 North
Reversal Reversal Reversal Reversal
Figure 5.8. Tests with all four landmarks present, both in their original arrangement as in pahse 2
training (upper row) and with LI and L2 reversed (lower row). The reversal made no difference to
search location.
™. . , Experimental ControlThis is confirmed by T , x „ , T , „T , T „ ^
LI North, L2 South LI North, L2 South
comparisons between the Control
group and Experimentals tested
with novel landmarks. In tests with
the L1N/L2S array, scores are
higher with novel landmarks (t 36 =
2.112, p < 0.05). In tests with the
L1S/L2N array scores are lower in
the Experimental than in the control
group (t 36 = 1.77, p < 0.05). There
is blocking in the array in which the
effects of landmark Identity and
Position cancel each other and the
landmarks are roughly equally
salient. In the array where one Figure 5.9. Control test with only the two L3
landmarks. Choice was at chance, ruling out control by
landmark is far more salient spurious cues.
because the effects of Identity and Position combine, the landmark added in phase 2
Experimental
Ll South, L2 North
Control
Ll South, L2 North
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supports a higher preference score than Controls.
Tests with 4 and 2 landmarks
The rats were then tested with all four landmarks present, once in the same
arrangement as during phase 2 training, once with the positions of LI and LI
reversed. In these two tests both groups performed significantly above chance (all p
< 0.001). An anova revealed a significant difference between training arrays (F 1/11
= 7.00, p < 0.05). Animals trained with LI South and L2 North performed better than
those with the other array. There was no other significant effect (all p > 0.2).
Importantly, not even swapping landmarks LI and L2 compared to their training
arrangement had any effect (F < 1). The search location could be determined by
reference to the shape of the array alone, regardless of the identity of the landmarks.
Finally, in the control test with only the two L3 landmarks animals in both groups
fell to chance (both p>0.2; figure 5.9). The difference between this test and the 4
landmarks tests was highly reliable (F 2/22 = 28.18, p< 0.0001). This shows that
performance did not depend on uncontrolled cues.
Discussion
The analysis of blocking was not straightforward due to the unexpected effects on
salience of landmark identity and position. The difference in salience between LI
and L2 was surprising. In Experiments 2 and 3 the rats' behaviour did not depend on
whether they were trained with LI or L2 in a Single landmark condition. In this
experiment, the difference in salience appears only if animals are trained with both
landmarks. Training with either LI or L2 (and the L3/L3 pair) in the Experimental
group in phase 1 did not show any differences between the landmarks. A difference
did appear in both groups after compound training, together with a landmark position
effect.
The effect of landmark position cannot be weighting according to distance. The
distances to all landmarks the same in the arrays with a landmark North or South.
The only obvious difference is that if the landmark was North, F+ was within the
array, if the landmark was South, F+ was outside the array. Although expected by
Burgess et al. (1994), this is, to my knowledge, a novel finding.
If this is an important factor, it would account for another, otherwise puzzling
feature of the results. Animals tested with L2 South in phase 2 were not just at
chance, they preferentially searched at F-. Therefore this behaviour cannot be
explained by exclusive reference to overshadowing. There must have been some
erroneous generalisation. A possible explanation is as follows: If LI is placed North,
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the more salient landmark is in the more salient position. The rats may then represent
only the L3/L3/L1 array, completely ignoring L2 in the South. When LI is removed,
landmark identity, the exact shape of the array, the distance of the landmark from the
L3/L3 array, and the distance of L2 from the feeder do not match the learned array
when the rat searches at F-. The only thing that does match is that it searches within
the array, on the side of L3/L3 where there is a landmark, rather than the opposite
side where there is none.
Blocking did occur when rats were trained with the L1S/L2N array, in which the
effects of landmark identity and position cancelled and the landmarks were about
equally salient. When landmark identity and position combined to make one
landmark far more salient, performance with the added landmarks was not just equal,
but higher than in the control group. It is not clear whether this is an effect of
differing salience, independent of the cause of difference, or whether it is specific to
spatial learning or perhaps even to this particular experimental design. Although
theoretically salience does not make a difference if learning has reached asymptote
(and comparisons of phases 1 and 2 show that this is the case in this experiment) in
conventional blocking experiments stimuli normally have similar salience to avoid
problems with overshadowing if conditioning did not reach asymptote.
The complete lack of reaction to exchanging LI and L2 in one of the 4 landmarks
tests replicates and extends the results of Cheng (1986) and Cheng and Gallistel
(1984). In this situation it is the shape of the array that determines search location,
not the features of the landmarks. Importantly, these are landmarks previously shown
to be discriminable. In Cheng's studies the shape was defined by the walls
surrounding the animal. The present study shows that shape can also have a strong
influence when it has to be reconstructed from the positions of discrete landmarks.
As in the work of Cheng (1984) and of Hermer and Spelke (1994), shape is only
shown to be important for the determination of orientation. It has not yet been
demonstrated that it is a relevant factor in determining translation.
Finally, the chance performance in the test with only two identical landmarks
shows that distribution of search was controlled only by the landmarks.
Blocking in the spatial domain has so far received very little attention. Two
studies had accidental similarities to a blocking design. Kraemer et al. (1983)
investigated the influence and interaction of intramaze and extramaze cues in the
radial maze. In phase 1 of the first experiment three groups of rats were trained with
either intramaze cues alone (group I), extramaze cues alone (group E), or both (group
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IE). The intramaze cues were arm inserts with different textures. In phase 2 their
preference for intra- or extramaze cues was tested. With both types of cues available
the animals were allowed to make three free choices and were removed from the
maze. During the interval the maze was rotated through 360° in control trials, and by
an angle that brought the visited intramaze cues into unvisited locations in the test
trials. Choice of unvisited locations over unvisited intramaze cues indicates a
preference for using extramaze cues to determine unvisited arms, and vice versa. A
table shows the similarity of this design to blocking. I stands for intramaze cues and
E for extramaze cues;
Phase 1 Phase 2 Test
Group I I IE I vs E
Group E E IE I vs E
Group IE IE IE I vs E
The two major differences are comparative testing throughout phase two and
training of Group IE (the control group) with the compound in phase 1. The latter
means that any difference between Group IE and the other two groups is likely to be
accentuated by this additional training. Group IE reached criterion faster in phase 1
than either group I or E, with no difference between these two, suggesting no
difference in salience between intra- and extramaze cues. In phase 2 group IE
displayed a strong preference for extramaze cues. That effect alone could mask any
possible blocking in Group E, and an analysis of blocking must rely on comparison of
groups I and IE. Unfortunately, the authors make no statistical comparison between
groups, though they assert that preference for extramaze cues is stronger in Group IE
than in group E. Despite having been trained with intramaze cues, and although the
reward rotated with the intramaze cues in the test trials, Group I initially showed no
preference and then came to rely on extramaze cues. Clearly the pretraining with
intramaze cues did not prevent learning about extramaze cues. In the absence of
comparisons of asymptotic preference levels in these groups, or of speed of learning
about extramaze cues in Group I and a group not trained in phase 1, it is not possible
to decide whether learning might have been impaired or delayed.
As part of a study of navigation under minimum and redundant cue conditions
Fenton et al. (1994) transferred rats in a watermaze from a two cue environment into
one with either two cues added or the familiar two cues replaced by new ones. They
found that rats tested with two added cues only, which they argue is similar to the
experimental group in a blocking design, performed not as well as those trained only
153
with two novel cues. They suggested that this was best explained by reference to
blocking. However, the table shows that if phase 1 is ignored this is an
overshadowing design.
Phase 1 Phase 2 Test
Exptl AB ABEF EF
Control AB EF EF
The Control group only has experience with half of the compound in the second
phase. Blocking may contribute to differential performance, but this experiment
cannot provide conclusive evidence.
The only two published studies explicitly designed to investigate blocking in the
spatial domain were carried out by Chamizo and coworkers. Chamizo et al. (1985)
studied blocking and overshadowing in the radial maze. Only three arms of the maze
were used at any one time. Both groups started in a plain wooden arm and had a
choice between one arm with a rubber insert and one with sandpaper. Both could see
extramaze cues. In the intramaze cue condition the arms were moved between trials
and reward was associated with one of the inserts. In the extramaze cue condition
one of the arms always pointed in a consistent direction and reward was found in this
location, regardless of the insert. In the compound condition this arm also had always
the same insert. In phase 1 of the first experiment one group each was trained with
intramaze and extramaze cues respectively. In phase 2 these and two control groups
received compound training. Comparisons showed that pretraining with one type of
cue impaired performance with the other type of cue that only became relevant in
phase 2. In standard conditioning experiments the to-be-blocked cue is only
introduced in phase 2. In this experiment it was present, but irrelevant, during phase
1. Therefore the impairment of the pretrained groups may be due not to blocking, but
to learned irrelevance of one type of cue (N. J. Mackintosh, 1973).
To counter this objection Chamizo et al. trained two groups with intramaze cues
relevant and extramaze cues irrelevant in the first phase. In the second phase both
intramaze and extramaze cues were relevant for both groups. They differed in the
reward contingency of the intramaze cues. In one group it remained unaltered. In the
other group it reversed, the previously unrewarded cue being rewarded and vice
versa. Unlike experiment 1 exposure to the conditions that could lead to learned
irrelevance are equated. The authors do point out that this procedure may produce
"superconditioning" (Rescorla 1971) to the newly relevant cue in phase 2. This
would be expected if the unrewarded intramaze cue had become an inhibitor. The
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authors argue that "a difference between the two groups in the amount learned about
extra-maze cues would still indicate an interaction between intra-maze and extra-
maze cues which could not be attributed to learned irrelevance" (p. 242). While this
is correct, the superior learning that was found in the group with intramaze cue
reversal could be attributed to superconditioning in this group instead of blocking in
the other. The control procedure is not appropriate.
The inspiration for these two experiments is O'Keefe and Nadel's (1978)
distinction between a taxon and a locale system, and the possibility that these systems
are used in parallel (Morris, 1981). This would be analogous to the relationship
between Pavlovian and operant conditioning, which establish separate associative
links and therefore do not compete for associative strength. While this is a possible
consequence of having separate locale and taxon systems, it is not necessary. Tn their
discussion of "hypothesis behaviour" (p. 91 ff.) O'Keefe and Nadel rather suggest that
hypotheses could overshadow one another. In other words, locale and taxon system
compete, rather than cues within the locale system. Consequently, the specific
prediction of O'Keefe and Nadel is the absence of blocking within the locale system,
while competition between systems may lead to their overshadowing or blocking one
another. In so far as Chamizo et al.'s identification of locale system with extramaze
cues and taxon system with intramaze cues is correct, the first prediction was not
tested, the second possibility was confirmed. Furthermore, while there is suggestive
evidence that blocking between intra- and extramaze cues does exist, the procedures
do not allow an unambiguous conclusion.
A recent study from the same group (Rodrigo et al., in prep.) deals with both of
these problems. This study of blocking in the spatial domain was conducted in the
watermaze, with discrete objects just outside the maze as landmarks, which could be
removed or added at will. In an effort to keep experience the same for all animals,
most trials consisted only of placing the rats on the platform. There were also some
conventional swimming trials, without which rats will not search for the platform.
Experimental animals were pretrained with landmarks A, B and C, then a landmark X
was added. In one experiment the Controls were not pretrained with any landmarks,
in another with a different set A', B' and C'. In both the Experimentals showed lower
performance with landmarks A, C and X than the Controls. Experimentals also
searched less in the correct quadrant with A, C and X than with A, B and C, while
there was no difference between arrays in the Controls.
The balance of evidence favours the presence of blocking in spatial learning,
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contradicting O'Keefe and Nadel's prediction that learning should be curiosity driven
and all available information should be incorporated in the representation. The
results of blocking studies are consistent with those of overshadowing, together with
blocking, Chamizo et al. (1985) also investigated overshadowing between intra- and
extramaze cues. Procedural ambiguities which led to the impression that extramaze
cues overshadowed intramaze cues, despite taking longer to learn, were corrected by
March and Chamizo (1992), who found that intramaze cues could also overshadow
extramaze cues. Nevertheless, the problem remains that different types of cue are
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Nadel (1978) predict the absence of blocking and overshadowing only within one of
these systems.
Spetch (1995) avoided these problems by using a counterbalanced design of cues
on a touch screen. Pigeons and humans were trained to peck at or touch a small area
on the screen marked only by nearby visual cues. It was expected that relative
distance from the goal would determine whether a cue would be overshadowed by or
would itself overshadow other cues (Figure 5.10). Tests measured both the accuracy
in the presence of single cues and preference when two cues indicated different goal
locations (Figure 5.11). It was found that cues closer to the goal overshadowed those
farther from the goal.
It is important to note that this is different from weighting by distance. Weighting
occurs after the retrieval of information. It can explain a preference for the closer
landmark within a perceived array, and greater accuracy of navigation when using
this landmark rather than a farther landmark. In this overshadowing experiment the
comparison is between cues at the same distance from the goal, originally in different
arrays. Therefore the inherent accuracy of navigation is the same. If, as O'Keefe and
Nadel suggest, the subjects learned equally about all available cues, there is no basis
for a preference or for differences in performance. The fact that accuracy and
preferences did differ is evidence that different information was stored. Learning was
goal driven in that it depended on what information was most useful to find a specific
point. This is contrary to O'Keefe and Nadel's postulate that all information in a
cognitive map is equivalent.
Summary
O'Keefe and Nadel's characterisation of cognitive mapping included the
suggestion, derived from analogy with physical maps, that information is acquired in
an all-or-none fashion. There either is an entry at a particular map location or there is
not. Overshadowing of one landmark by another is not possible in that case, if both
landmarks are present in the map. As a criterion for the acquisition of information
they suggested that the map is updated whenever a mismatch between the
environment and the representation is detected. In a novel environment there is no
match at all, so the animal will explore, and build up a representation. Change of a
familiar environment should also create a mismatch and trigger exploration. This is
independent of the amount or kind of information already stored in the map.
Therefore blocking should not occur. In associative learning theory blocking is one
of the phenomena showing interactions between cues. Kamin (1969) described this
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as the principle that animals should only learn about those things that surprise them.
If an event is already adequately signalled, there is no point learning yet another cue
predicting the same thing. Only if the added cue signals a change in the relationship
between events do animals learn, as shown by the phenomenon of unblocking
(Dickinson et al., 1976)). In conditioning experiments overshadowing depends on the
relative salience of stimuli. Animals concentrate on those cues that are easiest to
notice, even if the overshadowed cue is quite adequate on its own. In both cases,
learning is goal driven in the sense that learning depends on how useful a cue is to
predict a particular event. Recent evidence shows that learning about landmarks is
also goal-driven in this sense, rather than curiosity driven as defined by O'Keefe and
Nadel. As pointed out in chapter 3, this is not a necessary feature of cognitive maps.
Other definitions not including this feature are possible.
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6. What's it all about when you get right down^———%' \i
to it?
The two themes of this thesis are, on the one hand, the nature of navigational
processes and what could be called a cognitive map, and on the other hand, what role
associative learning may play in navigation. Much of the debate on whether animals
navigate by cognitive maps has been dominated by O'Keefe and Nadel's (1978)
definition. Even many associative learning theorists accept their arguments that
cognitive mapping and associative learning are fundamentally different and
incompatible processes. I have argued that possible strategies of navigation can be
subdivided into more than two processes. In this scheme of classification associative
learning could contribute to construction of a representation of space in most of the
cases examined. I also suggest that the features of cognitive maps which O'Keefe and
Nadel derived from analogy with physical maps are not an indivisible whole that
would make no sense if one or several of them was left out. Furthermore, cognitive
mapping is best defined as a process, an interaction between a representation and
readout and planning systems. Neither representation alone nor some planning
system alone is sufficient to provide the capabilities consisdered characteristic of
cognitive mapping.
This final discussion will begin with the most basic question that could be asked
of a navigational process, namely "how do I find X"? The properties of a process that
can solve this problem suggest additional requirements one might want to add to the
specification of a satisfactory navigational system. I will very briefly review the
evidence for use of each of these navigational strategies.
The simplest solution to the problem of finding a place X again is to lay down a
trail whan leaving X. This strategy does not even require a representation of space.
As long as a trail is distinguishable from trails to other locations, it is only necessary
to associate X with a specific trail. Molluscs (Blackford-Cook, 1969) and ants
(Wilson, 1971) are known to lay chemical trails. This strategy has many limitations.
The trail to X may be much longer than the direct path. It is not possible to determine
in advance how far away X is, either in a direct line or along the trail. To get to a
point Y on a different trail, a point must be found where that crosses the current trail.
Predators may follow the trail (Webb and Shine, 1992). I am not aware of any
evidence that there are distinguishable trails, so it may not be possible to choose
between destinations on different trails at all.
These limitations suggest the following additional problems one might ask a
navigational system to solve: What is an efficient path to X? What is the cost of
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travelling to X? How can competitors or predators be prevented from using this
information?
This last question is easiest to answer. Use information that is in memory, rather
than physical markers which others can notice. What is in memory is priviledged
information, until the organism communicates it. The relationship between a
landmark and a destination is one kind of information that could be stored in memory.
The most basic way of using landmarks is to approach a beacon, which is also one
possible solution to the problem of finding an efficient path. From anywhere the
beacon is noticeable and recognisable it is possible to go straight towards it, offering
more efficiency than trails, and even to detour round obstacles, giving more
flexibility. Sequences of beacons may be chained together. Extended cues can be
followed, too. Deutsch (1960) proposed a guidance model of that kind which is
adequate to account for rats' behaviour in complex mazes. This kind of model has
some degree of flexibility in that it can shortcut if an animal happens to come across a
stimulus further on in the chain than expected. It cannot plan such shortcuts, having
no information about the spatial relations between beacons.
Many destinations an organism might want to reach will not be in the immediate
vicinity of a landmark suitable as a beacon. In this case it may memorise a snapshot
of the world as it appears from the destination. If the snapshot is only used for place
recognition, navigation is possible by lining up the snapshot in a specific orientation,
then moving until the next familiar place is recognised. This may be called ballistic
stimulus-response chaining, as this type of landmark use only allows the organism to
move until hitting the next stimulus in the sequence. This method requires either a
high accuracy of response, as in its pure form there is no error correction if misses the
next stimulus or else a high density of remembered stimuli. Given a high density, it is
also possible to define the response in egocentric terms, as a small turn right or left
(Brown and Sharp, 1995). I am not aware of any experimental evidence that would
distinguish between this and a 'non-ballistic' S-R model, which would involve moving
for a specific distance in a particular allocentrically defined direction. This would
require dead reckoning to estimate distance. As in the ballistic S-R model, if the
organism is only capable of place recognition, either the density of recognisable
places must be high or responses must be very accurate. Error correction would only
be possible if there is a method of approaching the centre of a snapshot, which would
create a hybrid model.
Cartwright and Collett (1983) described an algorithm that uses the discrepancy
between remembered and currently perceived image to compute a direction that
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would take the bee closer to the goal. They found that it could account for bees' use
of landmarks to approach a goal. Each snapshot has a limited catchment area in
which the perceived scene is similar enough to the remembered one to allow a match.
To navigate beyond that range would require chaining of snapshots in much the same
way as beacons. Navigation by snapshot has the advantage of not requiring a
conspicuous landmark right at the point the animal needs to reach. Like beacon
navigation and the ballistic S-R method, snapshot navigation does not provide
information about distances between locations. Choosing one destination among
several on the basis of distance, or planning an efficient path between multiple
destinations is still not possible.
If relying on landmarks alone, this type of path planning requires the capacity to
perceive and store not only the angles between landmarks, but also their distances.
Then it is necessary to either read the relationship between one's own location and
that of the destination from a metric map, or to add self-landmark to landmark-goal
vectors. A list of vectors can be used to perform all the computations supported by a
map, assuming that all relevant vectors are stored in the list and that there is a
procedure to detect and remove inconsistencies. Maps and vector lists are at least
potentially equivalent at the adaptive and algorithmic levels of analysis. They differ
primarily in implementational details. In fact, the one capacity that is necessary for
all path planning based on true distances between points is vector addition, whether
the vector is read from a map or computed from several individually stored vectors.
When landmark arrays are distorted, gerbils (Collett et al., 1986) and pigeons (Cheng,
1988) shift their search distribution in ways that indicate use of metric relations and
which are characteristically different from the behaviour of bees using a snapshot.
Landmark-based navigation necessarily uses location-specific information. The
drawback is that if no familiar landmark is perceptible, the animal is completely lost.
This limits how far the animal can move from familiar areas, for example during
exploration. An alternative to use of landmarks is dead reckoning or path integration,
the updating of position by keeping track of all displacements. This capacity has been
demonstrated in many species (see section 2.5). As discussed before, dead reckoning
must use metric information, so a suitable readout mechanism can recover
information about distance. Bees do show evidence for the retrieval of such a stored
vector when signalling the distance to a food source in a waggle dance (von Frisch,
1967). Conversely, when a bee uses information from another forager's dance, she
must feed a vector into a readout mechanism. Thus at least in bees there is evidence
for storage of vectors in memory and for using them as input for dead reckoning
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(scheme DR3 in figure 3.1). Storage of such place codes in long term memory could
occur by associations, but the updating of the current location cannot be an associative
process, as discussed in section 2.5. If there are no restrictions to the combinations of
place codes, this strategy of navigation already has many of the properties postulated
for cognitive maps. It is possible to determine the distance and a path to a destination
or distances between multiple destinations. This is the information needed to plan
efficient paths between multiple goals. However, accumulating errors require that
location is updated by reference to landmarks at locations other than only home.
The properties of landmark-based navigation and dead reckoning ideally
complement each other. An ideal navigation system should therefore integrate the
two, rather than merely using them in parallel. A quite basic form of integration
occurs in navigation by non-ballistic S-R associations. Recognition of a place is the
stimulus and a directed displacement over a specific distance is the response. That
distance must be derived from dead reckoning. This requires a path integrator that is
set to 0 when the path is first traversed, and storage of the resulting vector in memory.
From there it must be retrieved and used as a target value in order to perfrom the same
response again. That way only the distance between individual places would be
known. Novel sequences of component paths may be created, as suggested by
McNaughton et al. (1991) and demonstrated in honey bees by Collett et al. (1993).
This strategy is still limited in path planning. It is not possible to determine the bee
line distance between two places linked only through several different S-R
associations. Only the cumulative distance along these routes is known. In a sense
that makes no practical difference, as the animal would have to follow those routes
anyway, having no mechanism to create a direct shortcut.
A higher degree of integration is possible if the path integrator is capable of taking
any two place codes (for example the home vectors of current position and
destination) and compute the difference between them (a vector between current
position and destination). That would allow novel shortcutting, determination of path
length and provide the information needed to plan an arbitrary route between multiple
goals. Even non-metric landmark information, as from snapshots, will allow
correction of random drift of the path integrator. Metric landmark information would
improve accuracy, but would not be essential. Bees appear to have a representation of
space that integrates dead reckoning with use of landmarks. Behavioural evidence for
interactions between visual cues and dead reckoning in rodents has been reviewed by
Etienne et al. (1996). They also report a recent experiment in which hamsters were
shown to be capable of choosing, based on dead reckoning along a novel route, one of
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four identical landmarks. More evidence for such integration comes from unit
recording studies. The firing of hippocampal place cells persists in the dark, and if
place fields change their locations, behaviour changes accordingly (O'Keefe and
Speakman, 1987). Jung and McNaughton (1993) found that on a radial maze the
whole set of place fields sometimes rotated relative to landmarks while retaining their
radial distances and their spatial relationships to each other. If place fields were
determined only by extramaze cues, or by unambiguous intramaze cues, this would
not be possible. If place fields were driven by ambiguous intramaze cues, perhaps the
shape of each individual arm, There would be no consistent relation between fields in
different arms. The actual results imply that place fields can be driven by dead
reckoning. In a cylindrical environment place fields could likewise rotate relative to
visual cues (Knierim, 1995; see discussion in chapter 4). McNaughton et al. (1994)
placed rats in a novel environment and after some time rotated it quickly. If the
rotation occured very soon, the set of place fields typically retained its geocentric
orientation. If the rats had more time to bind place fields to visual cues, they followed
the rotation. This implies that place field firing is initially maintained primarily
through dead reckoning. The unit recording studies also favour a representation in the
form of a two-dimensional map over vector lists.
The questions asked of navigation up to this point, and the methods suggested to
solve these problems, have only covered path planning up to the point of finding an
efficient path either to a single or between multiple destinations. O'Keefe and Nadel's
analogy with physical maps suggested some additional properties. One of these is
instantaneous transfer. As long as landmarks are identifiable and can be used to
localise a map user, it is possible to determine the relation between the map user and
any location on the map, regardless of whether this person has ever been anywhere
near this location before. The map is instantly usable, without prior experience of this
region. A vector-sum method of navigation should provide this capacity. Two
questions are important when considering the importance of instantaneous transfer for
the cognitive map concept: Is transfer a necessary property of a map? If transfer
exists, are there processes other than mapping that could account for it?
The first question can be answered both in general and by reference to specific
examples. The general answer is that instantaneous transfer depends on the capacity
to access all information in the map regardless of one's location in the represented
space. However, this capacity is a property of the readout mechanism, not of the map.
For a specific case, consider again the models of hippocampal function discussed in
chapter 3. They all rest on the assumption that location in two dimensions is encoded
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by patch of neural activity moving on a two-dimensional surface, a direct analog
mapping. (That there is no topographical mapping between place field and place cell
locations is functionally irrelevant; see appendix.) In Brown and Sharp's model place
fields are assumed to be created by associating multiple directional local views with
each place cell. This is only possible when the animal is at the location of the place-
field- to-be and can perceive the local views. Therefore this type of place field map
cannot possibly provide landmark information in places that have not previously been
visited. The landmark arrangement visible from the novel location would simply not
fit anything stored in the map. Instantaneous transfer is therefore not a property of all
possible mappping systems. In the case of hippocampal place cell maps it would
require a way of adding landmark information to cells whose place fields have never
been visited. The analogy of the paper map, where all landmark information can be
read regardless of location, is seriously misleading.
As for the second question, instantaneous transfer does not depend on use of
maps. The alternative implementation of a metric place code, in terms of vectors
decomposed into two components, would not suffer from any restriction on where
landmark information can be accessed. The reason is that a vector list does not
contain any place codes at all, except for landmark-goal vectors. Whenever an animal
is not at a goal, it must perform vector addition to determine its relation to a goal.
Where it is in relation to landmarks is immaterial. Therefore lack of instantaneous
transfer could even be considered evidence in support of maps and against vector lists.
Navigation by snapshot likewise could support instantaneous transfer, if a snapshot
can be formed quickly and accurately enough. Once a snapshot is formed, it can be
reached from any location within the catchment area. Instantaneous transfer can only
distinguish between representations that depend on exploring an area to use
landmarks there and those that do not need that much exploration. As discussed in
section 3.2, that does not correspond to a distinction between cognitive mapping and
associative learning.
Another set of features suggested by analogy with physical maps concerns the
conditions of information acquisition. O'Keefe and Nadel predicted that variability in
the spatial relations between objects should make it difficult or impossible to acquire
a map. The experiments on landmark stability offer only qualified confirmation, as
discussed at length in chapter 4. Learning is is influenced by the number of stable
spatial relations (Experiment 2), which speaks against navigation by snapshot, but the
learning under some conditions despite global instability shows that local stability is
sufficient. If a map cannot deal with instability, then it must be possible to construct
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rather small local maps. The predictions of mapping accounts and others then become
more difficult to distinguish, as shown by the development of procedures and design
from Experiments 1 to 3. The best hypothesis concerning the functional significance
of landmark stability effects appears to be resistance to error. Information is
classified according to two criteria, reliability and accuracy. In the case of landmarks,
these are likely to be negatively correlated. As a discrepancy between two sources of
information increases, the more accurate but less reliable should be given
progressively less weight, as it is likely to be misleading. The results of Experiments
1 to 3 indicate that this principle applies if the discrepancy is present during learning
and not only, as shown in other studies, if the discrepancy appears after learning in a
stable environment.
The absence of blocking and overshadowing was another property derived from
the paper map analogy. However, it is possible to use learning rules other than all-or-
none incorporation of information whenever a mismatch is detected. Comparison
with a hippocampal map model again proves instructive. McNaughton assumes that
place cell firing is driven primarily by dead reckoning. This means the map has to be
preconfigured, and therefore landmark information must be assigned to specific place
cells. The learning mechanism must detect correlations, which is something
associative learning does fairly well. That suggests there should be blocking and
overshadowing, as has been found in several studies. Experiment 4 suggests that
blocking may depend on the properties of the landmark array, but it is not clear
whether this effect is specific to spatial learning, or a consequence of a large
difference in salience.
The discussion of path planning has so far focused on the information provided by
the representation of space. Equally important are readout and planning systems. The
importance of readout mechanisms has already been shown by two examples. The
models of Burgess and coworkers (1994, 1995) use essentially the same
representation of space as that of Brown and Sharp (1995). The goal cells proposed
by Burgess et al. can provide distance and direction to the goal, while Brown and
Sharp's S-R mechanism is largely restricted to following previously taken routes, and
has the capacity to cut out loops from this path but has only limited generalisation and
no knowledge of distance. Bees have shown some capacity for vector addition, but
appear limited in the type of vector they can retrieve at any one time. In the study
reported by Menzel et al. (1996) they could only combine two inbound vectors, not an
inbound and an outbund vector, which would have enabled them to make a shortcut to
their destination.
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Even given a rich representation and readout mechanism, there must be a way of
putting this information to some use. In the case of planning an efficient path
between N goals, the system must find one of the better combinations from N!
possibilities. There may even be additional constraints, for example visiting rich
foraging patches first, before they are depleted by competitors. Leaving aside the
question how an efficient path might be computed, a powerful planning system does
not necessarily imply that there is a rich representation to work with. The planning
system could take its information from a metric map as well as a list of S-R responses.
In the absence of vector addition its estimate of distances would be limited to the
arithmetic sum of response vectors, but otherwise the problem would be the same as if
information about true Euclidean distances between destinations was available.
Cognitive mapping must be considered a process that includes forming a spatial
representation, reading the information stored in there, and using it to plan actions. If
an animal's behaviour does not meet some criterion for cognitive mapping, the cause
of the limitation may lie in any or all of these domains. The creation of a map can
only be the beginning of the process of cognitive mapping.
Summary
I have attempted to analyse the properties of spatial learning not by dividing it into
mapping and non-mapping strategies, but by asking what the functions are that spatial
learning fulfils. I suggest that this approach allows a finer division and classification
of possible navigational strategies. Most strategies in the suggested classification
leave a possible role for associative learning, including the majority of what I consider
cognitive mapping processes. Mapping and associative learning are not mututally
exclusive; that distinction must be given up. In the absence of that dichotomy the
questions of whether a particular navigational strategy is associative, becomes less
important. Likewise, there is no clearcut and logical division into mapping and non-
mapping stategies. The classification that follows from the questions about function
and adaptive value that I have asked contains several different strategies that have the,
in my opinion, most important functional properties of cognitive mapping. None has
all the properties derived from comparison with physical maps. While the concept of
a cognitive map still has some use, its definition by that analogy has, after many
years, finally become counterproductive. The analysis also suggests that many
aspects of cognitive mapping depend as much or more on the properties of readout




Why is there no topographic mapping of place
field to place cell locations in the hippocampus?
Abstract
The mapping of place fields onto the locations of place cells on the hippocampal
surface is non-topographic. It is suggested that non-topographic mapping in
conjunction with use of multiple reference frames allows individual cells to code for
locations in several reference frames. Storage capacity increases in direct proportion
to the number of reference frames per cell, at the price of increased sensitivity to
noise.
There is no recognisable topography in the mapping of place fields to
hippocampal place cells (Gothard et al., 1996; O'Keefe, 1976). Neighbouring place
cells do not have neighbouring place fields, although numerous examples are known
of the mapping onto anatomical space of either spatially distributed sensory input (for
example retinotopic and tonotopic mapping) or computational parameters (Gallistel
1990, Knudsen et al. 1987). The barn owl's auditory system even recreates a
topographic map of the direction of auditory stimuli from intensity and phase
differences of sounds, stimuli that are not spatially distributed on the sensory surface
(Knudsen et al. 1987). Why then is there no mapping of space to space in the
hippocampus?
To address this question, assume there were topographic mapping. In this
discussion I make the further assumptions that each place field has a two dimensional
Gaussian shape, that place fields are equally sized (in reality the fields of place cells
in the ventral hippocampus are larger than in the dorsal hippocampus; Jung et al.
1994), homogeneously distributed, and that they overlap. Place fields are larger than
the possible resolution (Wilson and McNaughton 1993) and position is specified not
by a single cell, but by an ensemble of active cells. If there were topographic
mapping between space and hippocampus, the spatial distribution of activation in the
hippocampus would replicate the distribution of active place fields in the environment
(Figure 7.1). The cells of an ensemble would form a patch of activation on the
hippocampal surface. The number of cells in this patch is determined only by the size
and density of place fields. All and only those cells are firing that have place fields
that overlap with the current location, or in other words the centres of their place
fields are no more than the field radius from the current location. Furthermore, a
strict one to one topographic mapping, such that neighbouring cells always have
neighbouring fields, has two implications: First, within this patch there are no cells
that are not active, If cells A and C are both firing, and there is a cell B between
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Figure 7.1. Topographic
mapping of the spatial
distribution of place fields
in geographical space to
place cells on the
hippocampal surface. The
animal is at the centre of
the place field with the
highest firing rate. In
"hippocampal space" the
location of each black
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square represents the
location in the
hippocampus of a place
cell that is currently firing.
The size of each square
represents the firing rate.
The same firing rates and
the locations of the centres
of the corresponding place
fields are represented by
the black squares in
"geographical space.
Broken lines connect each
place field to its
corresponding place cell,
illustrating the topographic
order. Each place cell is assumed to have a place field with a two dimensional Gaussian shape. The
fields are assumed to have equal spread and to be homogeneously distributed. Then the firing rate of
the overlapping fields necessarily reproduces the shape of individual place fields. In this example the
topographic mapping is so strict that all cells, and only those cells, that have place fields centred within
the place field of the central cell are active at any one time.
them, then cell B has a place field between fields A and C and therefore cell B must
fire as well. Second, no cells are active outside the patch. Any cell D beyond the
radius of the active cell patch also has a place field beyond the radius of the central
place field.
The cells within a patch may constitute a stable cell assembly such that activation
of one cell will activate the other cells of the assembly. This might be achieved
through a synaptic interaction whose strength decreases as a Gaussian function of the
distance between place fields (McNaughton 1996). However, the details of how the
topographic mapping from place field to place cell distribution is achieved is not
important for this argumant. Even the assumption of stable cell assemblies is not
necessary. Only the topographical arrangement itself matters.
The fact that only the cells in a single patch can be active at any one time has two
important consequences. First, even with very coarse coding these are likely to be
only a very small fraction of the total number of cells in the hippocampus. Strict
topographic mapping is inefficient in this case. Second, cells cannot have place fields
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in different reference frames or coordinate systems (unless the hippocampal map is
divided; see below). The active cell patches would be identical in each case and the
encoded locations indistinguishable.
The ability to use multiple reference frames is desirable because they offer more
flexibility than a single topographical map, at the expense of other potential problems
such as discontinuities between frames and the representation of the relationships
between frames. If a single topographic map of space on the hippocampal surface
preserved metric relationships between place field locations, there would be islands of
cells never used if the area they represent is inaccessible. Distortion of the map and
reallocation of those cells to other areas is conceivable and does occur in other
computational maps (King and Moore 1991, Merzenich et al. 1983a,b), but appears to
be slow. An animal would need a long time to transform its map whenever leaving
the boundaries of its current map, for example when migrating, leaving parental
territory to establish its own, or after being expelled from its territory.
Multiple reference frames could be represented in a topographic map by dividing
it into a corresponding number of separate areas. The spatial arrangement of these
areas would not necessarily replicate the spatial relations between the geographic
diagram illustrates one limiting factor to the number of reference frames. As the number grows
individual reference frames become smaller. As the size approaches the spatial resolution of the map,
location within a reference frame becomes less informative than location of the reference itself. There
may be earlier limits due to the necessity and cost of switching between reference frames.
Figure 7.2. Multiple
reference frames could be
represented in
topographic maps that are
spatially separated on the
hippocampal surface.










frames. The maps are not
drawn to scale. It is
assumed that the cell
patches and place fields
are small compared to the
topographic maps and the
areas they cover. Though
the area allocated to each
map and reference frame
was kept small only for
display purposes, the
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areas they represent. Ignoring potential boundary effects, multiple reference frames
as such have no influence on the storage capacity of a strictly topographical map
(Figure 7.2).
If the requirement for strictly topographical mapping is relaxed such that the
diameter of a cell patch increases, the possible number of cells within a patch grows
with the square of its diameter. What is the consequence of these additional cells
within the range of a patch? I will assume that the number of active cells in a patch,
and therefore the resolution of the map, stays constant (Figure 7.3). The remaining
cells may be allocated to other reference frames. If each cell still belongs to only one
reference frame, the only consequences are that the map of each reference frame has
been spread out and four maps are superimposed on the same hippocampal area
(Figure 7.4). Storage capacity is unaffected. Unit recording would show that only ]/4
of a cell's neighbours have neighbouring place fields. There would still be
recognisable topographic organisation of those cells simultaneously active at a
particular time. If cell A has a place field between B and C, then its location in the
hippocampus will be between B and C.
Instead of dividing the larger number of cells within the radius of the cell patch
into four mutually exclusive ensembles, it is possible to create a larger number of
uniquely identifiable ensembles that share some cells. Assume that each cell takes
part in the representation of two randomly assigned different reference frames
Figure 7.3. The radius a
of the active cell patch
has been doubled. If the
number of active cell is
constant, only '/4 of the
cells within the radius of
the patch are actually
active. The broken lines
illustrate the looser
topographic mapping
from place field locations
to place cell locations.
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Figure 7.4. The additio¬
nal cells within the
radius of potentialy
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Figure 7.5. The range of synaptic interactions has
been doubled relative to Figure 1. Each cell has
been assigned at random to two different cell
assemblies and reference frames. This keeps
constant the average number of cells per reference
frame. There are 8 reference frames, capable of
covering twice the area in geographic space.
Only two reference frames and cell assemblies are
shown, colour coded in black and red. Cells
active in both assemblies, on average one in
seven, are shown in violet.
(keeping constant the resolution, the number of place fields per area in each reference
frame). Then the same area of hippocampus contains not four but eight reference
frames (Figure 7.5). Under the given assumptions, the area that could be represented
in the map is proportional to the number of reference frames per cell. However, the
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o= radius of Gaussian activation patch in hippocampus
in units of average distance between
Fig 7.6. The probability that two cells
sharing one reference frame will also share
a second, so failing to unambiguously
specify the current frame, increases with
the number of frames per cell and
decreases with increasing spread of
synaptic interaction. Under the assumption
that all reference frames for an individual
cell will be different, it is given by the
equation:
where r = number of reference frames per
cell and n = o2r, the total number of
reference frames.
of its reference frames should be active. At least two cells are needed to
unambiguously specify a reference frame. As shown in Figure 7.6, the probability
that any two cells will fail to uniquely identify a single reference frame, i.e. the
sensitivity to noise, increases as a function of the number of reference frames per cell,
and decreases as a function of the radius of the cell patch, until the limiting case when
the cells of each reference frame are spread over all of the hippocampus. Distributed
mapping is actually found in the hippocampus (Gothardet al., 1996; O'Keefe, 1976).
Whether the mapping is actually random is not clear. If reference frames only ever
represented separate areas, it would not be difficult to search for topographical
ordering of the cells firing at a particular moment. However, as it has been found that
reference frames spatially overlap (Gothard et al, 1996, McNaughton et al, 1995),
being bound to different landmark groups, several reference frames may be in use
simultaneously. Separating them by manipulation of the environment while recording
a sufficient number of cells at a high enough sampling rate is extremely difficult. The
possibility of loose topographic ordering of place cells within individual reference
frames cannot yet be excluded.
To summarise, multiple reference frames allow not only increased flexibility, but
storage capacity is directly proportional to the number of reference frames per cell.
For a given noise sensitivity that number is the higher the looser the topography of a
computational map is. The limiting case, found in the hippocampus, is the absence of
any recognisable topography. For illustrative purposes I have assumed that multiple
reference frames would cover different areas. In practice, reference frames are found
within the same environment (Gothard et al, 1996, McNaughton et al, 1995), bound
to different sets of landmarks. I have also assumed that they represent only spatial
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relations. I cannot exclude the possibility that some reference frames may encode
non-spatial aspects of the environment, while others have purely spatial content.
The reference frames discussed here are equivalent to Worden's (1992) fragments.
Worden (unpublished manuscript) argues that the principle of "fragment fitting" can
be applied not only to navigation, but to cognition in general. In this case storage or
processing capacity would generally be greater in the absence of the mapping of
computational parameters onto space.
The argument does not specifically depend on a fragment fitting model of
cognition. As cognition becomes more abstract, the space of possible features
becomes larger while the proportion of features present at any one time becomes
smaller. For example, the feature space of an auditory coincidence neuron is limited
to frequency and a relatively small range of interaural delays. Sounds containing
many frequencies and originating from many directions may need to be processed
simultaneously. The feature space of a visual edge detector is limited to edge
orientation and retinal location. Many edges may occur simultaneously in many
locations and need to be processed in parallel. In navigation, there are more possible
combinations of location and orientation, only one of which occurs at any one time.
Likewise, a hypothetical "grandmother cell" would need to be sensitive to a selection
of features out of a very large space of possible features, at least some of them context
dependent. Dedicating a single cell or group of cells to just this specific combination
of features would be inefficient. Therefore topographic computational maps are most
suited to parallel processing of a large amount, but limited range, of data. The use of
multiple reference frames and sequential processing is preferable where the possible
range of data is large compared to the amount of data processed.
The argument so far is a derivation specific to reference frames of a more general
property. Topographic mapping restricts the population of cells that can be used to
code for a place or other parameter. The number of different codes is equal to the
total number N of units (neglecting border effects in coarse coding), while an
unrestricted code would have 2N different combinations, but no resistance to noise.
Any random change of the state of one unit would create a different, but still valid
code. In sparse coding only a small proportion of the total number of units is ever on,
but they are drawn randomly from the total population. This leads to lower storage
capacity, but higher resistance to noise. Is there any difference between sparse coding
and use of multiple reference frames? There can be, given an additional assumption.
If coding is preconfigured in the way suggested by McNaughton et al., with
connections between cells based on the distances between their place fields, then each
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cell can have only one place field within each reference frame. Multiple place fields
within the same environment would have to be fields in different frames. The
probability of a cell having two place fields close together should be lower than of the
fields being distant or of finding a field for the same cell in a different environment.
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